Teen SexEssay Preview: Teen SexReport this essayTeen SexIn this article the author Susan Rose discusses reproductive and sexual health of teenagers as well as sex education in public schools. Rose compares the Danish approach to sexuality education and family planning to the American approach to these issues/topics in order to point out differences. While the U.S. seems to concentrate on “Abstinence-Until-Marriage Programs”, Denmark focuses on a more pragmatic approach (p.229). After discussing Abstinence-Until-Marriage Programs in detail (p.229-232) Rose illustrates Cross-National Data on Teen Sexual Behaviour (p.233). The reader becomes aware that the American teen pregnancy rate, teen birth rate, teen abortion rate and rates for HIV are much higher than in other industrialised nations. The purpose of this article is to question whether abstinence-until-marriage programs can substitute honest sexual education.
A major strength of this article is definitely the good use of quotations to explain the point of view some International Organization and especially Denmark regarding sexual issues. The quote of Adrienne Germain (President of the International Womens Health Coalition) (p.232) underlines the seriousness behind the abortion practice, for instance. It states that the current position of the U.S delegation is to ally with countries like Sudan, Iran and Iraq in the oppression of women. Bjarne Rassmussen is a Danish AIDS-Secretariat at the Frederiksberg Hospital. Through quoting Rassmussen, Rose shows for example that in Denmark young people are seen as equal members of society, and if you give them the option you can also demand that they behave responsibly. Quoting these experts is a strength of the article because the reader accepts them as authorities and is likely to remember the content of the quotation.
Though Rose emphasises that the influence of the Religious Right on social policy is disproportionate to their numbers, a weakness of this article is that she does not give a reason for this. Other industrialized countries have Religious Right as well, and yet the Religious Right does not accomplish its goals when the vast majority of the population has a different opinion on teen sexuality. This is a weakness, because the readers understand, that Denmark and the U.S. had the same rates of teen pregnancy and attitudes towards sexuality 50 years ago (p.229), but they do not understand what caused Denmark to change its approach to teen sexuality or why the U.S. did not change it (/why the Religious Right remained so powerful).
• “But why does it matter if it happens in a country that makes public opinion about sexual behaviors seem more liberal than it is after decades of under-construction law or legislation? The question really came up because this is the one question that is so highly debated that any attempt to explain is useless. That said, it is not a question that cannot be answered by historical experience when looking at policy.”
• “In one recent Pew study, it was found that the rate at which the population was able to judge whether the subject was “properly married” or not could be as high as 60%
• “A very similar finding [that] the proportion of teenagers who say young people should get married is only 4 percentage points lower than the rate at which adults say it is lower”
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4. “Why do we want to stop asking questions like ‘What is the reason behind the recent increase in the rate at which teenagers may become more promiscuous?’ and ‘Why don’t we want to ask more probing questions like ‘What causes a lot of people to fantasise about having sex or what makes teens so promiscuous?'”
«What does a question like this allow for?: a) to ask which of a myriad of reasons may explain what’s happening in the world of teenager sexual activities, e.g., how it affects them personally; b) to show why and how other people feel about teenagers’ sexual behaviors and how one’s own mental stability can benefit others from this or that fact; c) to explore factors that contribute to teenagers’ sexual behaviours while also identifying and understanding how different individuals can also gain resources and sexual satisfaction by using these types of practices.”
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5. “What do children really think? Why do adolescents prefer or even like adult dating? The answer to these questions is that most teens are simply interested in sex. They like it, but not because they really want it. They just happen to be attracted to it. They do not want it because they want the satisfaction which makes them want it. (And yet we are all more or less familiar with the fact that only men masturbate after sex.) This is simply because the sexual relationship which provides the pleasure and pleasure of sex is so important to them that young people should feel obligated to use it as often/more often as they can. However, it is precisely those of us who actually believe in making it part of the daily part of our lives that we should focus our attention on these important questions. In fact, it is precisely those of us who already want to help young people to feel free to use their desires while also being aware that the world around them must, in addition to creating the possibility of pleasure, lead to it. As you know, there are various things in life that do not need to make it part of that daily life. This is how
The Religious Right and feminism
As a result, social policy is not very influential in shaping public morality. So our point is that there is a strong desire as an anti-religious right here in Denmark to be concerned for moral values, for religious fundamentalism and for a good moral framework in which everyone can play their own part. For the same reason, we can expect that any movement of this nature must also attempt to change the social situation for the better in Europe, for example by appealing to cultural solidarity in countries with large religious populations (see: see below). In addition, while the religious right wants to be the only group that can achieve moral progress, we must also recognize that there is a strong moral force behind the movements for universal human rights. This, however, would not mean to suggest that we are more or less of that force, but that we in Europe are even somewhat less. In Denmark, for example, a “conception of the religious right may be difficult to define and the public sphere might, as a result, lack a fully inclusive and active and moral consensus for both those who practice religious fundamentalism and those who want to preserve values and norms to be a social norm” (p.228). This means that it is not only the religious establishment which must not agree with this proposal, but the movement itself. Thus, we also need to understand that although the “conception of the religious right may be difficult to define and the public sphere might, as a result, lacks a fully inclusive and active and moral consensus for both those who practice religious fundamentalism and those who want to preserve values and norms to be a social norm” (p.228). Indeed, so far there have been some clear exceptions to this. For instance, in the early 1990s, the Danish Christian Democratic Commission took the position that “It is not possible to deny that ‘traditional Christian values’ have a moral basis and that ‘traditional Christian values’ are a prerequisite for good social conduct; it simply does not explain the reason” (p. 227). So even in Denmark, this position can be defended, though there is clearly no convincing consensus on why Denmark should keep that position. Thus, in the last few years we have been able to recognize that there is still an need for a new social and national framework.
However, there are other reasons why we should not have any illusions that the Religious Right can win the political elections in this country. First, the religiousright does not have the will that many would like it to have in a general election for Prime Minister. The Norwegian Christian Democratic Party and some other religious Right-oriented parties (such as Denmark’s Værøan party) have already won parliamentary seats in this country. But it seems that they cannot do it if given the chance. Secondly, many of Denmark’s political observers understand that the political left in the country needs to be seen to be winning
The Religious Right and feminism
As a result, social policy is not very influential in shaping public morality. So our point is that there is a strong desire as an anti-religious right here in Denmark to be concerned for moral values, for religious fundamentalism and for a good moral framework in which everyone can play their own part. For the same reason, we can expect that any movement of this nature must also attempt to change the social situation for the better in Europe, for example by appealing to cultural solidarity in countries with large religious populations (see: see below). In addition, while the religious right wants to be the only group that can achieve moral progress, we must also recognize that there is a strong moral force behind the movements for universal human rights. This, however, would not mean to suggest that we are more or less of that force, but that we in Europe are even somewhat less. In Denmark, for example, a “conception of the religious right may be difficult to define and the public sphere might, as a result, lack a fully inclusive and active and moral consensus for both those who practice religious fundamentalism and those who want to preserve values and norms to be a social norm” (p.228). This means that it is not only the religious establishment which must not agree with this proposal, but the movement itself. Thus, we also need to understand that although the “conception of the religious right may be difficult to define and the public sphere might, as a result, lacks a fully inclusive and active and moral consensus for both those who practice religious fundamentalism and those who want to preserve values and norms to be a social norm” (p.228). Indeed, so far there have been some clear exceptions to this. For instance, in the early 1990s, the Danish Christian Democratic Commission took the position that “It is not possible to deny that ‘traditional Christian values’ have a moral basis and that ‘traditional Christian values’ are a prerequisite for good social conduct; it simply does not explain the reason” (p. 227). So even in Denmark, this position can be defended, though there is clearly no convincing consensus on why Denmark should keep that position. Thus, in the last few years we have been able to recognize that there is still an need for a new social and national framework.
However, there are other reasons why we should not have any illusions that the Religious Right can win the political elections in this country. First, the religiousright does not have the will that many would like it to have in a general election for Prime Minister. The Norwegian Christian Democratic Party and some other religious Right-oriented parties (such as Denmark’s Værøan party) have already won parliamentary seats in this country. But it seems that they cannot do it if given the chance. Secondly, many of Denmark’s political observers understand that the political left in the country needs to be seen to be winning
The Religious Right and feminism
As a result, social policy is not very influential in shaping public morality. So our point is that there is a strong desire as an anti-religious right here in Denmark to be concerned for moral values, for religious fundamentalism and for a good moral framework in which everyone can play their own part. For the same reason, we can expect that any movement of this nature must also attempt to change the social situation for the better in Europe, for example by appealing to cultural solidarity in countries with large religious populations (see: see below). In addition, while the religious right wants to be the only group that can achieve moral progress, we must also recognize that there is a strong moral force behind the movements for universal human rights. This, however, would not mean to suggest that we are more or less of that force, but that we in Europe are even somewhat less. In Denmark, for example, a “conception of the religious right may be difficult to define and the public sphere might, as a result, lack a fully inclusive and active and moral consensus for both those who practice religious fundamentalism and those who want to preserve values and norms to be a social norm” (p.228). This means that it is not only the religious establishment which must not agree with this proposal, but the movement itself. Thus, we also need to understand that although the “conception of the religious right may be difficult to define and the public sphere might, as a result, lacks a fully inclusive and active and moral consensus for both those who practice religious fundamentalism and those who want to preserve values and norms to be a social norm” (p.228). Indeed, so far there have been some clear exceptions to this. For instance, in the early 1990s, the Danish Christian Democratic Commission took the position that “It is not possible to deny that ‘traditional Christian values’ have a moral basis and that ‘traditional Christian values’ are a prerequisite for good social conduct; it simply does not explain the reason” (p. 227). So even in Denmark, this position can be defended, though there is clearly no convincing consensus on why Denmark should keep that position. Thus, in the last few years we have been able to recognize that there is still an need for a new social and national framework.
However, there are other reasons why we should not have any illusions that the Religious Right can win the political elections in this country. First, the religiousright does not have the will that many would like it to have in a general election for Prime Minister. The Norwegian Christian Democratic Party and some other religious Right-oriented parties (such as Denmark’s Værøan party) have already won parliamentary seats in this country. But it seems that they cannot do it if given the chance. Secondly, many of Denmark’s political observers understand that the political left in the country needs to be seen to be winning
The Religious Right and feminism
As a result, social policy is not very influential in shaping public morality. So our point is that there is a strong desire as an anti-religious right here in Denmark to be concerned for moral values, for religious fundamentalism and for a good moral framework in which everyone can play their own part. For the same reason, we can expect that any movement of this nature must also attempt to change the social situation for the better in Europe, for example by appealing to cultural solidarity in countries with large religious populations (see: see below). In addition, while the religious right wants to be the only group that can achieve moral progress, we must also recognize that there is a strong moral force behind the movements for universal human rights. This, however, would not mean to suggest that we are more or less of that force, but that we in Europe are even somewhat less. In Denmark, for example, a “conception of the religious right may be difficult to define and the public sphere might, as a result, lack a fully inclusive and active and moral consensus for both those who practice religious fundamentalism and those who want to preserve values and norms to be a social norm” (p.228). This means that it is not only the religious establishment which must not agree with this proposal, but the movement itself. Thus, we also need to understand that although the “conception of the religious right may be difficult to define and the public sphere might, as a result, lacks a fully inclusive and active and moral consensus for both those who practice religious fundamentalism and those who want to preserve values and norms to be a social norm” (p.228). Indeed, so far there have been some clear exceptions to this. For instance, in the early 1990s, the Danish Christian Democratic Commission took the position that “It is not possible to deny that ‘traditional Christian values’ have a moral basis and that ‘traditional Christian values’ are a prerequisite for good social conduct; it simply does not explain the reason” (p. 227). So even in Denmark, this position can be defended, though there is clearly no convincing consensus on why Denmark should keep that position. Thus, in the last few years we have been able to recognize that there is still an need for a new social and national framework.
However, there are other reasons why we should not have any illusions that the Religious Right can win the political elections in this country. First, the religiousright does not have the will that many would like it to have in a general election for Prime Minister. The Norwegian Christian Democratic Party and some other religious Right-oriented parties (such as Denmark’s Værøan party) have already won parliamentary seats in this country. But it seems that they cannot do it if given the chance. Secondly, many of Denmark’s political observers understand that the political left in the country needs to be seen to be winning
In her article Rose demonstrates how a 17-year-old girls attitude towards love is socially constructed through her environment. Rose quotes two girls, one from Denmark and one from the U.S.. The 17-year-old Danish girl, on the one hand, brought up in a country where honest