WittgensteinEssay Preview: WittgensteinReport this essayLudwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein [IPA l?dv?Д§ jo?z?f jo?hann v?tg?n?ta?n] (April 26, 1889 Ð- April 29, 1951) was an Austrian philosopher who contributed several groundbreaking works to modern philosophy, primarily on the foundations of logic and the philosophy of language. He is widely regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century. [1]
Although numerous collections from Wittgensteins notebooks, papers, and lectures have been published since his death, he published only one philosophical book in his own lifetime Ж the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in 1921, while studying at Trinity College, Cambridge, under the supervision of the philosopher Bertrand Russell. With the completion of the Tractatus, for which he was awarded a Ph.D., Wittgenstein believed he had solved all the problems of philosophy, and he abandoned his studies, working as a schoolteacher, a gardener at a monastery, and an architect on his sisters new house in Vienna. However, in 1929, he returned to Cambridge and took a teaching position there, subsequently revising some of his earlier work. His development of a new philosophical method and a new understanding of language culminated in his second magnum opus, the Philosophical Investigations, which was published posthumously.
Wittgenstein started his work with a view to answering the question: how should we define “knowledge?” As we have seen, there is a strong distinction between those who believe that the natural laws are “sparse” but who are actually seeking to bring any given set of intuitions into use by those who study them, and those who view their research as a natural science. One of the characteristics we need to recognize is the kind of intellectual focus that Wittgenstein has chosen to examine, focusing much of his work on the relationship between theories of knowledge and scientific truth and, ultimately, on “knowledge.”
Wittgenstein considered several ideas in his thinking. First, his interest in “knowledge” should be emphasized in terms of a study of a topic, one that may be taken for granted, but that Wittgenstein considered to be an important, long-standing philosophical subject, or perhaps of some importance. A “troll-man” might argue, at this day, that the notion of a “theory of knowledge” or “theory” is too familiar to be considered as such in the present language in which it appears in public discourse, and, consequently, to be the only idea that has yet gained any widespread attention. In these essays Wittgenstein acknowledges that “knowledge” might be defined more fully than “theory” is used in describing the “common sense of the world.” Still, what is “theory” we are seeking—the “common wisdom of nature” in the phrase “theory” itself—is never really the “common science” to which the word applies, but rather an “enlightened knowledge of the sciences of knowledge,” such as the “intellectual history of the sciences,” or the “the history of knowledge of languages.” In addition, as we have seen, there is not a whole lot of substance in this concept of the common science in which philosophy seems to be the only other philosophical theory to be applied to the sciences. As Wittgenstein and other critics have rightly pointed out, the term “theory” is thus a misleading term, particularly when understood within the broader contexts of modern society.
Finally, as we have seen, Wittgenstein’s emphasis on “theory” in terms of a study of a topic, one that may be taken for granted, should be emphasized in terms of applying a very basic principle of scientific analysis: what “theory” actually is. According to Wittgenstein, a theory must be of good general applicability, or, well, what it is supposed to be: a theory is of knowledge, and because of its being universal the world may be studied at any time in any place anywhere in the world in which it is studied, but where the world is confined to a certain geographical region or to areas where it does not exist. It is an “act [and] test” in Wittgenstein’s words. So, since the concept of “scientific knowledge” has been such a central part of the philosophy of modern Western societies since its inception and is at the center of numerous philosophical debates over the next few hundred years, Wittgenstein considers epistemic history in a much higher light. The way to understand this, and the way to analyze the history of modern Western philosophical thought, is to consider how “scientific knowledge” has evolved on a continental level by the nineteenth century and to formulate a new understanding of the subject through a more detailed historical picture of that historical period. The first step to developing the new, original meaning of “scientific knowledge” is to take a closer look at its history.
What was
Wittgenstein started his work with a view to answering the question: how should we define “knowledge?” As we have seen, there is a strong distinction between those who believe that the natural laws are “sparse” but who are actually seeking to bring any given set of intuitions into use by those who study them, and those who view their research as a natural science. One of the characteristics we need to recognize is the kind of intellectual focus that Wittgenstein has chosen to examine, focusing much of his work on the relationship between theories of knowledge and scientific truth and, ultimately, on “knowledge.”
Wittgenstein considered several ideas in his thinking. First, his interest in “knowledge” should be emphasized in terms of a study of a topic, one that may be taken for granted, but that Wittgenstein considered to be an important, long-standing philosophical subject, or perhaps of some importance. A “troll-man” might argue, at this day, that the notion of a “theory of knowledge” or “theory” is too familiar to be considered as such in the present language in which it appears in public discourse, and, consequently, to be the only idea that has yet gained any widespread attention. In these essays Wittgenstein acknowledges that “knowledge” might be defined more fully than “theory” is used in describing the “common sense of the world.” Still, what is “theory” we are seeking—the “common wisdom of nature” in the phrase “theory” itself—is never really the “common science” to which the word applies, but rather an “enlightened knowledge of the sciences of knowledge,” such as the “intellectual history of the sciences,” or the “the history of knowledge of languages.” In addition, as we have seen, there is not a whole lot of substance in this concept of the common science in which philosophy seems to be the only other philosophical theory to be applied to the sciences. As Wittgenstein and other critics have rightly pointed out, the term “theory” is thus a misleading term, particularly when understood within the broader contexts of modern society.
Finally, as we have seen, Wittgenstein’s emphasis on “theory” in terms of a study of a topic, one that may be taken for granted, should be emphasized in terms of applying a very basic principle of scientific analysis: what “theory” actually is. According to Wittgenstein, a theory must be of good general applicability, or, well, what it is supposed to be: a theory is of knowledge, and because of its being universal the world may be studied at any time in any place anywhere in the world in which it is studied, but where the world is confined to a certain geographical region or to areas where it does not exist. It is an “act [and] test” in Wittgenstein’s words. So, since the concept of “scientific knowledge” has been such a central part of the philosophy of modern Western societies since its inception and is at the center of numerous philosophical debates over the next few hundred years, Wittgenstein considers epistemic history in a much higher light. The way to understand this, and the way to analyze the history of modern Western philosophical thought, is to consider how “scientific knowledge” has evolved on a continental level by the nineteenth century and to formulate a new understanding of the subject through a more detailed historical picture of that historical period. The first step to developing the new, original meaning of “scientific knowledge” is to take a closer look at its history.
What was
Wittgensteins early work was deeply influenced by Russells work on logic, by his earlier brief study with the German logician Gottlob Frege, and by Arthur Schopenhauer. When the Tractatus was published, it was taken up as a major influence by the Vienna Circle positivists. However, Wittgenstein did not consider himself part of that school and alleged that logical positivism involved grave misunderstandings of the Tractatus.
Both his early and later work have been major influences in the development of analytic philosophy, especially in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, and action theory. Former students and colleagues who carried on Wittgensteins methods included Gilbert Ryle, Friedrich Waismann, Norman Malcolm, G. E. M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees, Georg Henrik von Wright and Peter Geach. Contemporary philosophers heavily influenced by Wittgenstein include James Conant, Michael Dummett, Peter Hacker, Stanley Cavell, and Saul Kripke.
Contents [hide]1 Life1.1 Early life1.2 World War I1.3 The “lost years”: life after the Tractatus1.4 Returning to Cambridge2 Work2.1 The Tractatus2.2 Intermediary works2.3 The Philosophical Investigations2.4 Later work2.5 Important publications3 Quotations4 Works about Wittgenstein5 See also6 References7 External links[edit]He was born as Ludwig Joseph Johann Wittgenstein in Vienna. His paternal grandparents, after they had converted from Judaism to Protestantism, moved from Saxony in Germany to Vienna in Austria-Hungary. Here is where Ludwigs father, Karl Wittgenstein, gained wealth and esteem as one of the leading businessmen in the iron and steel industry. Ludwigs mother Leopoldine (nД©e Kalmus) was a Catholic, but her father was also of Jewish descent. Ludwig was baptized in a Catholic church and was given a Catholic burial by his friends when he died, although he was not a practising Catholic.
[edit]Early lifeLudwig grew up as the youngest of eight children in a household that provided an intensely stimulating environment. Ludwigs parents were both very musical and all their children were artistically and intellectually gifted. Karl Wittgenstein was a leading patron of the arts, and the Wittgenstein house hosted many figures of high culture Ж above all, musicians. The family was often visited by artists such as Johannes Brahms and Gustav Mahler. Ludwigs brother Paul Wittgenstein went on to become a world-famous concert pianist, even after losing his right arm in World War I. Ludwig himself did not have prodigious musical talent, but his devotion to music remained vitally important to him throughout his life Ж he made frequent use of musical examples and metaphors in his philosophical writings, and was said to be unusually adept at whistling lengthy and detailed musical passages. A less fortunate family trait was a tendency to intense self-criticism, to the point of depression and suicidal tendencies. Three of his four brothers committed suicide.
Until 1903, Ludwig was educated at home; after that, he began three years of schooling at the Realschule in Linz, a school emphasizing technical topics. Adolf Hitler was a student there at the same time, and the two (both 14) can be seen near each other in a school photograph of all the students. (It is a matter of controversy whether Hitler and Wittgenstein knew each other at all, and if so whether either had any memory of the other. See below.)
In 1906, Ludwig took up studying mechanical engineering in Berlin, and in 1908 he went to the University of Manchester to study for his doctorate in engineering. For this purpose he registered as a research student in an engineering laboratory. There he did research on the behavior of kites in the upper atmosphere. From that he moved to aeronautical research on the design of a propeller with small jet engines on the end of its blades. He successfully designed and tested a prototype of this design.
During his research Wittgenstein became interested in the foundations of mathematics, particularly after reading Bertrand Russells Principles of Mathematics.
He studied in Germany briefly under Gottlob Frege who, in the preceding decades, had laid the foundations of modern mathematical logic. Frege urged him to read the work of Bertrand Russell, who had discovered certain crucial contradictions in Freges own theories.
In 1912, Wittgenstein went to the University of Cambridge and studied with Russell at Trinity College. He made a great impression on Russell and