European Domination of the Indian Ocean Trade
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Prior to the arrival of the Portuguese in the in the Indian Ocean in 1498, no single power had attempted to monopolize the sea lanes that connected the ports of the Indian sub-continent with the Middle East and East Africa on the West, and the ports of South East Asia and China to the East. Unlike in the Mediterranean where during Roman (and earlier) times, rival powers attempted to control the oceanic trade through military means, peaceful trade had remained the norm in the Indian Ocean. Although there were periods when coastal rulers of the Malabar coast and Southern India were powerful enough to demand toll taxes from passing ships, (and Arab rulers had attempted to control the shipping lanes through the Red Sea) there had not been any systematic attempt by any single political power to eliminate all others from the oceanic trade that touched the Indian subcontinent.
Indian ports that demanded high taxes from docking ships invariably lost out to “free ports” – i.e. ports that demanded very low tariffs from docking ships. In fact, several of the Indian ocean ports were politically neutral entities – giving free and equitable access to shippers of varied nationalities and religious affiliations.
Whereas pre-15th century Arab and Chinese geographical texts spoke of various natural hazards involved in long-distance shipping, they did not cite any significant political or military impediments to undertaking long-distance voyages other than the risk from pirates. Thus, evidence left behind by chroniclers such as Marco Polo, Ibn Batuta, Persian ambassador Abdur Razzaq, the Venetian Nicolo Conti, and Genoan Santo Stefano – all indicate that the Indian Ocean was the scene of thriving trade in the 14th and 15th centuries.
But once the Portuguese had discovered their new route to India, they displayed considerable zeal in seizing the most profitable ports of East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Saurashtran, Konkan and Malabar regions in India. A chain of fortified coastal settlements backed by regular naval patrols allowed the Portuguese to gradually eliminate many rivals, and enforce a semi-monopoly in the spice trade by the middle of the 16th C. Local traders were coerced into buying safe passes and paying customs duties to the Portuguese. However, this attempt at a monopoly was challenged by the maritime powers of North Sumatra based in Aceh, as well as by the Omanis, and by Gujarati traders. And as the Portuguese expanded with settlements in South East Asia, China and Japan – the Western monopoly became harder to maintain.
Initial success came to the Portuguese because they had been shrewd enough to develop a strategy of divide and conquer – first concentrating on isolating Muslim traders from the Hindu monarch of Calicut and demonstrating their fire power by launching a two-day bombardment of the vital port city (which was then the largest spice market of the Indian Ocean). These intimidating tactics worked in the favor of the Portuguese who repeated this strategy at other key trading destinations. In 1510, Bijapurs Adil Shahi ruler ceded the control of Goa to the Portuguese. Having realized that the bulk of trade moving out of India landed at one of three ports in the Indian Ocean – i.e. Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, Aden on the Red Sea, and Malacca in the Malay Peninsula – Goas Indian Governor, Alfonso Albuquerque then shifted his attention to capturing each of these crucial ports. Malacca fell in 1511 and Hormuz in 1515. Only Aden proved elusive.
In 1505, the spice trade from Asia to Europe was declared a royal monopoly by the Portuguese, who saw in this the possibility of extorting tribute through military means. Once Hormuz and Malacca came under the military and political control of the Portuguese, the Portuguese then attempted to expand their monopoly to the inter-Asian trade. For this they needed to seal off independent access to the Gujarati traders who although cut off from Malacca could continue to trade through the Red Sea. For twenty years, the Portuguese kept attacking the ports of Gujarat, even gaining a military victory in 1509 (after an earlier defeat against the combined defences of Diu and an Egyptian naval fleet that had been sent to aid the defences of Dius Amir Hussain). But nevertheless, Diu did not fall; and attempts to defeat Malik Ayaz, (the next governor of Diu) also failed in 1520-1. In 1530, the Portuguese colonists looted and burned the ports of Cambay, Surat and Rander, but it was only in 1534, when in a moment of weakness, Sultan Bahadur of Gujarat relinquished control of the small port of Bassein. Diu – which had held out for two decades, suddenly became vulnerable when Mughal emperor Humayun cut a deal with the Portuguese to defeat Sultan Bahadur. The Portuguese were given permission to build a fort on the island, which allowed the Portuguese to garner complete political control over the territory by 1555. Portuguese naval control over the Gulf of Cambay became complete when they also captured the port of Daman in 1559. Thus the merchants of Gujarat were brought under control by the Portuguese, and Gujarat – (which on account of its thriving industry and trade may have been one of the richest of Indias provinces) saw its fortunes steadily decline.
Following their conquests in Gujarat, the Portuguese then proceeded to augment their control in Sri Lanka by taking over Colombo, and founding a settlement in Meliapur (Sao Tome) on the Coromandel coast. Realizing that the trade from Goa to Bengal was even more lucrative than the Coromandel trade, they then turned their aggressive energies on Bengal. After initial resistance, they were allowed to settle in Chittagaon and Satgaon (near Kolkata), and later moved up-river to Hooghly. This enabled them to establish a virtual monopoly on the trade out of West Bengal by the end of the 16th C, until they were expelled by the Mughal armies in 1632. The Livra das cidades, e fortalezas documented in detail Portuguese control over numerous Indian ocean ports (in addition to those previously mentioned), such as Sofala in Mozambique – a major supplier of African gold, Mangalore, Cannanore, Cranganore, Cochin and Quilon – all important sources for spices and other tropical produce.
This success had come about mainly because unlike the trading ships of their Asian predecessors, the Portuguese ships were extremely well-armed for their times. Moreover, they were fortunate to arrive in the Indian sub-continent at a time when many of the ports were outside the political control of any powerful local ruler who could mount any effective resistance against their superior fire-power and their willingness to use it without hesitation. This was also due to the fact that the great Asian economies of the time were essentially land-based self-reliant