Essay About Army Chief Of Staff And Admiral David Mcdonald

Dereliction Of Duty
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“I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage.”
Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff 1964-1968
The 1997 book, Dereliction of Duty, may become a critical treatise in the area of military ethics.[1] The research was
extensive (some 5 years), although it was primarily descriptive without incisive analysis or critique. Ironically, that may be the
most powerful aspect of the book. The facts and information are systematically laid out, and there is no doubt that the added
information will provide insights in both policy and military perspectives; the facts add weight to a number of previous theories.
Now, we may have a new theory–the Vietnam War would never have been fought if it had not been for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS): “The disaster in Vietnam was not the result of impersonal forces but a uniquely human failure, the responsibility for
which was shared by President Johnson, and his principal military and civilian advisors.”[2] The book illuminates the critical
importance of strong and honorable character for military leaders, especially senior military leadership: “The military…engaged
in a mutually deceitful relationship, in that they did not question a strategy that they knew to be fundamentally flawed and instead
went along with the game.”[3] It appears that some in the JCS went along “with the game” to protect the opportunity to further
the interests of their own service over the welfare of the nation, while other JCS members were misguided by conflicts of
loyalty.
Interest in Dereliction of Duty has spread throughout military circles, with an unprecedented degree of attention and
influence.[4] Many Air Force members have purchased this book, especially after a Wall Street Journal article stated that it
had a significant influence on General Ronald Fogelmans decision to resign.[5] According to Air Force Major General (Ret)
Perry Smith, who has known Gen Fogelman for 20 years, “He told me that Dereliction of Duty had a powerful influence on
his thinking.”[6] This paper will examine some possible implications of this book to include character-related issues, and
options for military leaders when they are confronted with profound ethical issues or concerns. Additionally, the delicate issue
of military dissent, and a focus on a systemic personnel issue, the “up-or-out” promotion system.
This book calls into question former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamaras revisionist account constructed in his
book, Retrospect. Certainly, McNamara has been a villain in many Vietnam postmortems, and this book does not diminish
that charge. However, what it uncovers is that others were not only guilty of a “dereliction of duty,” but there was a
fundamental breakdown in moral character– with a requisite lack of moral courage. Ironically, it appears that one of the first
casualties of the Vietnam War was the truth–it was shaded, evaded, spinned, and thinned!
President Johnsons first meeting with the JCS set an important tone. He expected their unqualified support.[7]
General Maxwell Taylor (former Army Chief of Staff under Eisenhower and Chairman, JCS under Kennedy and Johnson)
selected General Earle Wheeler for Army Chief of Staff because he believed Wheeler could be counted on for his personal
loyalty and support. [8] General Wheeler was predisposed to support the administrations policy because he owed his position
to Taylor. The book incriminates Maxwell Taylor for not only lying to LBJ about the views of the chiefs, but also deceiving the
chiefs about the presidents policy aims. Equally contemptuous was the narrow-minded rivalry between services coupled with
loyalty to individual service over Constitution and country.
One example of service loyalty was a running feud among the JCS members regarding who was to be the next
CINCPAC. The Chiefs had ranked the candidates from the three services and General Jacob Smart of the USAF was the
winner. Admiral David McDonald, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), was dismayed because that command had always
been under Navy control. Admiral McDonald went directly to Secretary McNamara and pleaded his case. McNamara
intervened and selected a naval officer. McDonald felt indebted to McNamara. “McDonald, who had hitherto opposed
McNamaras plans, no longer objected to them outside JCS meetings.”[9]
Later, when policies went counter to the Chiefs recommendations, McDonald and Wheeler indicated their reluctance
to challenge policy decisions already made “at the highest level.”[10] Secretary McNamara appeared to want courtiers[11] and
sycophants: “…advisors who would tell him what he wanted to hear…those who expressed views that ran counter to his
priorities would hold little sway…”[12] “Kennedy and later Johnson didnt really want military advice from the Chiefs. They
wanted people who would be acquiescent, who would be malleable.”[13]
When the JCS went to the Hill to testify in July 1965, the Chiefs were expected to lie