Nora-Sakari Case StudyBackgroundNora Holdings (Nora) and Sakari Oy (Sakari) are attempting to establish a joint-venture (JV) company. The JV Company would be set up in Malaysia to manufacture and commission digital switching exchanges to meet the needs of the telecom industry in Malaysia and in neighboring countries, particularly Indonesia and Tailand (Bhagat, Kashlak, & Phatak, 2009). Nora and Sakariās main objectives are complimentary, which at first glance, appear to be a picture perfect partnership. Nora is seeking to secure a share of the RM2 billion contract from Telekom Malaysia Bhd (TMB) and consequently acquire knowledge in switching technology (from its partnership with a telecom multinational corporation) and replicate the telecom technology/modular in the Malaysian market. Sakariās primary objective is to use the JV as a āhubā to gain access into other markets, specifically the Asia-Pacific region.
Case IssuesThere are several underlying issues in this case that hindered Nora and Sakari from finalizing negotiations. One obvious issue is the lack of understanding of each otherās country and cultural differences. This was exhibited by Zainal approaching the Sakari negotiations the same way had he with companies based in North America or the United Kingdom (Bhagat, 2009). Communication suffered because Sakari negotiators communication styles (verbal and nonverbal) were much different than he was used to, which made it quite difficult for him to determine if the Sakari team had a genuine interest in establishing the JV. Second, Nora had a contractual obligation to TMB that is requiring them to provide the switching technology. However, they have yet to secure a partner that could supply such technology and enable them to comply with TMB contract. A third and equally important issue is the internal politics within Sakari that led to the formation of two opposing ācampsā
. This creates a risk for both parties and further complicates the process. For the purposes of this discussion, we will focus squarely on the internal politics of Sakari negotiations, a situation that has been exacerbated by the presence of the political pressures and pressure from the international community, including the United States. We expect a resolution to these problems in an almost immediate manner.In her opening remarks, Nora described her negotiation with Sakari. She described how she and her team met in the US to present her proposal to a United Nations panel. [1] That discussion led to two meetings with the United States delegation and a decision on a resolution to the conflict. In the end, the United States decision to reach an agreement, rather than an agreement that could have been reached without it, was the deciding factor. [2] On June 7, 2006, Sakari issued the following statement on the JV contract: [3] In my view, the JV as a whole, and indeed any other JV contract, should be a commitment to a greater end and not a concession or a concession of convenience for the international community to pursue more complex, yet non-traditional, matters. I believe that JVP has a valid and practical purpose insofar as to help improve international humanitarian affairs. As for the JV’s role in the creation of conflict, I believe that most of its work has been devoted to its provision for the purposes suggested by Dr. Dr. Muratov. These are not activities that can be categorized as actions of any particular party with specific intentions (whether they be humanitarian matters or diplomatic work) ā and cannot be classified as political or military. The JV’s main role is to assist foreign authorities and non-governmental organizations. The JV is not a partisan political organization. It does not have to be a private interest group ā but a government-supported NGO that delivers the necessary services. The JV is not necessarily a representative of the United States or its Government. The purpose of any organization is to assist the interests of the community and to serve the interests of the peopleā not a political decision ā (Rosenstein, 2009, p. 25)āand to provide humanitarian aid.
7 JV Contract and Foreign Disaster Response The JV Contract was entered into as a government-sponsored NGO with a non-partisan structure (see below). In practice, the JV worked for a number of organizations including the World Relief Organization, and was an umbrella umbrella organization for other humanitarian organizations across the world (Wrijtensky, 2008). In the USA, the JV’s role was expanded to include a foreign-aid component. It provided a support team to aid the countries impacted by disasters such as famines. In 2011, the USA announced a pilot contract with the JV to help distribute more than 2 million tons of aid to affected nations. The JV provided that the country would not contract with the United Nations as a subcontractor (JWP). In 2011, the United States entered into a five-year contract with the JV that included a $1 billion loan, paid in cash, to cover expenses associated with developing a new JV helicopter aircraft. These funds also would provide up to $800,000 of emergency assistance. In 2012, the USA began to provide $700,000 to the JV in support of the JV, and to train the JV leadership for more direct training programs that would help to address climate change and other problems in the area. In 2014, the USA announced that it was going to spend $5 billion of additional funding to help with disaster relief work in Asia. The JV does not receive any government subsidies. In November 2014, the USA entered into a multi-year contract with the JV to help the JV carry out its mission