Ussr Colapse
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From the end of the Second World War until 1991, the longest war of the twentieth century occurred. The Cold War was roughly a forty year old stalemate between the two super powers of the world the west the United States versus the east the Soviet Union. The website At Cold Wars End: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1991 contains declassified CIA documents that focus on these important years in which the Soviet Union collapsed between 1989-1991. The site discusses the end of the conflict coming in three acts between 1989-1991. First of all the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev seemed pressed to let the U.S. know that the Soviets were willing to compromise. He had cut back on the arms race, removed troops from Afghanistan, and committed himself to greatly reducing Soviet ground forces. The second act began in late 1989 with the acceleration of peaceful revolutions Central and Eastern Europe. This subsequently brought on the weakening of the Soviet Union by losing its outer shell. The third act brought things to an end in 19991 with the complete dissolution of the USSR the resistance
that occurred in the outer republics began to spread to the inner ones as well; they too began to seek independence from Moscow. The economy was also beginning to take a dive, which discredited Gorbachev in the process. This eventually led to the end of the Soviet Union on December 31, 1991. Thus their hold on Eastern Europe and the Cold War were finally over.
Beginning in 1991 President Bush took over the United States and wanted to follow Reagans lead to make U.S.-Soviet relations the mainstay of his foreign policy plan. After a study of the new attitude of Gorbachev and the new USSR Bushs advisors became split between those who wanted immediate contact with Gorbachev and those who were suspicious of his new ideas.
These new ideas began in the late 1980s in 1987 Gorbachev signed a U.S. Soviet Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range-Missiles the first nuclear reduction accord in history. In 1988 he also said he would begin to remove Soviet forces from Afghanistan. In their analysis of this in Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 11/37-88, March 1988, USSR: Withdrawal from Afghanistan U.S. intelligence believed that the Soviets would withdraw under the cover of the Geneva accords. They also believed that the US would withdraw to improve its popularity among its allies as well as to improve situations in the west
Later in Dec. 1988 Gorbachev addressed the United Nations. In which he renounced class welfare as the focus of Soviet foreign policy and spoke of “pan-humanist values” and “global interdependence” . He claimed he was willing to work with the U.S. to end the arms race. He also vowed to reduce Soviet ground forces. Taking a look at what the U.S. intelligence community was thinking before Gorbachevs speech we can look at SNIE 11-16-88, Soviet Policy During the Next Phase Of Arms Control in Europe in this document they concluded:
In the short term (up to two years), we believe that the Pact (Warsaw Pact) will pursue a strategy aimed at reducing the Wests perception of the Soviet threat in the expectation that this course will make it difficult for NATO Governments to maintain or increase defense spending. The Pact will engage NATO in the Conventional Stability talks and probably will introduce sweeping proposal for asymmetric reductions.
Here we can see that they were not to optimistic thinking this could take a few years to happen. When they met again after Gorbachevs speech in NIE 11-23-88 Gorbachevs Economic Programs: The Challenges ahead, December 1988. Here the intelligence community discusses that some of the new economical changes Gorbachev was making would ultimately fail. This was seen to be positive for the west.
In April 1989 the review of the USSR that President Bush had asked for was being finished and was discussed in the document NIE 11-4-89, Soviet Policy Toward the West: The Gorbachev Challenge. In it the intelligence community agreed that in the next few years the U.S. could come to an agreement with the USSR. But they do however disagree on the long term motives behind the change in the USSR It did also conclude that “for the foreseeable future, the USSR will remain the wests principal adversary.”
It can be seen that the U.S. were not completely sold on Gorbachevs new ideas when they met to discuss NIE 11-3/8-1988, Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the 1990s, December 1988. Here the concluded that what they spend and how they plan their defense policies had not been changed be Gorbachevs reforms. They also did not see any change in the development of their strategic forces through the next decade . Nevertheless Gorbachev continued in trying to reach his goal of gaining western/American diplomatic support.
Gorbachev not only had to convince the west of his new thinking but also had to convince the old members of his regime that maintained the old way of thinking. They believed that the USSR could win the Cold War. For this we can look at how Gorbachevs new policies were seen within Eastern Europe. The intelligence community met in May 1988 to discuss what would happen to Eastern Europe in NIE/12-9-88 Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe, Under Gorbachev in this they concluded:
Thus, at best Gorbachevs approach can achieve only evolutionary progress toward political rejuvenation and improved economic performance in Eastern Europe. Continued, and probably heightened, Soviet pressure will lead to sharper conflicts, both within East European societies and between Moscow and its allies.
They also predicted three extreme scenarios which could happen in the Eastern European republics they were “popular upheaval”, “sweeping reform” and “conservative backlash” all three of these turned out to be pretty accurate estimates.
Next the Bush administration wanted to see what Gorbachevs chances of staying in power were like. The first report to tackle this issue was written by the Office of Soviet Analysis(SOVA) in September 1989 Gorbachevs Domestic Gambles and Instability in the USSR. This report stated that Gorbachevs program would not succeed. It would increase economic instability in the USSR. The SOVA report saw Gorbachevs chances of staying in power as bleak and saw ethnic tension and violence as a response to the reforms.
The entire intelligence community as a whole however did not see Gorbachevs chances as so bad in November 1989, they met and