Adarand Constructors, Inc., Petitioner V. Federico Pena, Secretary of Transportation, Et Al.
Essay title: Adarand Constructors, Inc., Petitioner V. Federico Pena, Secretary of Transportation, Et Al.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 93-1841
ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC., PETITIONER v. FEDERICO PENA, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit
[June 12, 1995]
Justice OConnor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion with respect to Parts I, II, III A, III B, III D, and IV, which is for the Court except insofar as it might be inconsistent with the views expressed in Justice Scalias concurrence, and an opinion with respect to Part III C in which Justice Kennedy joins.
Petitioner Adarand Constructors, Inc., claims that the Federal Governments practice of giving general contractors on government projects a financial incentive to hire subcontractors controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals,” and in particular, the Governments use of race based presumptions in identifying such individuals, violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals rejected Adarands claim. We conclude, however, that courts should analyze cases of this kind under a different standard of review than the one the Court of Appeals applied. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
In 1989, the Central Federal Lands Highway Division (CFLHD), which is part of the United States Department of Transportation (DOT), awarded the prime contract for a highway construction project in Colorado to Mountain Gravel & Construction Company. Mountain Gravel then solicited bids from subcontractors for the guardrail portion of the contract. Adarand, a Colorado based highway construction company specializing in guardrail work, submitted the low bid. Gonzales Construction Company also submitted a bid.
The prime contracts terms provide that Mountain Gravel would receive additional compensation if it hired subcontractors certified as small businesses controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals,” App. 24. Gonzales is certified as such a business; Adarand is not. Mountain Gravel awarded the subcontract to Gonzales, despite Adarands low bid, and Mountain Gravels Chief Estimator has submitted an affidavit stating that Mountain Gravel would have accepted Adarands bid, had it not been for the additional payment it received by hiring Gonzales instead. Id., at 28-31. Federal law requires that a subcontracting clause similar to the one used here must appear in most federal agency contracts, and it also requires the clause to state that “[t]he contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to be disadvantaged by the [Small Business] Administration pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(d)(2), (3). Adarand claims that the presumption set forth in that statute discriminates on the basis of race in violation of the Federal Governments Fifth Amendment obligation not to deny anyone equal protection of the laws.
These fairly straightforward facts implicate a complex scheme of federal statutes and regulations, to which we now turn. The Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. (Act), declares it to be “the policy of the United States that small business concerns, [and] small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, . . . shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal agency.” §8(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(1). The Act defines “socially disadvantaged individuals” as “those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group without regard to their individual qualities,” §8(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5), and it defines “economically disadvantaged individuals” as “those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit