Aristotle’s Moral Theory
Aristotle’s Moral Theory
In this paper, I will examine Aristotles understanding of virtue and his explanation of virtuous actions as presented in Nicomachean Ethics. In Book II of the work, Aristotle distinguishes between moral virtues, which are learned through habit and practice, and intellectual virtues, which are learned through instruction. However, it is not until later in Book II that Aristotle actually defines virtue. He opens Chapter 5 with, “Next we must consider what virtue is” (35) and at its end asserts that virtue is a state of character. Therefore, the conclusion of the whole argument is: Virtue is a state of character.
Aristotle first makes the following argument regarding the meaning of virtue: 1) There are only three kinds of things found in the soul: “passions, faculties, [and] states of character” (35); and 2) Virtue is a kind of thing found in the soul. Therefore, virtue is a passion, a faculty, or a state of character.
Having established that virtue is a passion, a faculty, or a state of character, Aristotle proceeds to make additional arguments to show that virtue is neither a passion nor a faculty. The first of the supplementary arguments are as follows: 1) “We are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions” (36); and 2) We are called good or bad on account of our virtues. Also, Aristotle adds that “we feel anger and fear [passions] without choice,” (36) but that acts of virtue do require choice. Therefore, virtue is not a passion. When arguing that virtue is not a faculty, Aristotle claims that “we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised or blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions” (36). From this one can deduce that we ARE called good or bad, praised or blamed, for our virtue. In the second argument of the paragraph, Aristotle asserts that “we have the faculties by nature”; (36) however, “we are not made good or bad by nature,” (36) and because of these differing characteristics, virtue is not a faculty.
Once Aristotle has shown that virtue is neither a passion