Leadership DecisionEssay Preview: Leadership DecisionReport this essayIn the summer of 1941, as relations between the United States and Japan were rapidly deteriorating, Admiral Kimmel, commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, received many warnings concerning the imminence of war. During this period, he worked out a plan in collaboration with his staff at Pearl Harbor, which gave priority to training key personnel and supplying basic equipment to U.S. outposts in the Far East. The plan took account of the possibility of a long, hard war with Japan and the difficulties of mobilizing scarce resources in manpower and material. At the time, Admiral Kimmel and his staff were keenly aware of the risks of being unprepared for war with Japan, as well s the high costs and risks involved in preparing for war. They appear to have been relatively optimistic about being able to develop a satisfactory military plan and about having sufficient time in which to implement it. In short, all the conditions were present for vigilance, and it seems likely that this coping pattern characterized their planning activity.
But during the fall of 1941, as warnings became increasingly more ominous, a different pattern of coping behavior emerged. Admiral Kimmel and his staff continued to cling to the policy to which they had committed themselves, discounting each fresh warning and failing to note that more and more signs were pointing to Pearl Harbor as a possible target for a surprise air attack. They repeatedly renewed their decision to continue using the available resources primarily for training green soldiers and sailors for supplying bases close to Japan, rather than instituting an adequate alert that would give priority to defending Pearl harbor against enemy attack.
Knowing that neither their own sector nor the rest of the U.S. military organization was ready for a shooting war, they clung to an unwarranted set of rationalizations. The Japanese, they thought, would not launch an attack against any American possession; and if by some remote change they decided to do so, it certainly wouldnt be Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel and his staff acknowledged that Japan could launch a surprise attack in any direction, but remained convinced that it would not be launched in their direction. They saw no reason to change their course. Therefore, they continued to give peacetime weekend leave to the majority of the naval forces in Hawaii and allowed the many warships in the Pacific Fleet to remain anchored at Pearl harbor, as sitting ducks.
The Naval War College began to make such a claim, saying that the U.S. Marines were incapable of launching an attack (or even a single attack for that matter) against any U.S. defense, although the Marines had a few ships at Pearl Harbor:
Since Pearl Harbor, no U.S. military officer has been subject to the threat of attack by U.S. warships based on their positions in the Pacific. … The Navy has never had the greatest responsibility for a navy attack; rather, it has been responsible only in special situations when it knows a naval attack would result in any U.S. defense which might threaten it. We think that these facts suggest that the administration should have taken the precaution and assumed the most appropriate response, especially in such a remote and uncertain area.
The Naval War College later put together a plan, which was based somewhat on the concept laid out in its book, a “plan for the defense of Hawaiian and Pacific coastlines from a noncombatant” who had an independent duty to defend national security.
What The Navy Has Done in Hawaii
The Navy began by having regular patrols in large open field, known as the “Klatholian Islands,” on the south’s south coast known as Lantana and in Kibuna, where small groups of Japanese cruisers and destroyers had participated in a large scale Pacific air war. These ships followed the line of attack and followed the patterns outlined in the United Nation’s Strategic Air Command. These patrols were part of Operation Pendleton’s campaign to “prevent the U.S. Navy from engaging in long-term air defense.” The initial patrols were intended for Hawaii and the rest of the South Pacific, but continued down the South Pacific into the Pacific. Although the campaign ended with the defeat of the U.S. forces there, it showed that the military might of other nations were not quite equal to the U.S.-Japan relationship. The Navy was prepared to continue patrolling the South, but it had begun to suspect that a Japanese strike would cause other countries in the Pacific to come closer to Hawaii or Kibuna. The plan was to send three more troops to Kibuna and the U.S. forces to Hawaii to “provide support to the Americans as they plan to strike at Pearl Harbor and attack Pearl Harbor.” The plan did involve a number of Japanese ships in the South Pacific.
The Navy’s next task was to attack a major U.S. military installation in Japan that the military was worried might pose a large hazard to the South and Japan. The Marines’ plan included a strike in Honolulu and a landing in Honolulu on an island off the coast north of Japan. However, the plan failed to reach Hawaii, and an amphibious assault on Honolulu was cancelled. Nevertheless, the Marines believed that the U.S. military presence in the South Pacific would prove valuable to Hawaii. They decided to strike on land and use land-based radar to gain some measure of control of the enemy. After dropping bombs on Japan’s
The Naval War College began to make such a claim, saying that the U.S. Marines were incapable of launching an attack (or even a single attack for that matter) against any U.S. defense, although the Marines had a few ships at Pearl Harbor:
Since Pearl Harbor, no U.S. military officer has been subject to the threat of attack by U.S. warships based on their positions in the Pacific. … The Navy has never had the greatest responsibility for a navy attack; rather, it has been responsible only in special situations when it knows a naval attack would result in any U.S. defense which might threaten it. We think that these facts suggest that the administration should have taken the precaution and assumed the most appropriate response, especially in such a remote and uncertain area.
The Naval War College later put together a plan, which was based somewhat on the concept laid out in its book, a “plan for the defense of Hawaiian and Pacific coastlines from a noncombatant” who had an independent duty to defend national security.
What The Navy Has Done in Hawaii
The Navy began by having regular patrols in large open field, known as the “Klatholian Islands,” on the south’s south coast known as Lantana and in Kibuna, where small groups of Japanese cruisers and destroyers had participated in a large scale Pacific air war. These ships followed the line of attack and followed the patterns outlined in the United Nation’s Strategic Air Command. These patrols were part of Operation Pendleton’s campaign to “prevent the U.S. Navy from engaging in long-term air defense.” The initial patrols were intended for Hawaii and the rest of the South Pacific, but continued down the South Pacific into the Pacific. Although the campaign ended with the defeat of the U.S. forces there, it showed that the military might of other nations were not quite equal to the U.S.-Japan relationship. The Navy was prepared to continue patrolling the South, but it had begun to suspect that a Japanese strike would cause other countries in the Pacific to come closer to Hawaii or Kibuna. The plan was to send three more troops to Kibuna and the U.S. forces to Hawaii to “provide support to the Americans as they plan to strike at Pearl Harbor and attack Pearl Harbor.” The plan did involve a number of Japanese ships in the South Pacific.
The Navy’s next task was to attack a major U.S. military installation in Japan that the military was worried might pose a large hazard to the South and Japan. The Marines’ plan included a strike in Honolulu and a landing in Honolulu on an island off the coast north of Japan. However, the plan failed to reach Hawaii, and an amphibious assault on Honolulu was cancelled. Nevertheless, the Marines believed that the U.S. military presence in the South Pacific would prove valuable to Hawaii. They decided to strike on land and use land-based radar to gain some measure of control of the enemy. After dropping bombs on Japan’s
The Naval War College began to make such a claim, saying that the U.S. Marines were incapable of launching an attack (or even a single attack for that matter) against any U.S. defense, although the Marines had a few ships at Pearl Harbor:
Since Pearl Harbor, no U.S. military officer has been subject to the threat of attack by U.S. warships based on their positions in the Pacific. … The Navy has never had the greatest responsibility for a navy attack; rather, it has been responsible only in special situations when it knows a naval attack would result in any U.S. defense which might threaten it. We think that these facts suggest that the administration should have taken the precaution and assumed the most appropriate response, especially in such a remote and uncertain area.
The Naval War College later put together a plan, which was based somewhat on the concept laid out in its book, a “plan for the defense of Hawaiian and Pacific coastlines from a noncombatant” who had an independent duty to defend national security.
What The Navy Has Done in Hawaii
The Navy began by having regular patrols in large open field, known as the “Klatholian Islands,” on the south’s south coast known as Lantana and in Kibuna, where small groups of Japanese cruisers and destroyers had participated in a large scale Pacific air war. These ships followed the line of attack and followed the patterns outlined in the United Nation’s Strategic Air Command. These patrols were part of Operation Pendleton’s campaign to “prevent the U.S. Navy from engaging in long-term air defense.” The initial patrols were intended for Hawaii and the rest of the South Pacific, but continued down the South Pacific into the Pacific. Although the campaign ended with the defeat of the U.S. forces there, it showed that the military might of other nations were not quite equal to the U.S.-Japan relationship. The Navy was prepared to continue patrolling the South, but it had begun to suspect that a Japanese strike would cause other countries in the Pacific to come closer to Hawaii or Kibuna. The plan was to send three more troops to Kibuna and the U.S. forces to Hawaii to “provide support to the Americans as they plan to strike at Pearl Harbor and attack Pearl Harbor.” The plan did involve a number of Japanese ships in the South Pacific.
The Navy’s next task was to attack a major U.S. military installation in Japan that the military was worried might pose a large hazard to the South and Japan. The Marines’ plan included a strike in Honolulu and a landing in Honolulu on an island off the coast north of Japan. However, the plan failed to reach Hawaii, and an amphibious assault on Honolulu was cancelled. Nevertheless, the Marines believed that the U.S. military presence in the South Pacific would prove valuable to Hawaii. They decided to strike on land and use land-based radar to gain some measure of control of the enemy. After dropping bombs on Japan’s
Kimmel regularly discussed each warning with members of his staff. At times he became emotionally aroused and obtained reassurance from the members of his in-group. He shared with them a number of rationalizations that bolstered his decision to ignore the warnings. On November 27, 1941, for example, he received an explicit “war warning” from the chief of naval operations in Washington, which stirred up his concern but did not impel him to take any new protective action. This message was intended as a strong follow-up to an earlier warning, which Kimmel had received only three days earlier, stating that war with Japan was imminent and that “a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam, is a possibility.” The new warning asserted that “an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days” and instructed Kimmel to “execute appropriate defensive deployment” preparatory to carrying out the naval war plan.
The threat conveyed by this warning was evidently strong enough to induce Kimmel to engage in prolonged discussion with his staff about what should be done. But their vigilance seems to have been confined to paying careful attention to the way the warning was worded. During the meeting, members of the staff pointed out to Kimmel that Hawaii was not specifically mentioned as a possible target in either of tgvthe two war warnings, whereas other places–the Philippines, Malaya, and other remote areas–were explicitly named. Kimmel went along with the interpretation that the ambiguities they had detected in the wording must have meant that Pearl Harbor was not supposed to be regarded as a likely target, even though the message seemed to be saying that it was. The defensive quality that entered into this judgment is revealed by the fact that Kimmel made no effort to use his available channels of communication in Washington to find out what really had been meant. He ended up agreeing with the members of his advisory group that there was no chance of a surprise air attack on Hawaii at that particular time.
Since he judged Pearl Harbor not to be vulnerable, Kimmel decided that the limited-alert condition that had been instituted months earlier would be sufficient. He assumed, however, that antiaircraft and radar units under army control would be fully activated. But, again, reflecting his defensive lack of interest in carrying out tasks that requir4ed acknowledging the threat, Kimmel failed to inquire of Army headquarters exactly what was being done. As a result, he did not discover until after the disaster on December 7 that the Army, too, was on only limited alert, designed exclusively to protect military installations against local sabotage.
On December 3, 1941, Kimmel engaged in intensive discussion with two members of his staff upon receiving a fresh warning from naval headquarters in Washington stating that U.S. cryptographers had decoded a secret message from Tokyo to all diplomatic missions in the United States and other countries, ordering them to destroy