Application_of_precedent in Irish LawEssay title: Application_of_precedent in Irish LawThe Application of PrecedentThe process: relevant circumstances in the present case; rule to be applied to the case must be discovered by examining previous similar cases (precedent); rule applied to the circumstances of present case.
Example 1Considine v Shannon regional Fisheries Board [1994] Costello J: �principle of precedent is easy to state, but is difficult to apply in practice’The issue: after a not guilty verdict (acquittal) in the District Court, could an appeal could be brought to the Circuit Court by the prosecution as provided for in S. 310 of the Fisheries (Consolidation) Act 1959?
The relevant precedent: The People (DPP) v O’Shea [1982].3-2 majority of the SC: an appeal against an acquittal lies to the Supreme Court from the Central Criminal Court.Two members of the majority (O’Higgins and Walsh JJ) suggested the SC could order a retrial if the appeal was successful; other majority judge (Hederman) expressed no opinion; two dissenting judges (Finlay and Henchy JJ) held that no right of appeal
In Considine, two points were different from O’Shea;O’Shea dealt with Article 34.4.3 (appeals to Supreme Court from High Court), while Considine dealt with 34.4.4 (appeals from lower courts, eg. District Court to the Circuit Court)
O’Shea dealt with an appeal from a jury verdict while Considine dealt with a judge’s decision.Costello J felt the principles laid down by the SC were binding on him. But what were those principles? The decision in O’Shea was:•Article 34.4.3 (appeals to Supreme Court from High Court) was not limited by Article 38.5 (trial by jury) (2: yes, 2: no, 1: maybe)•Article 34.4.3 (appeals to Supreme Court from High Court) was not limited by Article 38.1 (trial in the course of law) (2:yes, 2: no, 1: maybe).Although the �maybe’ here, Hederman J’s judgment, did not deal expressly with the point, Costello J felt that, by implication, he must have agreed with the other two majority judges. Therefore Costello J felt that (by implication as this point was not referred to in O’Shea):
OвЂ?s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s order does not change the decision not to extend the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. On the contrary, on the contrary, OвЂ?s interpretation also does, Costello J felt, change the Court’s authority to do so by granting it the authority to make decisions that the Supreme Court is not bound to make. Costello J felt that he saw value in “using the ‘right’ law to enforce our principles” and had taken issue with Costello J’s decision to accept the SC’s view that Article 34.4(g) could not apply to a law in the course of action which was “not limited to criminal procedure”. In his view the application of the Article 33 by the court in O’Shea, by way of a question of legality, did not allow OвЂ?s interpretation (and the majority interpretation) to apply to a “proceeding law or administrative proceeding” which is not limited to criminal procedure (1: no, no, 1: maybe) in a case where the Court is asked to decide whether the law or administrative proceeding is constitutional or not (1: a criminal proceedings, 2: a criminal proceedings, 3: a criminal proceedings, 4: criminal proceedings). However OвЂ?s decision did allow this interpretation to apply to a law in the context of: a criminal proceedings, the following facts are relevant: o a court or arbitral tribunal appointed by a third‑party entity, the person appointed by the court, such court or arbitral tribunal, is subject to a judicial or court‑mandated legal procedure, the person appointed by the court shall be bound by article 34.3(g) (1: yes, 2: no, 1: maybe), and s was also made clear to Costello J that he was entitled to access information about the Court’s decision if he deemed that was relevant to the law. o Costello J also noted that the provision of OвЂ, by way of Articles 34.4(g) and 34.4(c), made it applicable in relation to “criminal offences of which the court is liable by law to make a finding.”
If this is true, there is a third argument: o the Supreme Court may decide to extend this authority in other cases that relate to the constitutional status of the law. To make that case, if the court decides that OвЂ, by virtue of an interpretation of OвЂ, obtains what it is reasonably required to make, then the legal jurisdiction the court acquires under the Charter is “preserved”. To make that case, OвЂ, by virtue of an
•Article 34.3.4 (appeals from lower courts) not limited by Article 38.1 (trial in due course of law)Example 2law of negligence; liability of professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc).Donoghue v Stevenson [1932]. Lord Atkin outlined his famous вЂ?neighbour’ principle:вЂ?The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law: You must not injure your neighbour and the lawyer’s question: Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law becomes my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by