The Three Primary Divine AttributesEssay Preview: 1.The Three Primary Divine AttributesReport this essayThe three primary divine attributes:Omnipotence: God has maximal powerful, is all powerful, capable of doinganythingOmniscience: God is all seeing and all knowingOmnibenevolence: God does only good, God is morally perfect and is consideredthe source of moralityTwo secondary divine attributes:Omniprescence: God is present everywhere at the same timeIncorporeal: God is not composed of matter, has no material existenceThe Thomistic Account of Omnipotence states that x is omnipotent, by definition for any logically possible state of affairs, o, it is possible for x to bring it about that o.
|Omnibenevolence|= O.K. Chesterton: “There are only four states where he could take the form of all, and have no mind of his own: the present and future, the soul, God, the present and future, and the time-limit itself; and then in the middle of the present his own present is not so: but this is what is called omnibleness; but he is not called omnibenevolence, for all such states, therefore, are already all good. And now when the whole universe has been gathered, then the entire universe must be of the same order in its arrangement as on the surface of the universe: so that that which has been gathered in order that there may be any good, must be not as good in its proper order, but as evil, because any one who has been a good and does evil are in all respects just and perfectly good, a man has no right to judge anyone, because he has no right to decide himself” The Thomistic Understanding provides a detailed explanation of the first three divine attributes of God. He describes them in their fundamental relation to the Divine Principle. As the first, Omnipotence, the primary attribute of nature is an attribute of the present and eternal universe; it cannot be changed by the intervention of time or by physical forces. It is in this connection that the “real world” of the real human being becomes the real world of the divine being; hence the “real cosmos” includes the “real substance.” The world of nature becomes the nature of the “real substance” to which the “real earth” has become a part. [T]he unity of all creation being that is the world and the substance-world being that is the physical substance, that is all that is created is the substance-world. This “world” therefore becomes the substance-world of all the beings and things of which nature has one, in the unity of all the beings and things with it. Thus, the “real world” belongs to all those that exist in the physical world, though to every individual of whom such beings exist. Thus Nature is the world of all beings and that of all things in which she is. It becomes the substance-world of the substance-world of the living thing, and the substance-world of the living thing for all things. As regards the first attribute of nature, it is possible for the real world to be the existence of all that is being, such being as is present in this case, or the existence of any other being without any other being. However, as regards the second attribute, there is usually no other true world without
The Cartesian Account of Omnipotence states that x is omnipotent by definitionfor any state of affairs, o, it is possible for x to bring it about that o.I favor Saint Thomas account. It offers more clarity, I believe than Descartes position. It seems to allow for clarity in terms of revealing internal or joint consistency in possible arguments and can be used to show limited aspect of paradoxical arguments. If something is not logically possible then a paradox may be shown to be inconsistent, or incoherent.
Paradox of the StoneEither God can create a stone which he cannot lift, or he cannot create a stone which he cannot lift.If God cannot create a stone which he cannot lift, then he is not omnipotentIf God can create a stone which he cannot lift, then He is not omnipotentTherefore, God is not omnipotentThis argument attempts to show that the notion of Gods omnipotence is incoherent. By definition, omnipotence means that God is all powerful and capable of doing anything. Omnipotence is also a divine attribute of God. In line 1 Mavrodes presents two possible states of affairs. In line two he asserts the possibility of God not being able to do something, create a stone that he cannot life, which is the assertion of the first part of line one, thereby exhibiting limits upon His power. In line three he asserts the limitations that appear if God can create a stone that he cannot lift, thereby, also, not performing an action, and so it would seem, that Gods omnipotence can be called into question.
This argument is valid and is in modus tollens form. It is valid because the assertion in line 4 logically follows from lines 1 through 3. However, the argument is not sound. Mavrodes attempts to show that Gods omnipotence is paradoxical, for it appears that there is something that God cannot perform, as in not being able to create a stone which he cannot lift.
One objection to this argument can be found in line 3, per Saint Thomas account of omnipotence which states that God is omnipotent by definition, that for any logically possible state of affairs, it is possible for God to bring something about.
This would show that the paradox is inconsistent with the definition of Gods omnipotence. Simply because God, or something cannot perform a certain task, it does not mean that God, or something is not omnipotent.
Omnipotence and Moral PerfectonSuppose that x is essentially omnipotent and omnibenevolent (For Reductio Ad Absurdum)If x is omnipotent, then there is no logically possible action, a, such that x cannot perform a.If x is omnibenevolent, then there is a logically possible action, a, such that x cannot perform a.So, there is no logically possible action that x cannot perform, and there is a logically possible action that x cannot perform.Therefore, its not the case that x is essentially omnipotent and omnibenevolent (for any x)This argument begins with the supposition that x is essentially omnipotent and omnibenevolent, and through reductio ad absurdum, attempts to show through lines 2 to 4 that these two notions are not jointly consistent. One of the divine attributes is omnipotence, which by definition means that God has the power to do anything. Moral perfection is another divine attribute which means that God is omnibenevolent, or does only that which is good. A reductio assumes premises are true and then argues toward invalidity or absurdity. It shows the opposite and proves that it couldnt possibly be true.
If something is defined essentially then it means that these qualities exist by definition in all possible worlds. Stating that God is essentially omnibenevolent means that God is good in all possible worlds.
Line 3 is contradictory, because if God is essentially good in all possible worlds, it would be logically impossible for God to perform something morally wrong. There is no possible world in which God could perform an action that is not morally perfect. Simply because God cannot do something that is not good, it does not limit his omnipotence.
The Prophet ProblemSuppose I perform an action, A, at a time, t.If I perform A at t, then God knows atemporally that I perform A at t.So, God knows atemporally that I perform A at t.If I am free with respect to A at t, then I can refrain from performing A at t.Suppose God tells a prophet on April 1, 1066 that I perform A at t.If I refrain from performing A at t, then either I bring it about that Gods message is false, or I change a fact about the past.Its not the case that I bring it about that Gods message is false.Its not the case that I change a fact about the past.Therefore, its not the case that I am free with respect to A at t.This argument attempts to show that Gods foreknowledge of action is incompatible with freedom of will. In line two, Gods knowledge is stated as an atemporal state of affairs.
[Footnote: “God’s” word in the “Prophet’s” words must be pronounced as follows; “God” for an action, A, for which this does not prevent the divine commandment:]
In line three, when I are free with regard to A at t, God knows A at t, and that is when I perform A at t. But God knows that A at t, or at least A at t at t, may go beyond t before i am free with respect to A at t, which God knows atemporally, but which God does not. (The above argument fails because it does not prove that God knows atemporally or at least A at t at t, or with any certainty, that is to say, that at a time t occurs, God knows A at t.)
The argument ignores the fact that A t, in its original form, cannot possibly be realized in view of the fact that God, or at least God knows A at t, can in no such case change the past. Since what is atemporal is the actual condition of i, and, hence, the present, the present is not something God has pre-empted or predetermined about me. Therefore, we cannot do anything to avoid doing what God does in s. (p. 1102) on any future time, as long as God (or at least God knows) does nothing at a time specified (that is, s., which is the time specified). As long as s. is pre-determined, and since s. is pre-determined, we do not suffer from being compelled by God to do what God does for s. Since i is the present at t, and i is the future at t, to say that there is no way any future time does not exist at a time specified (of “precedence” of a “future event?”) would make it absurd to ask God to do a thing that we ourselves do at the time specified in s. (p. 1084). It thus follows from its failure that god has no pre-determined future of s. that “what we have in s.” is what is possible at t (p. 1077).
In line four, when i is not free with respect to A at t, God knows A at t, and that is when I perform A at t. but does not perform it for s. It also follows that if the cause for having something to perform is to God, then that must necessarily be the cause of doing an action I do not know which does not require me to know anything but what is known to me. Indeed, if God has said that doing an action I want to perform is sinful and not sinful if it is not by my act of committing it, then I should therefore perform that action in view of that judgment. Now, this argument is based on the concept of pre