Challenger Launch DecisionEssay Preview: Challenger Launch DecisionReport this essayThe case describes and outlines the group process in the Challenger Launch decisions. On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded in midair, taking the lives of six astronauts. The night before the launch of the Challenger shuttle, thirty two individuals from Morton Thiokol and NASA and other supporting agencies, participated in a teleconference to discuss whether to postpone the shuttle launch due to predicted low temperatures at Kennedy Space Center. It was recorded that engineers at Morton Thiokol, the contractor responsible for building the solid rocket booster, had strongly opposed the launching of Challenger, but their warning had not been heeded by management. These engineers suspected what the Rogers Commission would later support, that the immediate cause of the explosion was a burn through of the solid rocket booster joint O-rings, which were the same O-rings that engineers had been concerned about.
Roger Boisjoly, an engineer of 27 years, was among the engineers who instigated the issue to the top managers at Morton Thiokol. He had been extremely vocal over the past few months about the performance of the design of the shuttle and its O-Rings in low temperatures. It was documented that Roger wrote a letter to top management about the critical issue concerning the O-ring and its potential failure. Yet it was ignored.
After the accident, the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident was formed to examine the accident and reported a number of findings. The findings include a few interesting facts that will eventually be discussed in more detail. Despite this concern, top NASA decision makers told the Rogers Commission that they had no knowledge on January 27 that these matters had been the subject of intense controversy within Thiokol and between Thiokol and the Marshall Space Flight Center in the decision-making process (Dimitroff, Schmidt, & Bond, 2005).
Irving Janis, from Yale University, defined groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when members striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action (Kinicki & Kreitner, 2008). He also included that groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures (Kinicki & Kreitner, 2008). Members of groups mistreated by groupthink tend to be friendly and tightly knit. According to Janiss model, there are eight classic symptoms of groupthink. Symptoms of groupthink include invulnerability, inherent morality, rationalization, stereotyped views of opposition, self-censorship, illusion of unanimity, peer pressure, and mind guards (Dimitroff, Schmidt, & Bond, 2005).
The Problem
Despite their differences, groupthink and their political activities are generally the same. In general, groupthink seems incompatible with the liberal ideal of equality, liberalism, the rule of law, morality, and basic human rights. Groups are highly motivated to promote an in-group which is more productive at a higher level than any other group. They may try to avoid conflict from other individuals, which lowers the incentive for them to engage in conflict on a group level. The main problem is that groups tend to be so rigid that they tend to fall at the middle of the hierarchy and often in the bottom tier of the organization.
As a result, the group is more prone to failure (e.g., when a higher-level party has less success at any given level than the group). It is common for a group to appear to have little to no capacity for responsibility and are therefore more likely to leave the organization in frustration, fear, or other non-responsibility in order to support themselves with more money, influence, or power, according to a recent study (Szabo et. al., 2003). The problem can also arise when the level of social control between the higher-level and higher-level parties varies among the groups. As such parties, in a sense, tend to be more hierarchical at this level (e.g., even if social control is limited, individuals are generally not involved in managing the social networks without the political participation of higher-level parties).
The solution should be to reduce the amount of hierarchical social authority and control between different levels of parties (Kaplan, 2003), not through a more hierarchical society, but through “socially appropriate” social organization that works for the group for which it serves. For example, the concept of “self-government” (Kaplan, 2003) would require groups to follow a different social system from another group that is not the same organization. Similarly, “self-representation” (i.e., voting for a party that has better policies) would need groups to adopt policies that are likely to advance the interests of all people (Meadow, 2012). The idea of an organization like a social club could help to limit the number of individuals participating in a given organization.
The solution must also include the provision for the effective use of coercive measures by the party that has the power (i.e., the Party Control Board or control officers). An example of social control is a group which gives leadership to all persons who are members of a higher hierarchical group (e.g., the party headquarters of a top-level party of a higher group) while still using other members, such as elders of higher-level or less hierarchical groups. When a high-level leader of a dominant group abuses party power, that leader can be subject to blackmail and/or blackmail by the top party (Khalanov, 1990). Such actions are known as “self-serving measures” and have also been proposed as a means of controlling the membership in large-party organizations. The goal should be to create and sustain a system of hierarchical social control. While these measures may be necessary, no effective “social order” can be achieved via coercive measures without a government that uses coercive mechanisms.
This discussion is meant to help create and maintain a system that works for all people. No system can be
The Problem
Despite their differences, groupthink and their political activities are generally the same. In general, groupthink seems incompatible with the liberal ideal of equality, liberalism, the rule of law, morality, and basic human rights. Groups are highly motivated to promote an in-group which is more productive at a higher level than any other group. They may try to avoid conflict from other individuals, which lowers the incentive for them to engage in conflict on a group level. The main problem is that groups tend to be so rigid that they tend to fall at the middle of the hierarchy and often in the bottom tier of the organization.
As a result, the group is more prone to failure (e.g., when a higher-level party has less success at any given level than the group). It is common for a group to appear to have little to no capacity for responsibility and are therefore more likely to leave the organization in frustration, fear, or other non-responsibility in order to support themselves with more money, influence, or power, according to a recent study (Szabo et. al., 2003). The problem can also arise when the level of social control between the higher-level and higher-level parties varies among the groups. As such parties, in a sense, tend to be more hierarchical at this level (e.g., even if social control is limited, individuals are generally not involved in managing the social networks without the political participation of higher-level parties).
The solution should be to reduce the amount of hierarchical social authority and control between different levels of parties (Kaplan, 2003), not through a more hierarchical society, but through “socially appropriate” social organization that works for the group for which it serves. For example, the concept of “self-government” (Kaplan, 2003) would require groups to follow a different social system from another group that is not the same organization. Similarly, “self-representation” (i.e., voting for a party that has better policies) would need groups to adopt policies that are likely to advance the interests of all people (Meadow, 2012). The idea of an organization like a social club could help to limit the number of individuals participating in a given organization.
The solution must also include the provision for the effective use of coercive measures by the party that has the power (i.e., the Party Control Board or control officers). An example of social control is a group which gives leadership to all persons who are members of a higher hierarchical group (e.g., the party headquarters of a top-level party of a higher group) while still using other members, such as elders of higher-level or less hierarchical groups. When a high-level leader of a dominant group abuses party power, that leader can be subject to blackmail and/or blackmail by the top party (Khalanov, 1990). Such actions are known as “self-serving measures” and have also been proposed as a means of controlling the membership in large-party organizations. The goal should be to create and sustain a system of hierarchical social control. While these measures may be necessary, no effective “social order” can be achieved via coercive measures without a government that uses coercive mechanisms.
This discussion is meant to help create and maintain a system that works for all people. No system can be
In the Challenger case we see some of those symptoms recognized. It appears the decision to launch in colder temperatures was brought about by feelings of invulnerability due to the success of the Apollo program, as well as the fact they had flown previously in somewhat similar conditions. NASA management still pushed to meet its schedule and subconsciously relegated safety and quality to a minor role (Dimitroff, Schmidt, & Bond, 2005).We can see the effects of groupthink, where Morton Thiokol collectively rationalized their earlier decision and reversed it, all due to pressure and rationalization from NASA. The end result was that Morton Thiokol agreed there was no additional concern for flight safety. Verifiable documentation is available that sums up the Challenger incident as thus: “The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed.” Communication failures, incomplete and misleading information, and poor management judgment all figured in a decision-making process that permitted, in the words of the commission, “internal flight safety problems to bypass key shuttle managers (Dimitroff, Schmidt, & Bond, 2005).
With the Challenger explosion, one has to look at some of the key reasons that led to the disaster. As documented by the commission, there was not necessarily conflict at NASA
or at Morton Thiokol, but more a hesitancy to “raise a red flag.” Questions were raised, but the flag was not waved high enough. NASA had conflicting goals of cost, schedule, and safety. Safety lost out as the mandates of an “operational system” increased the schedule pressure. Scarce resources went to problems that were defined as more serious, rather than to foam strikes or O-ring erosion (Dimitroff, Schmidt, & Bond, 2005). During the course of the investigation, it was discovered that NASA and Morton Thiokol had vigorously debated the wisdom of operating the shuttle in the cold temperatures predicted for the next day. The investigation also revealed a NASA culture that gradually began to accept escalating risk and a safety program that was largely silent and ineffective (Kinicki & Kreitner, 2008).
In 1979, the Marshall Space Flight Center, in a bid to protect the safety of the astronauts, contracted with NASA to develop a new safety-related design for the shuttle. This design, however, failed to have sufficient data from an all-weather instrument on the outside, and NASA subsequently refused to renew the contract after that. In 1987, the agency became involved in an investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board that determined that the new design had failed to meet certain safety and safety standards that applied to shuttle flights. Over the next few years, NASA and Morton Thiokol’s engineers and engineers continued efforts to make the new design work for missions beyond low-Earth orbit. NASA finally accepted the design and approved it for its shuttle mission on September 1, 1988, following a review of existing information on the design, including the Shuttle’s instrument design, its engine design, and the flight controllers’ data. Following the release of the new, all-weather version of the Shuttle, NASA’s engineers then went to NASA Headquarters’ engineering office to assess whether the design met the standard, and eventually accepted for their upcoming schedule release in September of 1989 that would have permitted further analysis of the program, safety and design of the new design. This analysis concluded that the program was not ready due to safety problems associated with the instrument used (Ebbett, 1976). To test the design, NASA engineers used a second instrument with a new and improved version of the instrument. The second instrument, however, did not meet FAA safety recommendations, and the shuttle became an open-label operational program (Golb, 1987; and Kreitner, 2008). In 1998, the federal government finally accepted the Shuttle’s design again at the design cost. By this time, nearly 90 percent of the funds raised for the program came from the Marshall Space Flight Center, not from NASA. This time around, NASA agreed to fund the original program through the Marshall Space Flight Center (MFC) in Huntsville, Alabama. This new NASA program has resulted in a more reliable, cost efficient, and safe and functional shuttle that takes place on multiple days per week. NASA officials recognize this program could generate much higher numbers of positive NASA dollars. In particular, if these factors are not taken into account, the Shuttle could be significantly more successful and have more valuable future uses. By using new instruments, NASA scientists have learned that the Shuttle performs not only faster than any other mission-critical spacecraft, but can also be more efficiently flown by other human crew. During 1998, the Shuttle became the United States’ only shuttle launched aircraft to have flown with a flight path less than 9 km, and its success rate in achieving this mark had been declining over the last five years. Shuttle missions have also gained significant international approval following the implementation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)’s National Commercial Crew Program in 2009. The program has demonstrated that a crewed aircraft capable of carrying payloads can fly with fewer than five hours of flight a day for at least two months. The program has also created significant advantages over traditional manned spacecraft. The first crewed spacecraft in commercial flight did not have a dedicated cargo compartment, so crews aboard commercial aircraft could be
There were several measures that could have been practiced to prevent groupthink from developing. The diversity of viewpoints is one effort towards eliminating groupthink by attempting to structure the group so that there are different viewpoints. Diverse input will tend to point out non-obvious risks, drawbacks, and advantages that might not have been considered by a more standardized group (Von Bergen & Kirk, 1978).
Another is each member of the group should be assigned the role of critical evaluator (Von Bergen & Kirk, (1978).This role involves aggressively voicing objections and doubts. Roger tried to voice his concerns about the O-rings but no one was assigned to allow voice objections. Different