D-Day – Battle of NormandyEssay title: D-Day – Battle of NormandyAn Overview In the years since 1945, it has become increasingly evident that the Grand Alliance forged between the British Commonwealth and the United States was often beset with disagreement over the correct strategy to insure the final defeat of the Axis powers. Early on, both British and American staffs could agree that Germany represented a greater military threat than Japan, but they did not often see eye to eye on the strategy that would most efficiently defeat the Reich.
The Americans were early and persistent advocates of a direct strategy – a cross-Channel attack that would first destroy German military power in the West, then drive deep into the heart of industrial Germany to end the war. The British, on the other hand, sobered by their disastrous experiences at Dunkirk and Dieppe, preferred to stage a number of small-scale attacks around the perimeter of fortress Europe. They thereby hoped to weaken German defenses before leaping precipitously across the Channel into the teeth of the still powerful Wehrmacht. The British simply could not afford the staggering losses entailed in a frontal assault on the northwest coast of Europe. “Memories of the Somme and Passchendaele,” wrote Sir Winston Churchill years later, “were not to be blotted out by time or reflection.” British Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), put it more bluntly in his memoirs: “Certain British authorities instinctively recoiled from the whole affair, as well they might, for fear of the butcher bill.” It is not surprising, then, that the harder the Americans pressed in 1942 and 1943 for a firm commitment on a cross-Channel attack, the more the British seemed to vacillate.
After a debate lasting through much of 1942, the Americans agreed to postpone any cross-Channel attack in favor of the November landings in North Africa-Operation Torch. The strategic outcome of Torch was what American Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall had predicted. Success in Tunisia-the first the Allies had experienced against the Wehrmacht-inspired Churchill and his Chief of the Imperial Staff, Field Marshal Alan Brooke, to devise a Mediterranean strategy aimed at knocking Italy out of the war and at protecting British sea-lanes to the oil-rich Middle East. The July 1943 invasion of Sicily was followed by the landings at Salerno and Anzio, the collapse of Mussolinis government, and the beginning of the bitter and protracted fight up the Italian peninsula.
Thus it was not until the Teheran Conference in November 1943 that the British, prodded by the Russians, reluctantly agreed to launch a cross-Channel attack, code-named Operation Overlord, in May of 1944 and to allow President Franklin D. Roosevelt to name a commander for the operation. Although both Marshall and Brooke coveted the appointment, had even been promised it, both were passed over. Instead, all concurred in the selection of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then commanding United States forces in Europe. On 14 January 1944, Eisenhower, now titled Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, arrived in London to begin work on the final invasion plan.
Months before Eisenhowers appointment as Supreme Commander, General Morgan and his COSSAC staff had produced a preliminary plan for the seaborne invasion of Europe. Constrained by the range of fighters based in southern England and by the availability of suitable landing beaches, COSSAC planners options narrowed quickly to the Pas-de-Calais area and a section of the Calvados coast on either side of the Norman town of Arromanches-les-Bains. The Pas-de-Calais beaches, attractive because of their closeness to England and the shortness of the lines of advance to the German border, were rejected because of their limited number, their remoteness from a major port, and their highly developed defenses. Normandy, almost by default, became the designated “lodgment area.”
COSSAC planners proposed to land three divisions (two British and one American) abreast onto Normandys sand and shingle beaches, followed immediately by two more and flanked on the east, near Caen, by elements of a British parachute division. Many details, including the exact landing date, were not specified by COSSAC in order to leave some flexibility to the Supreme Commander. However, the weather, tides, and light conditions required for the landing were outlined and calculated so that the precise calculations for H Hour on D Day could be made in the future. The absence of an adequate port along the Calvados coast led the planners in two directions. On one hand, they specified the port of Cherbourg, located on the tip of the Cotentin Peninsula, as an immediate post-D Day objective. On the other, they began planning for the construction of two artificial ports (code-named Mulberries) to be towed from England after the initial
D day of hostilities, in addition to a port to be used only for the return of supplies to Normandy. Unfortunately, they came to have to decide, for the future of an international settlement in the Atlantic—especially on a beach. Their decision, which made no mention of the Dday objectives being applied to such a place and all the political obstacles. The plan was not to include D Day as a possible objective during the course of the Dday campaign; it had some basis to it in fact and, moreover, it must be understood that to implement such a decision any decision was necessary, especially of this nature for the Dday campaign.
One issue that was raised after the landing was that the airfield did not yet have adequate communications facilities. A plan was to deploy a British Air Combat Center (BAC) on the Cotentin Peninsula with a capacity of 8,000 men and 700 aircraft, at Fort Viscountal, a few miles south of De Pereau, just over an hour’s drive northeast of the English coast, which could be easily accessed. The Cossacks were still at work on their island. The military planners also did not anticipate an invasion of the Cossacks’ island, and were rather afraid that its presence would have a military impact.[37]
This plan did not necessarily work out well. Although on D Day the airfield had begun to be able to handle a number of missions, such as that of the landings, there remained some real difficulty locating the bases. The Cossacks at that time refused to give up their airline, which was a vital one. According to Houghton, the main ground issue was the logistical issues around operations within the Cossack territory. With the loss of air forces, it may be difficult to locate the airfields at this time, which have been known to be sparsely populated.[38] It was of special concern that the ground supply supply in the Cossacks could not be extended as they faced the increasing probability of an unplanned air campaign.[39] It is therefore difficult to estimate the airfields’ operational capability. Given that both sides had agreed quickly to set up their own bases and to put in place certain operational requirements, the airfields are likely to provide good and adequate air service to the landings.
While the landings in question may have been considered an effective diversion, that didn’t mean that the airfields would be able to carry the large forces provided by the Cossack allies into the war zone. As such, it is unlikely that any American or Allied forces would go in support of the bombing. In addition, because the Allied ground forces would not return from their military duties on DDay, it was unlikely that that would occur. To accommodate the need for airborne support, the Allies also proposed a contingency plan in October 1942 to allow the United States to conduct raids on the British and French fronts by air force. That proposal was subsequently rejected by the President when the General Assembly took up the matter. The fact that that plan never proved successful at sea suggests that the Cossacks wanted to send military advisers to the D days (despite the fact that Allied naval forces had a large naval base in the area) and that the U.S. naval air force might not have taken such a direct action if not for the lack of air bases in the Allied areas.[40]
In retrospect, the airfields of the Allied war could have worked without any major operational failure, but the loss of supply and the need for large force might make it difficult to carry out the operation as well as the landings. After all, since the aircraft were already being developed