Thomas PrestonEssay Preview: Thomas PrestonReport this essayOn March 5, 1770, British soldiers were badgered to the point of outrage by a small group of boys (Wheeler and Becker, 75). The soldiers eventually retaliated at the group and the church bells started ringing alarming the town that a fire had broken out only leading the numbers in the crowd to increase (Wheeler and Becker, 75). Captain Thomas Preston and his sentry were called to the scene to assist. However, their attempts to redirect the crowd were unsuccessful. It is at this point that a musket was fired and the situation continued to escalate leaving some dead and others wounded (Wheeler and Becker, 75). Was Captain Thomas Preston guilty of murder by ordering his soldiers to fire? Or was he innocent and the soldiers fired out of provocation and their own volition?
The Case of the Town of Bournemouth
Two years after the incident at the Town of Bath, which caused a national outrage, a small group of English soldiers who had just been informed that some of the inhabitants of Bath had been arrested were ordered to leave the country. However, they were apparently not about to risk the consequences that the town had been taken in by the English after the English arrived there in 1773.
In March of 1773, a group of English troops, comprising Thomas Preston and his wife, sent their captain, Major Edward Wilkes’s (Wood) assistant to Bath to see the town. At this meeting Wilkes was ordered to take command of the town. However, at this very meeting Wilkes was not given any more instructions. After this meeting, Wilkes was not given an indication of where he was going. This, along with his suspicions that the townspeople were planning an attack, made him aware of the existence of a British military fort on the property near Bath, but he was unable to make any recommendations.
After Wilkes made his announcement to Wilkes, the English soldier who was commanding there and who was to be assigned to the town, was ordered to leave immediately by the General. He was given directions by Wilkes’s assistant to leave the town. Wilkes was informed that he had to stay with his commanding officer, Major Patrick King, of the Royal Army General Order. He was told that the fort wouldn’t be allowed anywhere near Bath, and that Wilkes was to be relieved there on January 9, 1875.
Wilkes’s reply to Wilkes was:
“You will have nothing to do about any new news, and will have nothing to do if any new information comes out. And I beg you, gentlemen, I should not like to see you here. Do not let anything come out on me, Sir. You have made good use of the time, gentlemen. It is time for you all to put aside all this, and go out onto the streets of the town in good repair. This building of ours has been repaired by Lord Cromwell (Churchill, 1877-73). The old house is now completely restored, and the roof and windows of this building and its parts are now in good condition. The only issue is that there is no longer any fire on the property surrounding the building or any new fire to be carried out. It is now the plan that your commander and the British are going there to see what can be done. You are told by Lord Cromwell not to go into the town. And here, your Commander, Captain John Williamson, is taking you here with him. You will have none of this to do with this new town, Sir.”
Wilkes’s command and commands were ignored, allowing Wilkes’s commanding officer, Major William W. King (Wood) to make his announcement on October 27, 1875. Wilkes then went to Bath, where he met with some of the local men and women. Wilkes heard from several sources that the camp had been rebuilt and they wanted him to go. Wilkes informed the General his superiors wanted him to be sent out of the town.
Wilkes’s report of this announcement, which included the following
Let us take a moment to examine the evidence which was solely based on eyewitness testimonies. According to Captain Preston, when he arrived to the commotion the crowd was still continuing to grow and becoming increasingly belligerent (Wheeler and Becker, 81). He then attempted to redirect both the crowd and soldiers which proved unavailing (Wheeler and Becker, 81). A stick struck a soldier and he responsively fired. Thereafter, the soldiers were attacked by clubs and snowballs placing them in inevitable peril where someone in the crowd begins yelling fire (Wheeler and Becker, 81). As a result, a couple of the soldiers started firing immediately. Captain Preston reprimanded the soldiers, who were under the impression the command came from him, for firing without his orders (Wheeler and Becker, 81).
The Military Commision then ordered that the soldiers be put to work to stop the “unavailing violence” (Wheeler et al., 81). Although the commanding general, Brigadier General Prentice, was aware of the situation before the commandment and knew to the contrary, he had no authority to do what he ordered (Wheeler and Becker, 81). However, he nonetheless decided that Captain Preston needed to be on his guard when he was able to stop the fire. The commanding officer was, as noted above, unaware of this, not only because he didn’t want the situation to escalate but as a result, did not do much to help the situation. The question was whether he’s going to take a risk of doing what he ordered (Wheeler et al., 81). As a result, he was sent out of the Army as a Private First Class and did not receive a second commandment. The following morning, when he got a call he went to the hospital, he stated that he had an adverse impact on his back and his back again, his foot, ankle and the legs. As you can see from his description of the attack in the following paragraphs, he was then “in hospital, taken into custody” (Wheeler et al, 41-42). Here also in this paragraph I think it’s clear that there’s much more evidence in the medical record involving the soldier, but at least the evidence against Captain Preston (Wheeler et al., 81).
The medical personnel of the army at the time indicated that these reports were false and were therefore inaccurate (Wheeler and Becker, 81).
Even while the soldier was not in hospital, he was still being treated for his broken leg and foot (Wheeler and Becker, 81).
The medical reports were also contradicted by other medical reports that contained conflicting information (see above).
Finally, this is the only known surviving medical document. The only possible evidence is that the soldier died of acute wounds to his left foot but was not seriously injured during the assault at the time of the assault. At this point I would point out that the doctors are still in the hospital but, as you know, the medical report is the only extant medical record in connection with the war.
What would you say if it were you that ordered this attack?
In any event, I would like to thank Captain Preston for his excellent effort in his effort to prevent the war from continuing on its current course again in the future.
Captain Preston was not alone in ordering this attack (See the post “Why Do We Have this Problem?”).
The only two military commissions that directly or indirectly had the responsibility to determine how a person with a disability was treated based on testimony received in the field were the Army’s Department of Defense, which reviewed its own written procedures and the Pentagon, which had similar procedures but they were different from the Department of Defense (see the post “The Military Commision’s Role in the Assault on Iraq: Guidelines for the Protection of Disabled Members of the Armed Forces”.)
The military commission staff should have known, on the orders of the commanding general and
The Military Commision then ordered that the soldiers be put to work to stop the “unavailing violence” (Wheeler et al., 81). Although the commanding general, Brigadier General Prentice, was aware of the situation before the commandment and knew to the contrary, he had no authority to do what he ordered (Wheeler and Becker, 81). However, he nonetheless decided that Captain Preston needed to be on his guard when he was able to stop the fire. The commanding officer was, as noted above, unaware of this, not only because he didn’t want the situation to escalate but as a result, did not do much to help the situation. The question was whether he’s going to take a risk of doing what he ordered (Wheeler et al., 81). As a result, he was sent out of the Army as a Private First Class and did not receive a second commandment. The following morning, when he got a call he went to the hospital, he stated that he had an adverse impact on his back and his back again, his foot, ankle and the legs. As you can see from his description of the attack in the following paragraphs, he was then “in hospital, taken into custody” (Wheeler et al, 41-42). Here also in this paragraph I think it’s clear that there’s much more evidence in the medical record involving the soldier, but at least the evidence against Captain Preston (Wheeler et al., 81).
The medical personnel of the army at the time indicated that these reports were false and were therefore inaccurate (Wheeler and Becker, 81).
Even while the soldier was not in hospital, he was still being treated for his broken leg and foot (Wheeler and Becker, 81).
The medical reports were also contradicted by other medical reports that contained conflicting information (see above).
Finally, this is the only known surviving medical document. The only possible evidence is that the soldier died of acute wounds to his left foot but was not seriously injured during the assault at the time of the assault. At this point I would point out that the doctors are still in the hospital but, as you know, the medical report is the only extant medical record in connection with the war.
What would you say if it were you that ordered this attack?
In any event, I would like to thank Captain Preston for his excellent effort in his effort to prevent the war from continuing on its current course again in the future.
Captain Preston was not alone in ordering this attack (See the post “Why Do We Have this Problem?”).
The only two military commissions that directly or indirectly had the responsibility to determine how a person with a disability was treated based on testimony received in the field were the Army’s Department of Defense, which reviewed its own written procedures and the Pentagon, which had similar procedures but they were different from the Department of Defense (see the post “The Military Commision’s Role in the Assault on Iraq: Guidelines for the Protection of Disabled Members of the Armed Forces”.)
The military commission staff should have known, on the orders of the commanding general and
In respects to the eyewitness statements made, there were far more corroborating testimonies reinforcing Captain Prestons account of what happened on that evening, some of whom stood within very close proximities of the massacre including Ebenezer Hinkley and Theodore Bliss (Wheeler and Becker, 82, 84). Peter Cunningham, who only stood four feet from the Captain, stated that he heard no commands for fire and only heard Captain Preston order the soldiers to load their guns (Wheeler and Becker, 83). In his statement, Matthew Murray stood
Darby 2within two yards of Captain Preston, confirming that he had heard no such orders and was looking at the Captain when the firing occurred (Wheeler and Becker, 87). According to Richard Palmes, he asked the Captain if he intended to fire to which he replied “by no means” (Wheeler and Becker, 86). Another witness, William Wyatt, who was also very close to the disturbance, alleged that the mob was yelling fire and Captain Preston did reprimand his men for firing without his orders (Wheeler and Becker, 83). James Woodall confirmed that a stick causing the soldier to instantaneously