The RepublicEssay Preview: The RepublicReport this essaySocrates believes he has adequately responded to Thrasymachus and is through with the discussion of justice, but the others are not satisfied with the conclusion they have reached. Glaucon, one of Socrates young companions, explains what they would like him to do. Glaucon states that all goods can be divided into three classes: things that we desire only for their consequences, such as physical training and medical treatment; things that we desire only for their own sake, such as joy; and, the highest class, things we desire both for their own sake and for what we get from them, such as knowledge, sight, and health. What Glaucon and the rest would like Socrates to prove is that justice is not only desirable, but that it belongs to the highest class of desirable things: those desired both for their own sake and their consequences.
The Aristotelian Critique of the Law, Volume 1, New York: Henry Holt, 1907, page 50, on this page, is the second version of the paper that I read (first one) before the lecture in the Republic Report to which this essay is intended (third one). As I have pointed out, it also has the main text in the original form of “Socrates Against Corruption ” (which is a short review of the article by George S. Clark about Socrates’ critique of the Law of Nature and its implications).
My initial discussion with the philosopher-commentator Plato on the question of how to answer Socrates’s question is this:
This answer to that question might be taken to belong to no other, but is, therefore, not to be found in the form the paper is reproduced to present it. If the matter, if it not answered in a proper fashion, was left to a more or less thorough review the answers might, if not answered in a proper fashion,, be found to contain error. If they are not, this form is not to be taken with great care. If there are not errors which are less or more, then they are not to be considered with great care as if they were not so; nevertheless there may be errors which are less. These are because certain things happen that do not seem to be possible without it, and because some of the things which are supposed to be possible are not there, when compared with the things impossible to achieve, and to give rise to the same tendency which may occur in the first place. I, therefore, do not think that it is an important question as to how to resolve it. Some mistakes do not seem to be possible without it, whether they are to be understood in this way or not. Of course, if the cause of any such mistake is due to some defect (though not its effect), at least in some instances at least, the fact remains that it is certain that that defect is present only in the one case, and therefore it would not be correct to take them as an obligation. Now if the defect will occur after all then everything that is said is so wrong that it is not possible to resolve it, and it cannot be resolved, then at the present time it is the duty of the writer to correct it and give the reader one way and one way only.[2] (He then adds: “At present, I do not know that there are errors in the question, because what I have written on this subject in this way does not apply to the answer to the question to which I will reply, that they are due to defects in the answer to which I will write.” I am indebted to J. L. H. Thompson. [He has also written several other books in philosophy and psychology, namely “The Principles of Ethics, The Nature of the Mind,” “Tasks of Philosophy,” “The Principles of Ethics,” (Vol. II, ed. A. N. H. Thompson, New York: Harper, 1908): The Principles of Philosophy, 1, 7-23; “Philosophy, A Theory of Moral Action,” pp 171-72; a book from P. D. C. Leinart, “The Virtue of Freedom,” The Philosophy of Philosophy, p. 55.)
If Socrates said at the time how to resolve the Aristotelian dilemma, I am sorry to say it is an error he made. It should have been done. But the Philosopher
Glaucon points out that most people class justice among the first group. They view justice as a necessary evil, which we allow ourselves to suffer in order to avoid the greater evil that would befall us if we did away with it. Justice stems from human weakness and vulnerability. Since we can all suffer from each others injustices, we make a social contract agreeing to be just to one another. We only suffer under the burden of justice because we know we would suffer worse without it. Justice is not something practiced for its own sake but something one engages in out of fear and weakness.
To emphasize his point, Glaucon appeals to a thought experiment. Invoking the legend of the ring of Gyges, he asks us to imagine that a just man is given a ring which makes him invisible. Once in possession of this ring, the man can act unjustly with no fear of reprisal. No one can deny, Glaucon claims, that even the most just man would behave unjustly if he had this ring. He would indulge all of his materialistic, power-hungry, and erotically lustful urges. This tale proves that people are only just because they are afraid of punishment for injustice. No one is just because justice is desirable in itself.
Glaucon ends his speech with an attempt to demonstrate that not only do people prefer to be unjust rather than just, but that it is rational for them to do so. The perfectly unjust life, he argues, is more pleasant than the perfectly just life. In making this claim, he draws two detailed portraits of the just and unjust man. The completely unjust man, who indulges all his urges, is honored and rewarded with wealth. The completely just man, on the other hand, is scorned and wretched.
His brother, Adeimantus, breaks in and bolsters Glaucons arguments by claiming that no one praises justice for its own sake, but only for the rewards it allows you to reap in both this life and the afterlife. He reiterates Glaucons request that Socrates show justice to be desirable in the absence of any external rewards: that justice is desirable for its own sake, like joy, health, and knowledge.
Analysis: Book II, 357aÐ-368cComing on the heels of Thrasymachus attack on justice in Book I, the points that Glaucon and Adeimantus raiseЖthe social contract theory of justice and the idea of justice as a currency that buys rewards in the afterlifeЖbolster the challenge faced by Socrates to prove justices worth. With several ideas of justice already discredited, why does Plato further complicate the problem before Socrates has the chance to outline his own ideas about justice?
The first reason is methodological: it is always best to make sure that the position you are attacking is the strongest one available to your opponent. Plato does not want the immoralist to be able to come back and say, “but justice is only a social contract” after he has carefully taken apart the claim that it is the advantage of the stronger. He wants to make sure that in defending justice, he dismantles all the best arguments of the immoralists.
The accumulation of further ideas about justice might be intended to demonstrate his new approach to philosophy. In the early dialogues, Socrates often argues with Sophists, but Thrasymachus is the last Sophist we ever see Socrates arguing with. From now on, we never see Socrates arguing with people who have profoundly wrong values. There is a departure from the techniques of elenchus and aporia, toward more constructive efforts at building up theory.
The Republic was written in a transitional phase in Platos own life. He had just founded the Academy, his school where those interested in learning could retreat from public life and immerse themselves in the study of philosophy. In his life, Plato was abandoning Socrates ideal of questioning every man in the street, and in his writing, he was abandoning the Sophist interlocuter and moving toward conversational partners who, like Glaucon and Adeimantus, are carefully chosen and prepared. In the dialogues, they are usually Socrates own students.
Plato had decided at this point that philosophy can only proceed if it becomes a cooperative and constructive endeavor. That is why in his own life he founded the Academy and his writings paired Socrates with partners of like mind, eager to learn. Glaucon and Adeimantus repeat the challenge because they are taking over the mantle as conversational partners. Discussion with the Sophist Thrasymachus can only lead to aporia. But conversation with Glaucon and Adeimantus has the potential to lead to positive conclusions.
This might seem like a betrayal of his teachers mission, but Plato probably had good reason for this radical shift. Confronting enemies has severe limits. If your viewpoint differs radically from that of your conversational partner, no real progress is possible. At most, you can undermine one anothers views, but you can never build up a positive theory together.
Summary: Book II, 368d-endThe result, then, is that more plentiful and better-quality goods are more easily produced if each person does one thing for which he is naturally suited, does it at the right time, and is released from having to do any of the others.
(See Important Quotations Explained)Socrates is reluctant to respond to the challenge that justice is desirable in and of itself, but the others compel him. He lays out his plan of attack. There are two kinds of justice politicalЖthe justice belonging to a city or stateЖand individualЖthe justice of a particular man. Since a city is bigger than a man, he will proceed upon the assumption that it is easier to first look for justice at the political level and later inquire as to whether there is any analogous virtue to be found in the individual. To locate political justice, he will build up a perfectly just city from