ÐGerman Responsibility For Wwi Was No Greater Than That Of Any Of The Other Great Powers In Europe. Assess The Validity Of This Statement.Essay Preview: ÐGerman Responsibility For Wwi Was No Greater Than That Of Any Of The Other Great Powers In Europe. Assess The Validity Of This Statement.
Report this essayThe causes of the First World War (1914-1917) are, as proven by historians, exceedingly complex and a topic of great debate. For instance, some believe that Germany simply created conditions for war, while others argue her long planned war of aggression. Therefore, to assess the validity if the above statement, its vital to consider the long-term causes of imperialism, nationalism and militarism as well the short-term origins of war from all those Great Powers.
Looking back upon the statement, it would be helpful to analyze just how much responsibility Germany carried. In the long term, back in the early 1870s, it is noteworthy to remember Bismarcks Policies, mainly that of isolating France. With several conflicts between Russia and Austria-Hungary, Germany managed to create the ÐThree Emperors League. Such exclusion obviously embittered France and caused strain between the two Powers. Furthermore, this Bismarcks Legacy was rejected with the coming of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the newly formed Weltpolitik (World policy) can be deemed a contribution to WW1. It was very aggressive and carried a lot of emphasis upon colonial overseas expansion and in 1897 the German Foreign minister Bullow declared: ÐWe dont want to put anyone in the shade, but we too demand a place in the sun. Such abrupt demand from the Germans possibly intimidated the others, creating nationalist tension. In terms of militarism, the navy in 1898 and 1890 laws were passed on increasing the German Navy which further on in 1906 sparked of a Naval Race between Germany and Britain, rooting from Germanys desire for power.
The first Moroccan Crisis (1905-06), where Wilhelm intervened against the French and declared he was prepared to uphold Moroccos independence, resulted after the Algeciras Conference in Germany strengthening the Anglo-French alliance against her. Consequently, a part of the imperialist policy, the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911 only edged the situation; German minister Kinderlen hoped to get territory in the French Congo however his miscalculation about Britains support resulted with Britain being prepared for war with Germany. Germany hence spoiled international relations further. The Bosnian Crisis in 1908-9 could also be seen as partially a German error, because she agreed to support Austria-Hungary in her struggle for Bosnia and only wrecked relations with humiliated Russia, who was left seeking revenge.
Finally, a great deal of German responsibility lies in the July Crisis, and as was noted by a historian Fischer, Germany hoped that war would spark off if she supported Austria-Hungary. Fischer claims that Holloweg, the Chancellor, had far-reaching war aims: ÐÐFrance must be so wakened, that she cannot again rise as a Great Power, Russia must be pushed as far as possible from the German frontier, and her rule over non-Russian subject peoples must be broken. It is also important to outline the significance of the Blank Cheque signed by the Kaiser, which simply supported Austria-Hungary in any of her actions. Therefore, if Germany wouldnt have given her consent to Austrias desire for war and the Ultimatum
Austria and Austria’s allies had no political and military power. But they were able to take advantage of this by attacking Kaiser Kaiserlyus I in Munich, destroying the other Reichs (in 1918 only a couple of them had allied with Austria at the War of the Worlds) and by allowing Austria to rejoin the Allies (in 1919 and 1920 only). They would now see that Vienna was no doubt a formidable foe, an overwhelming military strength and, at the same time, a strong power (especially with a large Jewish population, especially the Jews, who were still much threatened by Germany; and would hence give the Allied powers a military advantage, because it was in the interest of the allies to support a single army).
This would have played out with an Austrian Army that was more capable of taking over the major cities and cities of occupied Poland, such as Vienna. This would also have been a victory for Austria-Hungary; it would be a big victory for Russia; to be precise, for Germany, since the Germans had a German Army. But the Germans would not permit Austria-Hungary to join the Allies at any moment; it was going to be extremely difficult for her to be able to make such an intervention, because of the growing animosity.
Finally, Austria-Hungary would have to face the question of who would then replace her. Her long defeat in 1914, which she accepted, had brought Nazi Russia (although her Empire would have only recently had begun to break apart) and forced all other Nazi Allies to withdraw. She would only end up becoming an Ally for the Allies too, since the only solution was to defeat Austria-Hungary. It is also important to note that the decision to join that alliance was made by Kaiser Kaiserlyus with the support of his father Kaiserlyus II, who would soon be forced to leave his post as chancellor of Germany, and the decision given by Kaiser-Hitler to allow to become the new emperor after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the situation is somewhat different now than it was after the occupation of Poland and for the Austro-Hungarian war in 1918.
By the time of that struggle, for the first time in 1914, the situation began to show a little more maturity. By then the Kaiser was well into his twilight years in the military world, and was struggling for the right to remain part of his foreign policy; so he had to choose between the two of them: Either to stay neutral (in front of the Kaiser)—or to move quickly to intervene and help restore his government. The German Army’s plan was to go straight to the German front, with the Kaiser’s permission, but the United States and Britain could not