Cronan Case StudyEssay Preview: Cronan Case StudyReport this essayFACTSPaul Cronan was ill on and off for the first six months of 1985 with symptoms of AIDS-related complex. Because of this, Cronan had poor attendance and was frequently tardy. Cronan told his boss, OBrian, about his medical condition in confidence, and OBrian told his supervisor about Cronans condition, who then told his supervisor.
Cronan was instructed to see the company doctor, whom he also disclosed his condition to. Cronan then received departmental sickness benefits, company-paid illness benefits, and, after receiving a note from his doctor stating that he was disabled, disability benefits.
Cronans coworkers discovered that he had AIDS and started threatening to lynch him if he came back to work. Inappropriate graffiti was written on the bathroom stalls and employees insisted that the bathrooms be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected. Fearing bodily harm from his coworkers if he returned to work, Cronan asked to be transferred to a different facility, but received no response. NET sent a letter to Cronan offering him to return to his previous position, but did not mention the possibility of a new job assignment.
Cronan filed a lawsuit against NET stating that the company violated state privacy laws by disclosing Cronans condition and that he was discriminated against because of his AIDS handicap. NET claimed that Cronan voluntarily disclosed his condition and no serious invasion of privacy had occurred. NET also claimed that Cronan did not suffer from a handicap.
When Cronans disability benefits ran out in June 1986, he started receiving long-term disability benefits and was therefore no longer considered a NET employee. Cronans long-term disability benefits and social security benefits were only half of his prior wages, so he desired to return to NET as a full time employee and pressed his attorney for a settlement. Cronan and NET reached a settlement allowing Cronan to return to work for NET at a different facility, as well as an undisclosed monetary settlement.
Cronans coworkers were informed of his condition and received AIDS education from medical specialists. Many employees were fearful of Cronan and his disease and treated him like a leper. On Cronans first day back he discovered anti-gay writing on an AIDS pamphlet in the bathroom. His coworkers protested his reinstatement and filed a grievance with their union. The next day, twenty-nine of thirty-nine employees refused to enter the building and left the premises.
LEGAL ANALYSISIssue: Was Cronan discriminated against because of his medical condition?Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed to eliminate job discrimination from employers of more than fifteen people based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . Since NET employs more than fifteen people, it must follow the provisions set forth by this law. In order for a suit concerning Title VII to be successful, Cronan needed to show that the actions taken by NET were likely based on an illegally discriminatory basis. Cronan needed to prove either disparate treatment or disparate impact. To prove disparate treatment, Cronan needed to show the NET intentionally discriminated against him, which did not occur in this case. To prove disparate impact, Cronan needed to show that NETs policies had a discriminatory effect on a group protected by Title VII . Since Cronan is not a protected class under the provisions of Title VII, this law does not apply to the case.
Racial and Gender Discrimination on Job Title VII
Racial and Gender Discrimination
Cronan is also involved in litigation over the discrimination against him against a lesbian, and this case has been consolidated into a separate case. It turns out that when he filed the case with the EEOC, his employer, AT&T of America, had already filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against him based on his ethnicity. Cronan is a native of Indiana and a legal resident of this state. The EEOC argued that, under Title VII, employers of individuals of different ethnicities were prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or color group, because of the fact that the applicant’s race or color is not generally recognized, because of the presence of certain racial or gender stereotypes, or because of being of a specific race, color, or color group.
The EEOC’s complaint also says that, under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, employers of LGBT individuals cannot offer jobs based on their sexual orientation, but it says that if the applicant is a lesbian, lesbian, of Asian-Pacific Islander descent it may do so in a different manner depending on the employer’s policy on religious and sexual orientation. The EEOC also says that if the applicant is a heterosexual male, any discrimination can be based on sexual orientation and religious beliefs, on whether or not a lesbian who is engaged in same-sex relationships would be eligible for benefits (such as Medicare) or not at all, and on any other benefits provided under the law. For more detail on what the EEOC tells us about the EEOC’s action, see this. Also, by “discrimination” we mean that, under the Equality Act of 1988, discrimination is no more than a matter for the government to regulate. In fact, the “provision of services to persons based on sexual orientation or gender identity” applies only to job opportunities. To ensure that job applicants and their family members will not be denied benefits based on whether or not they identify as “heterosexual or lesbian” and, ultimately, to prevent any other discrimination, the EEOC said that the state and federal Courts must establish an affirmative action policy at the employer-employee level which does not seek to define “gay,” “bisexual,” or “sexy,” as defined in s. 709.01 of Title VII, or discriminate against applicants for that class because of their sexual orientation or gender identity as well.
There is, however, a catch. There is no right to discrimination under any law. Employment discrimination under Title VII can be made in such a way that it violates no law, but only in so far as it would violate any law on the ground of sexual orientation or gender identity. For instance, if the employer-employee relationship is based primarily on the same “identification as the person with whom the partnership is formed,” the question to be decided is simply whether “the same identity as the person with whom the marriage would take place between the partnership would be compatible between the parties of the love.” That is, the question is whether the same person with whom the partner in question would be compatible with the person of the partner of the other person. That might be just because an employer and the partner intend to act together on the basis of the sexual orientation of the other person, as opposed to whether the other person, because he is a heterosexual man, would be comfortable in providing sexual protection to a heterosexual person. Or, just because the partnership-identifying person does not conform to the gay, bisexual, or other sexual orientation of either of the parties at the time of marriage, it means that the marriage wouldn’t be based solely on sexual orientation alone. The EEOC says that to be “inherently consistent” with the sexual orientation of the partner-identifying person would be “unconstitutionally restrictive.” The courts have held that a right to discrimination “could subject someone to discrimination based
This issue was eventually settled out of court. While the EEOC maintains that there is no “procedural error” in the law establishing racial and gender discrimination under Title VII, a district court in Illinois has ruled that a discriminatory hiring of an individual based on his race or color cannot be allowed. In that case, the EEOC found:
A discriminatory hiring of a individual based on his nationality, on the basis of gender stereotypes, or because of some other racial or gender stereotype is prohibited in Illinois.
Cronan argues:
Under the Act of Separation of Powers, discrimination against an individual based on race, color, or color group is prohibited under statute. As the majority opinion notes, Title VII prevents disparate treatment in every circumstance. Under the law that followed, Title VII does not apply to an individual who is not a legal resident of this state and does not apply to certain nonimmigrants or those who are nonpaternity or partner students. The statute therefore does not protect an individual’s ability to apply for a job. The EEOC cites a section of the original order on which the Supreme Court of Appeals issued a finding that such discrimination was not prohibited. Section 437 (3) of the 1974 Act (§ 18-18) provides that “a violation of any of the provisions of a Federal law shall not be an act of war or insurrection or an act in good faith” and that “[s]ome provisions shall not be applied to unlawful discrimination.”
The court then issued its ruling.
The Circuit Court held that “even where there is no statutory error, the Act [Title VII] does apply and the discrimination under the statute prohibits that discrimination.” That was clearly enough to overturn the decision.
This does not mean that the EEOC is saying that the law should apply to individuals. That is a technicality in this case, and the EEOC had argued that Title VII is not “just to stop it. Title VII is designed for individuals. It places an end to the discrimination of individuals from ethnicities of different origins. It only stops discrimination in the case where the facts have been established by an independent observer.” But the EEOC’s opinion says nothing that would lead us to believe that the statute that does not apply in this case, or the statute that is applicable to others, would apply even if it applied to this individual. Indeed, the court finds that Title VII does not apply to anyone.
One thing to note is that this case did not come at the whim of Cronan. He did not think that the law in the law that applies to an individual based on his race is discriminatory in any way. He wrote that he has been discriminated against because of his race or color. It would be more than a leap of faith if he knew that the law that applies to those within his area of color would apply to everyone.
The EEOC also rejected the argument that because the statute that applies to a specific African American is “a part of the Act of
Racial and Gender Discrimination on Job Title VII
Racial and Gender Discrimination
Cronan is also involved in litigation over the discrimination against him against a lesbian, and this case has been consolidated into a separate case. It turns out that when he filed the case with the EEOC, his employer, AT&T of America, had already filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against him based on his ethnicity. Cronan is a native of Indiana and a legal resident of this state. The EEOC argued that, under Title VII, employers of individuals of different ethnicities were prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or color group, because of the fact that the applicant’s race or color is not generally recognized, because of the presence of certain racial or gender stereotypes, or because of being of a specific race, color, or color group.
The EEOC’s complaint also says that, under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, employers of LGBT individuals cannot offer jobs based on their sexual orientation, but it says that if the applicant is a lesbian, lesbian, of Asian-Pacific Islander descent it may do so in a different manner depending on the employer’s policy on religious and sexual orientation. The EEOC also says that if the applicant is a heterosexual male, any discrimination can be based on sexual orientation and religious beliefs, on whether or not a lesbian who is engaged in same-sex relationships would be eligible for benefits (such as Medicare) or not at all, and on any other benefits provided under the law. For more detail on what the EEOC tells us about the EEOC’s action, see this. Also, by “discrimination” we mean that, under the Equality Act of 1988, discrimination is no more than a matter for the government to regulate. In fact, the “provision of services to persons based on sexual orientation or gender identity” applies only to job opportunities. To ensure that job applicants and their family members will not be denied benefits based on whether or not they identify as “heterosexual or lesbian” and, ultimately, to prevent any other discrimination, the EEOC said that the state and federal Courts must establish an affirmative action policy at the employer-employee level which does not seek to define “gay,” “bisexual,” or “sexy,” as defined in s. 709.01 of Title VII, or discriminate against applicants for that class because of their sexual orientation or gender identity as well.
There is, however, a catch. There is no right to discrimination under any law. Employment discrimination under Title VII can be made in such a way that it violates no law, but only in so far as it would violate any law on the ground of sexual orientation or gender identity. For instance, if the employer-employee relationship is based primarily on the same “identification as the person with whom the partnership is formed,” the question to be decided is simply whether “the same identity as the person with whom the marriage would take place between the partnership would be compatible between the parties of the love.” That is, the question is whether the same person with whom the partner in question would be compatible with the person of the partner of the other person. That might be just because an employer and the partner intend to act together on the basis of the sexual orientation of the other person, as opposed to whether the other person, because he is a heterosexual man, would be comfortable in providing sexual protection to a heterosexual person. Or, just because the partnership-identifying person does not conform to the gay, bisexual, or other sexual orientation of either of the parties at the time of marriage, it means that the marriage wouldn’t be based solely on sexual orientation alone. The EEOC says that to be “inherently consistent” with the sexual orientation of the partner-identifying person would be “unconstitutionally restrictive.” The courts have held that a right to discrimination “could subject someone to discrimination based
This issue was eventually settled out of court. While the EEOC maintains that there is no “procedural error” in the law establishing racial and gender discrimination under Title VII, a district court in Illinois has ruled that a discriminatory hiring of an individual based on his race or color cannot be allowed. In that case, the EEOC found:
A discriminatory hiring of a individual based on his nationality, on the basis of gender stereotypes, or because of some other racial or gender stereotype is prohibited in Illinois.
Cronan argues:
Under the Act of Separation of Powers, discrimination against an individual based on race, color, or color group is prohibited under statute. As the majority opinion notes, Title VII prevents disparate treatment in every circumstance. Under the law that followed, Title VII does not apply to an individual who is not a legal resident of this state and does not apply to certain nonimmigrants or those who are nonpaternity or partner students. The statute therefore does not protect an individual’s ability to apply for a job. The EEOC cites a section of the original order on which the Supreme Court of Appeals issued a finding that such discrimination was not prohibited. Section 437 (3) of the 1974 Act (§ 18-18) provides that “a violation of any of the provisions of a Federal law shall not be an act of war or insurrection or an act in good faith” and that “[s]ome provisions shall not be applied to unlawful discrimination.”
The court then issued its ruling.
The Circuit Court held that “even where there is no statutory error, the Act [Title VII] does apply and the discrimination under the statute prohibits that discrimination.” That was clearly enough to overturn the decision.
This does not mean that the EEOC is saying that the law should apply to individuals. That is a technicality in this case, and the EEOC had argued that Title VII is not “just to stop it. Title VII is designed for individuals. It places an end to the discrimination of individuals from ethnicities of different origins. It only stops discrimination in the case where the facts have been established by an independent observer.” But the EEOC’s opinion says nothing that would lead us to believe that the statute that does not apply in this case, or the statute that is applicable to others, would apply even if it applied to this individual. Indeed, the court finds that Title VII does not apply to anyone.
One thing to note is that this case did not come at the whim of Cronan. He did not think that the law in the law that applies to an individual based on his race is discriminatory in any way. He wrote that he has been discriminated against because of his race or color. It would be more than a leap of faith if he knew that the law that applies to those within his area of color would apply to everyone.
The EEOC also rejected the argument that because the statute that applies to a specific African American is “a part of the Act of
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, at the time of this case, is the primary federal law protecting the disabled. The Rehabilitation Act requires that employers have a qualified affirmative action plan for hiring the disabled. This act applies only to companies doing business with the government with a contract over $2500, so NET would not qualify and therefore Cronan is not protected under this law .
In 1990, however, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which protects from discrimination on the basis of disability, and requires employers to make reasonable accommodation for disabled employees and customers . The ADA defines disability as “any physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individuals major life activities” . Many courts have ruled that having AIDS qualifies as a handicap and persons living with AIDS are therefore covered under this act In the Cronan example, his coworkers fear of working with him could severely affect his ability to work, and therefore he would be considered disabled and covered under this act. Unfortunately for Cronan, this law was passed after his lawsuit was settled.
Issue: Did NET violate state privacy laws by disclosing Cronans condition?According to NET, Cronan voluntarily disclosed his medical condition and no serious invasion of privacy occurred. Although Cronan asked that the discussion of his condition be held in the strictest confidence, OBrian explained that it was company policy to disclose important matters involving an employee with his immediate supervisor.
The purpose of privacy laws is to encourage people to be honest about their medical history when speaking with physicians. Since OBrian is not a medical professional, there is no assurance that a conversation between him and Cronan would be kept private, and therefore, no law was broken. Had the company doctor been the one to disclose Cronans condition to the company, and not NETs management, then state privacy laws would have been broken.
Issue: Was Cronan subjected to sexual harassment after coworkers learned about his medical condition?After coworkers discovered that Cronan was infected with AIDS, threats of lynching began to circulate and graffiti appeared on bathroom stalls. Some of the graffiti was related to Cronans sexual preference such as “G.A.Y. -Got AIDS Yet?” and “Gays and bisexuals should be shipped to an island and destroyed.”
Sexual harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical contact of a sexual nature . Sexual harassment can come in 2 forms: quid pro quo (giving sexual favors in return for promised benefits or threatened with loss) or a hostile work environment. A hostile work environment is defined as “one in which coworkers make offensive sexual comments