Caramol V. Nlrc
Essay Preview: Caramol V. Nlrc
Report this essay
Romares v. NLRCG.R. No. 122327. August 19, 1998MARTINEZ, J.:Caramol v. NLRCG.R. No. 102973, August 24, 1993BELLOSILLO, J.:Facts: Roger Caramol was hired by Atlantic Gulf and Pacific CO. of Manila, Inc based on a “project to project” contract, which was renewed 44 times by the company. Caramol is seeking the reversal of the NLRC’s decision, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. According to Caramol, the company no longer recognized him as an employee after he was manning the picket lines during the recent union strike. According to the labor arbiter, Atlantic Gulf and Pacific CO. of Manila, Inc. was found guilty of the following: misuse of labor practices, declared illegal the constructive dismissal of the petitioner, and directed for the immediate reinstatement of the petitioner, which includes the payment of full back wages and without loss of Caramol’s seniority rights.The NLRC, however, reversed the said decision and declared that Caramol should be considered as a project employee. Consequently, Caramol argues that the NLRC made the wrong decision because their decision was based on several errors that go against the law. Issue: Whether or not Roger Caramol should be considered a regular employeeHeld: Yes, Caramol is qualified to be a regular employee in the company because he falls under the two types, which is by duration and by virtue of work. Caramol was hired by Atlantic Gulf and Pacific CO. of Manila, Inc. 44 times, where he continued to work as rigger. This allowed him to qualify for the security of tenor. Furthermore, the fact that Caramol was hired 44 times by the company shows that his service plays a crucial role in the daily functions of the company. Moreover, a report of termination was lacking on the part of the company, which is crucial because it is required by Policy Instruction No. 2 to be filed when the company decided to terminate a contract due to the completion of a project. Rationale: Therefore, Roger Caramol is an employee of the company and is entitled to be reinstated and to receive payment for back wages. Kimberly v. DizonG.R. No. L-77629 May 9, 1990REGALADO, J.:Facts: Kimberly-Clark Philippines, Inc. and the United Kimberly-Clark Employees Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization agreed on a three-year collective bargaining agreement that expired on June 30, 1986. During the 60-day freedom period, where the negotiations for the renewal of the said agreement was taking place, some members of the bargaining unit decided to form the “Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture”. On April 21, 1986, KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a petition for certification election, in which both KIMBERLY and UKCEU-PTGWO did not oppose to. However, both the latter organizations objected to the inclusion of the contractual workers of KIMBERLY as qualified voters for the election. Moreover, on June 2, 1986, Bonifacio Marasigan issued an order that declares the following as eligible to vote in the certification election, thus: regular rank-and-file laborers/employees of the respondent company, casuals who have worked for at least six (6) months, and contractual employees who are allegedly in the employ of an independent contractor and who have also worked for at least six (6) months.
During the pre-election conference, KIMBERLY and UKCEU-PTGWO called out 64 workers and challenged them because that they are not employees of KIMBERLY but of RANK. This led to the agreement by all affected parties that the 64 voters shall be allowed to but on the condition that their ballots shall be segregated and subject to challenge proceedings.After the elections, UKCEU-PTGWO was victorious by 20 votes. However, the votes of the 64 employees were counted separately. Regarding the votes of the 64, Sanchez claims that: the other casual employees not performing janitorial and yard maintenance services were deemed labor-only contractuals. Furthermore, since labor-only contracting is prohibited, the employees are considered regular employees. Due to how members were only considered regular at the time of the decision, their votes were not re-considered. Issue: Whether or not the 64 employees were considered to be regular employees during the certification electionHeld: Yes, they are considered regular employees. A280LC states that there are two kinds of regular employees; namely, those who are engaged to perform activities that are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer and those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. In this case, the 64 employees fall under the second kind of employee. It is a fact that these employees were employed by Kimberly for over a year at the time of the filing of the petition for certification election. Although the actual regularization of these employees requires the issuing of regular appointment papers and compliance with other operating procedures, the issue is more about keeping the spirit of the law, in which casual workers are considered regular employees after the end of their first year of service. Given these circumstances, the regular employees have the right to vote in the certification election. Moreover, the votes cast by those employees not performing janitorial and yard maintenance service should also be opened and included in determining the certified bargaining representative.Rationale: Therefore, the 64 employees are deemed regular employees.Brent v. ZamoraG.R. No. L-48494, February 5, 1990NARVASA, J.:Facts: Doroteo Alegre was an athletic director at Brent, who had a contract with a fixed term of 5 years, which lasted from July 1971 to July 1976. Furthermore, he engaged in subsidiary agreements on March 1973, August 1973, and Sept. 1974, which had the same terms and conditions as the original contract. 3 months before the expiration of the stipulated period, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent with the Dep. of Labor, which stated that his services were terminated, effective July 16, 1976, due to the “completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment.”