Essay About Euro Disney And Case Study

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6. Case Study – (Euro Disney) Disneyland Paris:
Importance of Researching the Customer
Disney assumed that its reputation and success would transfer to Europe.
The case highlights that the organisation did not take into account customer
differences or the marketing environment into which Disney was moving.
Amidst high expectations, Euro Disney opened just outside Paris in April
1992. Success seemed guaranteed. After all, the Disneyland Parks in Florida,
California, and most recently in Japan, were all spectacular successes. But
somehow all the rosy expectations became a delusion. The opening results
cast even the future survival of Euro Disney in doubt. How could what
seemed so right be so wrong? What mistakes were made? And what lessons
can be learned?
Optimism
Perhaps a few early omens should have raised some cautions. Between
1987 and 1991, three, 150 million dollar amusement parks had opened in
France with great fanfare. All had fallen flat, and by 1991, two were in
bankruptcy.
Visit London Module 2 – Researching Customer Insights
September 2005 16
By now, the Walt Disney Company was finalising its plans to open Europes
first Disneyland early in 1992. Company executives initially predicted that 11
million Europeans would visit the attraction in the first year alone. After all,
Europeans accounted for 2.7 million visits to the U.S. Disney parks and spent
$1.6 billion on Disney merchandise. Surely a park closer to home would draw
many thousands more?
As Disney executives thought more about it, the forecast of 11 million seemed
most conservative. Adding fuel to the optimism was the fact that Europeans
typically have more vacation time than do U.S. workers. For example, fiveweek
vacations are commonplace for French and German employees,
compared with just two to three weeks for U.S. workers.
The failure of the three earlier French parks seemed to be irrelevant to
Disney. Robert Fitzpatrick, Euro Disneylands chairman, stated, “We are
spending 22 billion French francs before we open the door, while the other
places spent 700 million. This means we can pay infinitely more attention to
detail – to costumes, hotels, shops, trash baskets, etc. – to create a fantastic
place.”
Nonetheless, a few early indicators suggested that not everyone was happy
with the coming of Disney. Leftist demonstrators at Euro Disneys stock
offering greeted company executive with eggs, ketchup and Mickey Go
Home signs. Disney had foreseen that it might encounter cultural problems.
Results
As the first year-end was winding down, it became clear that revenue
projections were, unbelievably, not being met. But the opening turned out to
be in the middle of a severe recession in Europe. European visitors, perhaps
as a consequence, were far more frugal than their American counterparts.
Many packed their own lunches and shunned the Disney hotels.
Disney executives soon realised they had made major miscalculations.
Whereas visitors to Floridas Disney World often stayed more than 4 days,
Euro Disney – with one theme park compared to Floridas three – was proving
to be a 2-day experience at best.
Other operational errors and miscalculations, most of these cultural, hurt the
enterprise. A policy of serving no alcohol in the park caused consternation in
a country where wine is customary for lunch and dinner. (This policy has
since been reversed.)
Disney thought Monday would be a light day and Friday a heavy one and
allocated staff accordingly, but the reverse was true. It found significant peaks