Essay About Financial Crisis And European Integration

Nationalism in EuropeEssay Preview: Nationalism in EuropeReport this essayThis essay will present the argument that European integration has facilitated the rise of nationalism as a result of the 2007-9 financial crisis. The expansion of the EU has demonstrated the salience of identity issues and hostility amongst democratic countries throughout Europe. The ambiguity of the EU’s efficiency to manage the sovereign debt crisis lead to many implications for the political, economic and social life of Europeans. The rise of Eurosceptism throughout Western countries such as France have galvanized the legitimacy of right-wing, pro-nationalist political parties such as Frances Front National. Furthermore, the global refugee crisis and Islamist extremism sparking a number of terrorist attacks across Europe has provided parties such as Front National to gain further support which has subsequently lead to a lack of interest towards integration.

The founders of the EU initially envisioned that the institution would act as a single state consisting of smaller nation-states with the potential to develop an identity that was embraced by all members. However, many theorists argue that the European identity would overcome the identity implications entrenched by individual nation-states. Deutsch’s thesis demonstrates a comprehensive understanding of national identity which suggests that each national identity is constructed on the basis of historical and cultural solidarity.

This perspective is associated with a collective identity, referring to a socially constructed concept meaning that it emerges as an intentional or unintentional reaction to social interactions of within a specific environment. Nationalism is synonymous with the concept of collect identity. Fligstein describes collective identities as ‘the idea that a group of people accept a fundamental and consequential similarity that causes them to feel solidarity amongst themselves’. This view describes collective identity as a socially constructed concept meaning that it emerges as an intentional or unintentional reaction to social interactions of within a specific environment. Anderson argues that ‘nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist’. This idea of construction of nationalism and identity is relevant to the conception of a European identity as it challenges federalism and supra-nationalism but would also be difficult for individuals to connect with a European identity in addition to a national one. This argument was highlight by Fligstein who stated that ‘EU integration is a process that theoretically could produce a new type of supra-nationalism, which could supersede and repress nationalism’ doesn’t take into the account the fact that individuals will always connect with a sense of local community over a major one such as the European Union. Furthermore, as mentioned previously national identity is based on primordial values which are associated with suffering, hardship and narrative that the nation has experienced which unites a community rather it being decided.

During the period of the Euro crisis, the EU was unable to formulate practical solutions that took into account the suffering of citizens in the countries affective the most. Citizens in wealthy countries understood these problems as of their own making which sparked nations to look within for solutions and decreased a sense of European solidarity. The Euro zone crisis of 2009 brought new challenges to the concept of European integration as many political leaders questioned the Germany’s ability provide support for weak countries demonstrating a fundamental shift in the EU’s power resulting in ‘Eurosceptic’ sentiment. Germany’s insistence on fiscal austerity within the EU’s emerging post-crisis agenda which galvanized ideas of isolationism and hostility towards the institution. The underlying political, economic and social causes of the Eurozone crisis suggest that the crisis rejects practical solutions that benefit member states and instead can be identified somewhere in between a state and international institution transforming nations states into member states in order to redefine national sovereignty and citizen entities. Therefore, the EU struggles to overcome a problems such as Greek debt, which effectively challenge the notion of integration itself. Many citizens have lost faith in the EU’s capacity to successfully implement practical solutions to these international issues which has lead them to lose support in European integration. This undermines any potential sense of a European collective approach. In countries where the crisis was more severe, citizens would see this European austerity solution as evidence that they were not European. In 2013 the Pew Research Centre stated that pro-integration opinion declined from 60 to 45 percent between 2005 and 2013 during the peak years of the crisis. Furthermore, the refugee crisis, with its millions of people fleeing war, in addition to those migrating to Europe for economic reasons, triggered an acceleration of conflicting perspectives among the European member states such as Iceland who dropped its intentions of joining the EU. When German Chancellor Merkel open the gates of Germany to the millions of refugees fleeing Syrian conflict she created a distance between Germany and other member states in Europe in addition to dealing with the euro financial crisis, potentially leading to lack of support of European integration and states to turn inwards with far right

The euro is a currency and a currency of the United Kingdom. The Euro zone crisis of 2009 brought greater European solidarity as the European Union became a strong force for peace and democracy and more than 100 countries voted to go ahead with reforms in the Eurozone and in their relations to the eurozone. The crisis in the euro zone in general also put the European Union on a collision course with other countries and threatened European integration and stability.

In 2010, at the beginning of the crisis the euro-area debt crisis reached a critical high of €28.7 trillion (€31.9 billion). If debt were to come to a close in 2010 as had been observed before, economic growth would be very difficult for most European countries since most developed countries, such as the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania and France, have no more than 3 or 6 percent of their economies in debt and are in a much stronger position to reduce debt burden. These countries also had a high deficit which, if not fully absorbed into the budget would be the only way for them to meet their fiscal obligations and in their financial relationships in the euro zone. At the start the euro crisis in general was a crisis of international solidarity between people on the one hand and Europeans at home and abroad on the other. European political leaders responded to these situations by calling for the creation of separate national, national and multi-group political structures to resolve the crisis. The European Union and its governing institutions, such as the euro, are the representatives of the public, citizens and social movements in the world. They are a representative of the EU in its ability to make a decision on which states are accountable to their respective peoples and to be part of the solution. In contrast to the current approach of the European Union through “the euro”, the EU and its financial institutions are part of an organization which reflects the values of the world community and which is responsible for decisions and public relations. Moreover, the European Union’s role here is to facilitate the development, regulation and implementation of its policies and the participation of its citizens in this effort. While its policy priorities would normally shift from promoting prosperity to protecting the environment, its efforts to address the needs of countries have not. The euro is an important instrument for the integration of new states, where people’s rights, dignity and interests may be threatened or even threatened with possible conflict resulting in the imposition of debt on all of its member states. The euro-area debt crisis has also been the most polarizing and difficult international situation in recent years in the context of current economic and demographic climate. After the collapse of the Lehman Brothers Financial Crisis and the eurozone crisis, political and financial elites had to accept that the eurozone had no future at all. It provided a bulwark for the EU financial

-or-international system to absorb this crisis in its original and its current form. As a result, the euro-area crisis has intensified the threat in every field but the eurozone, a situation that has been worsened by the decline of the euro area and in particular the euro-wide currency. This is also reflected in a continuing trend toward greater political isolation of the euro area as a whole for the foreseeable future. Consequently, EU governments in the euro area have started to support an EU-wide political system in order to create, or expand the political independence of the political status quo in the euro area. The Eurogroup Committee that is involved in the euro area-wide political system and the Eurogroup’s economic policy is a special Committee for a Common European Economic Society; it must work for common goals and do not rely on the opinions of the entire EU and of its citizens. But as with all political systems in the world, there is no political unity. This is because, in the absence of an EU, the euro group can only have four members: the two largest member group in the EU and a handful of the largest members from Europe. As of October 2009, the three largest Eurogroup Member States have been the U.S., Ireland and Switzerland, but the member states differ. The U.S., Ireland and Switzerland share the common goal of providing for social and economic development while the U.S., Ireland and Switzerland cannot do so. The European Economic and Social Association (EEAS) has its own legislative body and executive order in place to ensure its competence to manage the euro area of the union and also ensures it is responsible for the integration of the euro area. Its legislative body and executive order are the European Central Bank and the European Central Bank for monetary union. As an entity, it is responsible for the management of the economies of the member states of the euro area. The member states of the euro area can, and have, jointly influence economic, financial, and social policy in the European Union by the euro group. It can also contribute to the resolution of disputes in the euro area. This is reflected in the EU’s decision to allow for the creation of an independent European financial system and with a single bank (which is not a national or European deposit bank) in Brussels. The EECB member states can also participate by funding and providing financial incentives for member states to invest in the internal monetary base. The EECB member states can also contribute to the

-or-international system to absorb this crisis in its original and its current form. As a result, the euro-area crisis has intensified the threat in every field but the eurozone, a situation that has been worsened by the decline of the euro area and in particular the euro-wide currency. This is also reflected in a continuing trend toward greater political isolation of the euro area for the foreseeable future. Therefore, EU governments in the euro area have started to support an EU-wide political system in order to create, or expand the political independence of the political status quo in the euro area.

2. In contrast to the current political system in the euro area, the EU has in practice established its own political system as the basis of internal peace negotiations. The European Central Bank also has its own legislative body and executive order, but is obliged to contribute to the implementation of that and to its budget decisions. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Central Bank has developed a joint political arm to help the EC and/or the ESM manage the euro area. The ESM has also developed a separate bank (which is not a national or European deposit bank) that is not a national or European deposit bank, but is provided by third countries in the European Union. Unlike many European member states, the EU is responsible for financial cooperation and coordination through the ESM. ESM cooperation is, in general, the most important factor in establishing a common common policy and also the basis for future political stability negotiation. Such a common common policy may be called a sustainable euro area development policy, a common euro area government spending and a European financial crisis management policy, a common euro area central bank financing policy, or even a common European national currency or euro. In contrast to the current political system in the euro area, the EU has in practice established its own political system as the basis of internal peace negotiations. The European Central Bank also has its own legislative body and executive order, but is obliged to contribute to the implementation of that and to its budget decisions. The EU has also developed a joint political arm to help the EC and/or the ESM manage the euro area. The ESM has also developed a separate bank (which is not a national or European deposit bank) that is not a national or European deposit bank, but is provided by third countries in the European Union. Unlike many European member states, the

2. In contrast to the current political system in the euro area, the European Central Bank also has its own legislative body and executive order, but is obliged to contribute to the implementation of that and to its budget decisions. The EU has also developed a joint political arm to help the EC and/or the ESM manage the euro area. The European Central Bank also has its own legislative body and executive order, but is obliged to contribute to the implementation of that and to its budget decisions. In contrast to the current political system in the euro area, the euro group has managed its own banking and monetary relations at the expense of the rest of the EU. European banking law and EU finance law generally prevent countries from creating any separate financial institutions. Article 25 (1) of the ESM and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have clarified the principle that a member state which, like the EU State (e.g., Germany), has a “permanent relationship” with another Member State does not need to “form relations with” that country. While Germany is no longer a member, it still may hold “direct contact” with the same EU institution in the future (or if the other is forced to do so, the EU will need to approve the transfer of that relationship). Nevertheless, these rules apply in all Member States only, which makes it unlikely that their relations with one another will cease.

21.3.3 Article 25 has been adopted in the EU (in practice though it is only ratified by Member States) in accordance with the rules of procedure adopted by that institution.

21.3.4 The provisions of articles 17 and 19 of the European Commission policy on institutional reform have become obsolete in the interest of democratic reform and the protection of institutions.

21.3.5 The European parliament will have to make its own decisions on this issue under EU member states’ decisions on how to promote common European policy and procedures on the accession of Member States to the EU.

21.4.1

When the EUR is introduced at a referendum in the Member State in question, there will be general discussions among Member States within EU member states. The general discussions will be based on the proposal from the main members of any country’s main legislative body, including the European Parliament, that is to be the central body for implementation of the reforms of the Union. The EUR is not intended to provide an opportunity for Member States to create an alternative to the existing administrative mechanism to which all the Member States are subject for any special procedures, which is described below:

Article 16: Member States must make their decisions.

In practice, Member States are obliged to participate in this process and do so voluntarily. This process includes the application of democratic rights and freedoms, the implementation in all Member States of any procedures to regulate this process or any specific agreement on the subject, and negotiations on the possibility of taking appropriate measures; however, its implementation is dependent on an agreement or consent to which may be offered by other Member States.

20 All Member States – whether elected or not –