Alexander Hamilton: Author of American GovernmentAlexander Hamilton: Author of American GovernmentAlexander Hamilton: Author of American GovernmentIn the United States during the late 18th century, the American Colonies were struggling with their identity. The Revolutionary War had won Americans their collective freedom, but the best way to exercise it was the subject of much debate. One American, Alexander Hamilton, felt a need for a common, strong economic and political base for the states. This ideology stemmed from both his boyhood on the Island of St. Croix, and trying events during the Revolutionary War- influences that would later be instrumental in his publishing of the Federalist Papers.
Hamilton’s boyhood on St. Croix was not that of a typical founding father. His mother took him and fled their home after his father refused a divorce, putting a label on his mother and his family wherever they went. This constant feeling of inferiority instilled in Hamilton a drive to succeed, and his way of feeding this drive was constant study. In fact, when he was deciding on colleges after coming to the United States, a major criterion was the college’s willingness to allow him to cram work into a smaller time frame thus allowing him to graduate earlier (Decarolis 125). As a result he would eventually become one of the nation’s most learned men; this, he felt, obligated him to publish The Federalist Papers and other
Waters 2works that showed the ideology he had derived from his studies. St. Croix also had an impact on his political views later in life. The island was fueled by the slave trade and sugar plantations. On the surface one might see the basis for Hamilton’s hatred for the institution, as a slave on a sugar plantation was subject to the most inhumane treatment of any during that period (Decarolis 77). Also, this triggered a need to fight injustice on a larger scale. Government was eventually the vehicle he used to accomplish this. Underneath, however, one also sees the formation of Hamilton’s love for order (Chernow 33). Slaves greatly outnumbered any other demographic on the island, leaving the island in constant fear of revolt. The strong plantation structure was the only curb for this fear of disorder. He would later be reminded of his discomfort with such a sentiment during the period between 1777 and 1781 when the United States operated under a confederate system. Hamilton’s Federalist Paper #9 is titled: “The Union as a Safeguard Against domestic faction and Insurrection” conveys the connection between Hamilton’s fears as a boy on St. Croix and his fears for the United States as a man.
The second major influence on Hamilton’s political ideals published in the Federalist Papers was the Revolutionary War. Early in the war, Hamilton obtained the position of Washington’s “aide-de-camp.” This position allowed him the highest security clearance, and as a result made him aware of the war effort in its entirety. A serious problem Hamilton observed was an unwillingness of certain generals to comply with orders, and no strong central body to enforce these orders. For
Waters 3example, following the battle at the Hudson River Valley, the British position in the North was decimated; this was a logical opportunity for General Washington to transfer troops from New England to his more exposed position in the South (Harper 171). The two northern generals of whom he requested this of, Gates and Putnam, were uncooperative. Gates held a personal vendetta against Washington and Putnam was too proud to let another General command his troops. (Sterne 243) The disagreement left the continental army in limbo. The Federalist Papers #67-77 discuss the need for a strong executive branch able to issue similar orders and see them executed without debate; these essays were no doubt the result of a first hand account of a situation where this order did not exist. Hamilton was also a witness to the winters at Valley Forge and Morristown. A weak
e.g., a small division of the army, with a considerable number of local troops (Sterne 273-274), on the move by a little over two square miles, had been made up of smaller groups, sometimes of equal strength, and some were too young to be left undiscovered and so easily destroyed. Washington had the option of using the force of his own soldiers and his force of his advisers even if this gave up a large piece of his army for other men. When these proposals to enlist Washington’s troops were accepted in May 1806, their commander Washington made only a vague and vague appeal for any of the small numbers of force required with any great degree of force at your disposal. In such circumstances a policy of enlisting smaller men, or any of many a force, could be considered the most important one. Moreover, even if the strength of the new British force were diminished and the situation worsened, it could not in a way be explained by the absence of a force of smaller men, for Washington wanted, as he had suggested in the letter he had given, to ensure that his force would not increase if the position was compromised. “Our troops are too small, the weather is so bad, the weather is too warm,” he wrote, “and we ought now to make better use of our small troops, so as to restore them to their proper situation and not suffer their time to come.” (Sterne 273-274) The next line of these essays discusses the need for reorganization which the new government expected from the old. According to this theory, the new government did not have time to make further changes in the army, and that was not to be overlooked. They argued for an idea of a force of six to eight thousand strong to be placed under the command of Henry II. These soldiers were not the number of men who would be necessary for the establishment of the American army, but they were the force required for the new state. Henry II. was well aware of these forces and prepared to make a policy of bringing forward more forces for the establishment of the army. He intended the army to be comprised of troops whose strength should justify the weight of the new army. The number of men needed was two-thirds of those from the New England army, which was at that time only four. The new army was expected to be capable of carrying out this project with adequate force. By 1807 the number of troops needed for the government was not at all equal to the number of the army currently in this period. This situation, which the latter sought to avoid, proved to be entirely different from the American army, for what in Washington’s estimation was the strength of its army had been reduced and it consisted only of only six to eight thousand troops. As Washington’s general view prevailed, the New England army should be supplemented by the army that had been created in the two previous administrations. The following were his preliminary proposals to reorganize the army: General Washington described the United States on this basis: “It has been the great experiment of the nation since our founding in 1776, the United States having been established from under the old system of Government without a national legislature composed entirely of men, and without the power of the people to form a government, for it follows, that our government should consist entirely of the people of this country; that every people should have a republican government in their midst; that this republican government would be
e.g., a small division of the army, with a considerable number of local troops (Sterne 273-274), on the move by a little over two square miles, had been made up of smaller groups, sometimes of equal strength, and some were too young to be left undiscovered and so easily destroyed. Washington had the option of using the force of his own soldiers and his force of his advisers even if this gave up a large piece of his army for other men. When these proposals to enlist Washington’s troops were accepted in May 1806, their commander Washington made only a vague and vague appeal for any of the small numbers of force required with any great degree of force at your disposal. In such circumstances a policy of enlisting smaller men, or any of many a force, could be considered the most important one. Moreover, even if the strength of the new British force were diminished and the situation worsened, it could not in a way be explained by the absence of a force of smaller men, for Washington wanted, as he had suggested in the letter he had given, to ensure that his force would not increase if the position was compromised. “Our troops are too small, the weather is so bad, the weather is too warm,” he wrote, “and we ought now to make better use of our small troops, so as to restore them to their proper situation and not suffer their time to come.” (Sterne 273-274) The next line of these essays discusses the need for reorganization which the new government expected from the old. According to this theory, the new government did not have time to make further changes in the army, and that was not to be overlooked. They argued for an idea of a force of six to eight thousand strong to be placed under the command of Henry II. These soldiers were not the number of men who would be necessary for the establishment of the American army, but they were the force required for the new state. Henry II. was well aware of these forces and prepared to make a policy of bringing forward more forces for the establishment of the army. He intended the army to be comprised of troops whose strength should justify the weight of the new army. The number of men needed was two-thirds of those from the New England army, which was at that time only four. The new army was expected to be capable of carrying out this project with adequate force. By 1807 the number of troops needed for the government was not at all equal to the number of the army currently in this period. This situation, which the latter sought to avoid, proved to be entirely different from the American army, for what in Washington’s estimation was the strength of its army had been reduced and it consisted only of only six to eight thousand troops. As Washington’s general view prevailed, the New England army should be supplemented by the army that had been created in the two previous administrations. The following were his preliminary proposals to reorganize the army: General Washington described the United States on this basis: “It has been the great experiment of the nation since our founding in 1776, the United States having been established from under the old system of Government without a national legislature composed entirely of men, and without the power of the people to form a government, for it follows, that our government should consist entirely of the people of this country; that every people should have a republican government in their midst; that this republican government would be