Common Sense Morality
Consequentialism draws a focus on an action’s capacity to lead to the greatest maximization of a particular value. The theory states that the best moral action is that which leads to the greatest maximization of wellbeing. The theory also calls for total impartiality in order to prevent personal bias from obstructing maximization. Thus, the goal of a good consequentialist is to promote any value (i.e. happiness, as in the case of utilitarianism) to the highest degree possible by taking the action which will maximize this value. (Väyrynen, 2012)
Objections that challenge consequentialism’s alignment with common sense morality have tended to come from the fact that consequentialism calls for impartial consideration and promotion of an agent-neutral value for all (Cocking and Oakley, 1995). For this essay’s sake that agent-neutral value shall be wellbeing. Thinkers have stated that consequentialism fails to appreciate the value of entities such as friendship and trust (Cocking and Oakley, 1995). Because of this assumption, consequentialism is considered an alienating and callous moral theory that demands too much of an agent. In this essay, I will argue that consequentialism is a suitable moral theory and objections against it do not succeed. My main focus shall be friendship. I shall argue that consequentialist theory does not devalue institutions such as friendship and trust but in fact encourages engagement with these institutions (Jackson, 1991; Pettit, 2011). However, I shall argue that friendship only has instrumental value, derived from its capacity to maximize wellbeing (Jeske, 2008). Another objection that this essay shall attempt to defeat is the objection that consequentialism demands too much from an agent. I shall discuss how even the most demanding forms of consequentialism only demand as much as an agent can cope with sacrificing whilst not compromising their own wellbeing.
Many state that consequentialism alienates