An Overview: What Uncle Sam Really Wants
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In What Uncle Sam Really Wants written by Noam Chomsky, he uses his prolific knowledge in the field of linguistics to vividly describe American foreign policy throughout the post World War II years. Renowned for research and dedication, “a brilliant distillation of the real motivations behind US foreign policy, compiled from talks, interviews declassified government files, public policy, and geopolitical events.”(McChesney, 1985) Chomsky has written over forty political books and is the eighth most quoted individual of all time and number one living. Currently working at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology he has earned some twenty-six honorary degrees from some of the most prestigious schools around the globe; including Columbia University, Georgetown University, Cambridge University, and Harvard. Belonging to numerous highly educated, professional groups including American Academy of Arts and Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, American Philosophical Society he has won seemingly countless awards; the Distinguished Scientific Contribution American Psychological Association, the Kyoto Prize in Basic Sciences, the Helmholtz Medal, the Dorothy Eldridge Peacemaker Award, the Ben Franklin Medal in Computer and Cognitive Science, twice winner of the Orwell Award and others. Having written many books on a slew of subjects this one in particular, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, is based on government foreign policy with chief goal of crushing the most serious threat of them all- Third World countries.
“How well have the precepts put forth by George Kennan been followed? How thoroughly have we put aside all concern for “vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization”?” Well, “in one high-level document after another, US planners stated their view that the primary threat to the new US-led world order was Third World nationalism — sometimes called ultranationalism: “nationalistic regimes” that are responsive to “popular demand for immediate improvement in the low living standards of the masses” and production for domestic needs.” It is with these goals in mind that we justify, the world-wide, nothing short of, atrocities that we commit. After reading this book, it becomes hard to determine what is not worthwhile. There are paragraphs that talk about life lost in some of the most miserable of circumstances, while others talk about the policies that will lead people to such an end, and yet others talk about the massive public relations campaign launched by the government to conceal our actions, and if concealment is not possible well actually claim some right to have done it; George Schultz referring to the Sandinistas running Nicaragua, they are “a cancer right here on our own land mass”, that needs to be destroyed. Many people assume that the domino theory, referred to as the rotten apple (Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in the late 40s, “one rotten apple can spoil the barrel”) theory behind the scenes, was thought only to have been the pressing point in Vietnam but that has remained our foreign policy premise for decades. As aforementioned, every paragraph in this book can be found important; therefore detail will not be ignored in one exemplary case, so, hopefully, the picture as a whole may be more readily grasped.
In the early 1970s the American government realized another problem was coming -you may want to sit down- the tsunami named El Salvador. As Somozas control on Nicaragua was decreasing, public awareness and groups supporting basic human liberties that supported democracy were on the rise. Soon the Archbishop of El Salvador, Oscar Romero, became a real problem, asking us (Americans) not to send aid in any way to the “junta that ran the country” – his response a bullet in the head while at mass a week later.
Several weeks before the assassination occurred an all out war was waged on the streets. The first so-called attack was much more a show of open aggression and the flaunting of the over-inclination to use force. The place: Rio Sumpul. The soldiers: El Salvadoran army and Honduran mercenaries. The people: Numbering 600, consisting heavily of women and children- literally butchered, left dead in the river to be seen (in pieces) for several days to come. The word spread quickly since the massacre wiped out many church-goers, however due to this storys obvious lackluster- one can only assume- it was never reported in America.
The main victims of the war were the same as almost every war – the peasants; but due to the particular political undertones of this conflict: labor organizers, students, priests, or anyone else who was suspected of promoting the will of the people was subject to oppression. In late 1980 the death toll had broken the 5-digit mile-marker and under the Reagan administration was on its way to breaking many more; 3,000 deaths in one year, immediately following his election, as opposed to the national average of about 1,000.
October 1980: new archbishop condemns the “war of extermination and genocide against a defenseless civilian population.” December 1980: realized heroes for our “Valiant service alongside the people against subversion” so said the “favorite US “moderate” Jуse Napleуn Duarte, as he was being appointed civilian president of the junta.” One can only imagine what takes place in each and every fourth November, including the 1980 one, in the leading aggressor nation in this conflict. This story finally raised some criticism in America when four American churchwomen were raped and murdered; “slaughtering Salvadorans is one thing, but raping and killing American nuns is a definite PR mistake.”
When the Reaganites took power they took it upon themselves to justify the ongoing atrocity, most notably Secretary of State Alexander Haig and UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. Surprisingly however, a few years later, there was a show trial in which the junta and the grand money supplier (America) were, not so surprisingly, exculpated. The information problem was dealt with in 1980-81 when the independent newspapers in El Salvador whom would likely have reported such atrocities had been destroyed (the editor of one murdered, the other fled into exile); while they “were mainstream and pro-business, they were still too undisciplined for the militaries taste.”
More slaughter: November 1989, six Jesuit priests, their cook, and her daughter were dispensed with by the El Salvadoran army. Within the same week 28 other local civilians met their death, some of these people were: “the head of a major union, the leader of the organization of university women, nine members of an Indian farming cooperative and ten university students.”;