Why the Allies WonOvery, R. 1995. Why the Allies Won. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.World War II is often seen as a battle between good and evil, where good naturally triumphed. The reasons for the victory of the western powers were not so simple. Richard Overy draws aside the illusions of the common view of the victory, exposing the alliance as a necessity of national self-interest. To begin with, the west allied with the Soviet Union, a dictatorship, and before 1941, the Soviet Union was harshly criticized. Between the U.S., Soviet Union, and Britain, the Allies did outnumber and out produce the Axis powers, but numbers do not indicate quality of weapons, skill of the military, or the access to and limits on resources on each side. The war did not make the world safe for democracy as much as it made it safe for communism, building on the power base of the Soviet Union, and the spread of communism in Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union was critical in securing the defeat of Germany, so for the large part, earned its freedom from interference by the west.
Overy goes on to examine the reasons for the failure of the Axis to win early in the war when they were ahead in resources and training. Contributing causes to Allied victory were numerous, and included the ability of the Soviets to output tanks with comparatively few resources; the failure of Japan to obtain oil resources; the bombing of European countries on both sides; the different levels of technology in each country as the war progressed; the damages of Great War of 1914-1918 including a depression Russia, political extremism, and the constantly changing imbalance of power between the European states. Overy’s thesis is that there were many factors that explain the Allied victory, from the psychology of anti-Hitlerism, to technology, military leadership, and morality, and that the deaths of at least 55 million people, and the prevention of the same level of slaughter recurring, require a well-defined and accurate examination and accounting of the true reasons for Allied triumph; “’why the Allies won’ is done… in the spirit of genuine inquiry, in order to be precise about the explanations that matter, and may matter once again in the century to come” (24)
The contest for control of the oceans by naval sea and air power illustrates the combination of psychology and technology that boosted the Allies’ chances of winning the war. By August 1941, the German armies had made large inroads into Russia. Japan had moved into French Indo-China, and was casting its sights on the south-east Asia and the southern Pacific. Britain had lost some 2000 ships, and the U.S. was committed to aid in the war through supply and rearmament. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter, a statement of hopes, and an unbinding solidarity. At this point, the U.S. was a non-combatant, expecting to remain so. But on December 7, 1941, Japan
in a Japanese submarine with the intent of stealing U.S. weapons. The next day, on the 12th, when the Japanese warships were about to reach the Philippines, FDR and the Japanese minister of military affairs gave a speech in which they denounced the Americans for their actions. A British official called the statement “the only blow to peace by the Japanese in this war.” On that day the United Nations called for unconditional recognition by Japan.
The Japanese held a series of meetings in Washington, D.C., and, on December 17, 1941, when the White House announced that American Navy fleet and military personnel should go to New York, they held a joint press conference in the National Zoo. But this was a short period of a peace agreement. There was no peace agreement; Japan had already lost an overwhelming amount of ships. The United States had been unable to make significant contributions to the war effort and the new American naval force had not prepared the necessary equipment to be used the next day. If the United States did not come to terms on the terms, Japan would be forced to withdraw from the islands by the end of 1942. The Japanese military wanted American surrender.
The United Nations was going to make a deal with the Japanese military on the status of all American warships, of the Japanese submarine vessels being sent to Japan: “the final payment of which on December 20 shall be as follows: • that America, who has suffered the world war against the Japanese Navy and naval forces, shall accept, either in return or in whole or in part, unconditional surrender and be prepared to receive any compensation which may hereafter be due or payable to Japan, to prevent any warlike acts or any war which may be caused for or by the United States and which may render it impossible for Japan to obtain a peaceful peace and to prevent any calamity.” The United States should agree to pay a sum for the Japanese submarines to give the United States the naval forces necessary to carry out the agreement. The terms of the surrender of Japan were to be agreed at Washington on the following day when the Japanese warships were to reach their bases. The Japanese ships were to be placed on the right deck of the U.S.S. Cole at Pearl Harbor.
U. S.S. Roosevelt and other U.S. presidential aides had decided against this idea. They feared that if the British and American ships left Pearl Harbor, the United States might decide that it had got too close to China and would not have an army or navy. They feared that the Japanese military was prepared simply to destroy the Americans. Roosevelt had been advised of the American military plan and he had told them the Japanese military was ready to go