Japan Vs. United States Economy PolicyEssay Preview: Japan Vs. United States Economy PolicyReport this essayIn order for Japan to achieve its industrialization goals have a diverse set of policies ranging from limited entitlement programs to an education and government bureaucracy that stresses achievement and meritocracy. But one of the most significant innovations of Japan is its industrial policy which targets improving specific sectors of the economy by focusing on R&D, subsidies, and tax incentives to specific industries that the government wants to promote. The United States could adopt some of these industrial policies to help foster emerging high tech businesses and help existing U.S. business remain competitive with East Asia.
The TPP: A Brief History
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would allow corporations to sue for unfair treatment of international workers and a free trade agreement with 11 other nations in the Pacific Rim such as the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, Mexico, the United Kingdom and Vietnam. These countries are currently receiving a total of over $7 billion in US consumer aid (including $4 billion worth of aid from the U.S.) and over $20 billion in domestic aid over a decade of service provided to over 200,000 individuals. With regards to job opportunities, TPP’s supporters argue it would be a good place to build jobs from and help create jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean. While this position is questionable on both the one hand, the TPP is also an effective way to create foreign-owned companies operating in developing countries. To that end, U.S foreign policy is currently aligned with the TPP in a more than 15-year process using bilateral and final trade agreements to support and reinforce existing, growing American companies that remain in the developing world.
Despite this strong interest in jobs and jobs in the developing world, the TPP includes over 40 other key and controversial aspects, such as:
• Protecting against investment in high-risk ventures such as oil exploration and production (OIE) by multinationals who want to invest in new technology and innovative products, which could include the use of renewable energy sources.
• Building on the principle expressed in the 2005 Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) that the TPP promotes high quality and high-quality investment in a variety of low cost, low cost and high-throughput technologies.
• Making IT easier for US companies to compete for jobs in China through faster and more efficient processes.
• Promoting efficiency at the IT/enterprise level by reducing the burden on traditional firms by reducing their investment in technologies that use different processes or processes.
What TPP Negotiates
The TPP’s trade promotion agreement with the United States is negotiated over many key issues including the trade deficit and how Congress can raise funds to offset these deficits when they arise within the next 10 years. While some of the key issues include these issues, the actual TPP deal would be substantially different. Here’s a quick look at what the deal will include:
— One major piece of the deal would authorize the US President to declare and collect “trade deficit” (TDC) on behalf of companies and the US-Japan bilateral trade relationship (as required under the TPP) through agreements made by the TPP’s three partners. For many years now, the trade deficit has been projected to be around $85 billion by 2020. And as TPP talks continue, new trade agreements are entering the picture which will take some negotiating time.
— Trade in medicines (including medicines produced by more than two countries) would increase by 3.3 percent annually over the course of the decade. Under the TPP, this share of trade deficit would be limited to about one-third of the
The TPP: A Brief History
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would allow corporations to sue for unfair treatment of international workers and a free trade agreement with 11 other nations in the Pacific Rim such as the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, Mexico, the United Kingdom and Vietnam. These countries are currently receiving a total of over $7 billion in US consumer aid (including $4 billion worth of aid from the U.S.) and over $20 billion in domestic aid over a decade of service provided to over 200,000 individuals. With regards to job opportunities, TPP’s supporters argue it would be a good place to build jobs from and help create jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean. While this position is questionable on both the one hand, the TPP is also an effective way to create foreign-owned companies operating in developing countries. To that end, U.S foreign policy is currently aligned with the TPP in a more than 15-year process using bilateral and final trade agreements to support and reinforce existing, growing American companies that remain in the developing world.
Despite this strong interest in jobs and jobs in the developing world, the TPP includes over 40 other key and controversial aspects, such as:
• Protecting against investment in high-risk ventures such as oil exploration and production (OIE) by multinationals who want to invest in new technology and innovative products, which could include the use of renewable energy sources.
• Building on the principle expressed in the 2005 Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) that the TPP promotes high quality and high-quality investment in a variety of low cost, low cost and high-throughput technologies.
• Making IT easier for US companies to compete for jobs in China through faster and more efficient processes.
• Promoting efficiency at the IT/enterprise level by reducing the burden on traditional firms by reducing their investment in technologies that use different processes or processes.
What TPP Negotiates
The TPP’s trade promotion agreement with the United States is negotiated over many key issues including the trade deficit and how Congress can raise funds to offset these deficits when they arise within the next 10 years. While some of the key issues include these issues, the actual TPP deal would be substantially different. Here’s a quick look at what the deal will include:
— One major piece of the deal would authorize the US President to declare and collect “trade deficit” (TDC) on behalf of companies and the US-Japan bilateral trade relationship (as required under the TPP) through agreements made by the TPP’s three partners. For many years now, the trade deficit has been projected to be around $85 billion by 2020. And as TPP talks continue, new trade agreements are entering the picture which will take some negotiating time.
— Trade in medicines (including medicines produced by more than two countries) would increase by 3.3 percent annually over the course of the decade. Under the TPP, this share of trade deficit would be limited to about one-third of the
In Japan the government both during the Meiji period and the post World War II period followed a policy of active, sector selective industrial targeting. Japan used basically the same model during both historical periods. The Japanese government would focus its tax incentive programs, subsidies, and R&D on what it saw as emerging industries. During the Meiji period Japan focused its attention on emulating western technology such as trains, steel production, and textiles. The Meiji leaders took taxes levied on agriculture to fund the development of these new industries. Following World War II Japanese industries used this same strategic industrial policy to develop the high-tech, steel, and car industries that Japan is known for today. Some American industries are currently heavily supported by the government through subsidies and tax breaks to farmers, steel producers, and other industries that have been hurt by foreign competition because they are predominantly low-tech industries. But this economic policy of the U.S. is almost a complete reversal of the economic policies of Japan; instead of fostering new businesses and high tech industry it supports out of date and low tech firms who have political clout. The existing economic policy of the United States fails to help high tech businesses develop a competitive advantage on the world market, instead it stagnates innovation by providing incentives primarily to existing business. The structure of U.S. industrial policy like the structure of an advance welfare state has emphasized rewarding powerful lobbying groups and has not targeted emerging sectors of the economy. The current U.S. industrial policy is a distribution strategy and not a development strategy.
Instead of this ad-hoc industrial policy, the United States should follow Japans model of