John Locke
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John Lockes, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), was first criticized by the philosopher and theologian, John Norris of Bemerton, in his “Cursory Reflections upon a Book Calld, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” and appended to his Christian Blessedness or Discourses upon the Beatitudes (1690). Norriss criticisms of Locke prompted three replies, which were only posthumously published. Locke has been viewed, historically, as the winner of this debate; however, new evidence has emerged which suggests that Norriss argument against the foundation of knowledge in sense-perception that the Essay advocated was a valid and worthy critique, which Locke did, in fact, take rather seriously. Charlotte Johnstons “Lockes Examination of Malebranche and John Norris” (1958), has been widely accepted as conclusively showing that Lockes replies were not philosophical, but rather personal in origin; her essay, however, overlooks critical facts that undermine her subjective analysis of Lockes stance in relation to Norriss criticisms of the Essay. This paper provides those facts, revealing the philosophicalЖnot personalЖimpetus for Lockes replies.
INTRODUCTION
“Lockes Examination of Malebranche and John Norris” (1958), by Charlotte Johnston,1 connects John Lockes posthumously published treatise on the philosophy of Nicolas Malebranche to the replies he had written to an English philosopher and theologian, John Norris of Bemerton. When Locke first published An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690),2 Norris, aided by the philosophy of Malebranche, responded with the first critique of the Essay, entitled “Cursory Reflections upon a Book calld, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” and appended to Norriss Christian Blessedness or Discourses upon the Beatitudes (1690).3 Three texts: “JL to Mr. Norris” (1692), An Examination of P. Malebranches Opinion of Seeing All Things in God (1693),4 and Some Remarks Upon Some of Mr. Norriss Books, wherein he asserts P. Malebranches Opinion of our Seeing all Things in God (1693),5 according to Johnston, were all a direct response to Norris.
Johnstons essay, which has been widely accepted, clearly shows the interrelatedness of the texts; however, her appraisal of them as a response to Norris, incorrectly devalues their philosophical seriousness by overestimating the importance of a personal quarrel between Norris and Locke. She concludes her essay with this summation: “the stimulus for these three papers came directly from Norris, from his criticisms of the newly published Essay, and still more from his personal relationship with Locke”; otherwise, “Lockes opposition to the theory of vision in God would surely have remained unexpressed, since he felt the notion to be sufficiently absurd to die of its own accord.”6 Her emphasis on the personal quarrel over the philosophical debate rests on the assumption that the personal dispute, which occurred in 1692, the same year as Lockes first rebuttal, “JL to Mr. Norris,” prompted that response; her argument, however, neglects evidence that the philosophical debate predates the quarrel, which would indicate that Lockes replies were philosophically rather than personally invested, signifying that Norriss “Cursory Reflections,” presented a potentially serious counter-argument to the empirical epistemology of the Essay.
In 1691, the year following publication, Lockes Essay was defended against Norris by Jean Le Clerc, a friend and correspondent with Locke. He first published this defense in his Bibliotheque universalle et historique 7; it was translated into English, also in 1691, for John Duntons Athenian Gazette.8 Within the same circle of friends was another learned man, Benjamin Furly, who shared with Locke, as LeClerc did, a belief in religious tolerance, which Lockes Essay advocated. LeClerc and Furly clearly alerted Locke to the significance of Norriss “Cursory Reflections.”
In a letter to Locke on October 16, 1690, Furly briefly outlined Norriss criticisms of the Essay.9 A few days later, Le Clerc wrote to Locke, stating that Furly had given him a copy of Norriss critique, which his Bibliotheque would review in defense of the Essay.10 Clearly, Locke was aware that a rebuttal was to be published just months following the May publication of “Cursory Reflections.” Norris, however, was not silenced. In 1692, he published a second edition of Christian Blessedness, and this time, appended to “Cursory Reflections,” was a sharp reply to the Athenian Gazette.11
It is doubtful that Locke owned the first edition of Norriss Christian Blessedness. His library, now housed at the Bodliean at Oxford, contains only the second edition.12 The personal quarrel, which ended the amicable relations between the two, involved the miscarrying of a letter addressed to Locke and entrusted to Norris by the Lady Masham, and began quite late in the year, on October 22, 1692.13 Furthermore, “JL to Mr. Norris,” which is endorsed, “JL Answer to Mr. Norris Reflections 92,” omits reference to the month in which it was written, and we also do not know the month in which the second edition of “Cursory Reflections” appeared; therefore, the chronology of events cannot be conclusively determined.
Nonetheless, there is textual evidence that strongly suggests Norriss second edition was published before Locke wrote “JL to Mr. Norris”: the endorsement seems clearly to refer to the 1692 edition of “Cursory Reflections”; the content of the reply indicates that Locke had a copy of the text in his possession&emdash;again, there is no record that Locke owned a first edition; Furlys brief outline of the reflections cannot account for the details of Lockes reply; and, finally, Locke simply had no reason to reply to Norris before the “Reflections” reappeared in a second edition&emdash;his friends had already defended the Essay.
Neglecting these facts, Johnston relies, instead, on her subjective analysis of Lockes “tone” in his reply, asserting that it shows the reply was instigated by the personal quarrel between the two men: “it seems to have been this personal quarrel rather than Norriss criticism of Lockes philosophy that decided Locke to reply to Norris Reflections,” a reply, she argues that was only “occasioned by the second edition of Norriss Cursory Reflections.” She insists that Lockes “tone” in the letter reflects