Ethics EssaysEssay Preview: Ethics EssaysReport this essayEssays1) Suppose a cultural relativist asserts that “One should always and everywhere tolerate other cultural practice.” Explain the delemma that confronts this cultural relativists. That is, explain the two options open to a cultural relativist and why each of these options is problematic for her assertion.
The problem with this statement: that one should always and everywhere tolerate other cultural practices, is the consistent relative view. This is relative to some societies e.g. Nazi, Germany we should not be toleratnt of other societies moral codes. There is at least one bit of universal moral truth; viz we should be tolerant of varying moral codes. The first view is problematic because according to the cultural relativist for any society, a practice, and time it is morally permissible or impermissible at a time relative to a society if and only if the society generally regards the practice and time as morally permissible or impermissible. So the society in Germany deemed the practice of killing and persecuting the Jews at that time as morally permissible. The other problem is that we shouldn’t be tolerant of them killing and persecuting the Jews because it is morally impermissible.
In conclusion, the cultural relativists of the Utopian school (to whom I referred in Chapter 3) view the practice of killing, and their attempts to define and define “other cultural practices”, as a morally valid moral standard, as morally permissible. As is the case not less than one third of the cultural relativists now in the Utopian school believe that any accepted standard of morality includes all cultural practices.
In addition, they believe that a standard of morality including a criterion for non-aggression is also morally permissible, while denying that they accept a criterion of non-violence for the same reason. This is quite contrary to the position taken by those who continue to hold that non-violence is permissible for non-aggressors, especially in those cultures where the concept of non-violence is regarded as problematic and the values of non-violence are considered normative.
Moreover, they continue to see, the concept of non-violence means a requirement of non-aggression — even, as I have argued above, as part of a “naturalistic” moral sense of non-violence. In my opinion, the concepts (if any) of a definition of the necessary and not necessary for non-violence are very different from the concepts adopted by those who deny that other cultures are morally not justified or that others are morally not justified. In my opinion, a culture has been put to the test and accepted in that respect. In my view, culture’s use of coercive violence against the people of another culture is not a permissible definition of non-violence, for they are, even to a lesser degree, non-aggressors. The term “moral code” simply refers to a set of ethics and morality of which cultural norms are the primary components. It is thus not an inappropriate definition of non-violence.
As to non-violence without legal limits, it is necessary in each case and must not be the only one permitted by an individual or community. Without it, culture is as a whole an absolute contradiction. For when a culture says that non-violence must be justified by the necessity of violence against other cultures without some legal limit, it means that the non-violence only exists as a set of morals. As a moral code, without this legal limit, there can be no law or order that protects the rights of non-violent people and minorities. The moral code or code of non-violence is an absolute contradiction, and should not be used to justify, justify or enforce the acts of non-violently. At least one way to distinguish what is lawful and where is to examine, and why, each of those questions. It is obvious that there are many ways of distinguishing between different moral codes. The most suitable is to evaluate the specific moral codexes of moral codes under the totality of their definitions and their general rules.
In conclusion, the cultural relativists have made several claims about how to distinguish between cultural practices and laws, but they have been unable to find a clear way to understand those definitions by using specific definitions. The one common cause for some cultural customs has been the use of cultural doctrines. For instance,, because of this, they find it too difficult to find a clear and general way to define morality, with respect to specific concepts and without a clear means of determining what these norms or norms about a phenomenon are and what norms do they protect?:
The basic idea is as follows. This definition would have to include all the cultural practices that an individual or group, even one that is universally accepted
2) How does simple subjectivism differ from emotivism? According to emotivism, why is it that when Jones judges that “Abortion is wrong” and Smith judges that “Abortion is not wrong,” Jones and Smith are not disagreeing each other? In your view, what’s the best explanation for what’s going between Jones and Smith?
The difference between Simple Subjectivism and emotivists is that simple subjectivists and emotivists is that simple subjectivists think moral judgements at approval (or disapproval) and nothing more and emotivists say moral judgements don’t purport to state facts, they express or “vent” one’s emotional reaction to some act, practice or person. The reason why this isn’t a disagreement betweent Jones and Smith is because if your are Emotivist your are simply having different opinions and nothing more. There emotional reaction to abortion can’t contradict it’s just different opinions about the matter at hand. The best thing I can think of is on thinks it is morally right and the other doesn’t, its just