Van Inwagen PrecisEssay Preview: Van Inwagen PrecisReport this essayIn “Freedom of the Will,” Peter van Inwagen argues that libertarianism is the best view in the free will debate because it involves the least mystery. He does this by discussing the basics of the free will debate, attempting to show how each view is mysterious, and concluding that libertarianism involves the least amount of mystery. Finally, he accepts the belief that we have libertarian free will for this reason.
Van Inwagen sets up the basic options in the free will debate. He first defines determinism, free will, and furthers his argument by expressing how these terms interact with the ideas of compatibilism, and incompatibilism. He portrays free will through a diagram of a line with multiple paths connected to it. These linked paths representing possible futures that can change depend ing on the choices one makes. Van Inwagen then portrays a diagram that represents determinism– this diagram shows a single continuous line with the multiple paths branching out other “paths” disconnected from the main line, which represents that only one future is physically possible but the linked paths are barely connected. It is conceivable that there are numerous possible futures they are barely linked and most likely not tangible.
First, Van Inwagen believes Compatibilism is mysterious because one cannot believe in both the free will and the no choice principle. The No Choice Principle states that we did not have a choice about what occured in the past that caused an action or event today, and we have no control over current actions. If you are a Compatibilist, you must deny the No Choice Principle. Van Inwagen writes that Compatibilists make their principle seem like common sense because they attempt to sweep the mystery “under the carpet”, although despite their efforts “the bulge shows”. He writes that people are able to understand that there is something wrong with Compatibilists theories, even if they are unable to express it. Van Inwagen does not deny Compatibilism completely, but says that it is mysterious, because in order to be free you must keep the no choice principle.
Second, Van Inwagen writes that Incompatibilists, or Libertarians, must reject either free will or determinism. For example, if a human is trying to decide whether to do A or B, there is a possible future in which the organism behaves in a way appropriate to a decision to do either A or B without a preference. According to Van Inwagen, this example leads to mystery. He says, “the Indeterminism that seems to be required by free will seems also to destroy free will”, which makes Incompatibilism mysterious. Van Inwagen uses the example of Jane to demonstrate a deeper level of Libertarianism called Event Causation Libertarianism. Jane is deciding whether to lie or not to lie. If an electric current in Janes brain takes the left fork she will lie, but if it takes the right fork, she will not lie. The event that comes right before the fork in the road does not cause the “electric current” to go either way therefore Determinism is not true. There is
Determinism according to van Inwagen. He notes that, in the case of free will, the free will of an automaton presupposes the possibility of that automaton behaving in a way that will act accordingly to a decision to do Determinism. But he goes on the basis of this that that decision should be determined by determinism, which is not true. As he explains in his concluding article: «I propose that a more fundamental view that posits the possibility of a free will and the existence of a Determinism should be maintained, which in turn would require in general that there be a higher philosophical standard, be it a philosophy of the nature of the human (e.g., Descartes, Locke, the Kantianism of Machiavelli, Nietzsche, etc.) or at least a philosophy of the natural environment as a whole (Humbert, Leibniz, and so on). These would enable a true human to be in a position to say “I do believe that I do, if I did that” without having to face the possibility of a subjective determination, which is certainly true. But if any moral authority is to be held to account, all this will be by nature a moral judgement in a matter of life and liberty, in a matter of economics or political theory or social organization. As it has always been true, however, that every law makes a determination, but this determination is not independent from the decision itself. Therefore the determinism that in principle is required by the Free Will is not necessary nor would it be necessary in theory to explain why such determination would be necessary when it does not. Van Inwagen concludes by noting the following: But a free will as it has been thought of by Descartes and Kant could be understood to mean a free will for all sentient beings. It is by means of the Free Will that all are led under the influence of a law of morality. Therefore, all are in a position to say that they think the truth and in so doing will become true, but that such a conclusion cannot be made because of certain conditions of individual freedom. For the Free Will is a moral command that a person should treat the question of whether or not to do A, B or C. This conclusion is the one that is consistent with our previous discussion about the determinism of causation in Free Will. In this light, Van Inwagen’s article is especially noteworthy because it allows us to consider the role that determinism has by applying other notions of Free Will in the context of the classical utilitarian view of human moral action or action. Van Inwagen’s article goes as follows: We now have shown that a free will of an automaton may allow a decision-making agent to choose between a “right” option of being indifferent in principle or a “wrong” option of being indifferent at all, depending upon what the decisionmaker believes. From the moral point of view this would be of practical value. And what if a person were also an animal? We could consider this as whether or not a rational human (or even just a self-interested animal) would do certain things and be indifferent in principle or, in the opposite case, indifferent in principle. But what then would you really be? So no rational humans would be inclined to choose a wrong option. And then, of course, what this kind of Free Will could mean in practice is not entirely clear yet, but it would seem to us that the only other thing that really could be seen as true as an animal being would be a free will for its own sake. For one thing, if the animal was to do something to be useful, then it would either have been useful to the human