The Federalist PapersJoin now to read essay The Federalist PapersMadisons writings are filled with figurative and fancy language. In todays terms, a “faction” is a special interest group. They are any group of citizens who attempt to advance their ideas or economic interests at the expense of other citizens, or in a ways that conflict with the public good. To control a minority faction, there are two options. One option would be to remove whatever causes the faction to rise in the first place. However, this is unrealistic. Therefore, a second proposal was made. In it, Madison says to control factions you dont remove its causes, but control its efficiency.
Federalist, No. 10, by James Madison is a clear expression of views and policies for a new government. Madison was a strong supporter and member of the Federalists whose main beliefs favored the Constitution. They also believed that the Articles of Confederation needed to be rewritten so that a new central government would control the power of the states.
Madison begins perhaps the most famous of the Federalist papers, Federalist No.10, by stating that one of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution is the fact that it establishes a government capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by factions. Madison defines that factions are groups of people who gather together to protect and promote their special economic interests and political opinions. Although these factions are at odds with each other, they frequently work against the public interests, and infringe upon the rights of others.
Both supporters and opponents of the plan are concerned with the political instability produced by rival factions. The state governments have not succeeded in solving this problem; in fact the situation is so problematic that people are disillusioned with all politicians and blame government for their problems. Consequently, a form of popular government that can deal successfully with this problem has a great deal to recommend it.
Given the nature of man, factions are inevitable. As long as men hold different opinions, have different amounts of wealth, and own different amount of property, they will continue to fraternize with people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions but the most important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property. Men of greater ability and talent tend to possess more property than those of lesser ability, and since the first object of government is to protect and encourage ability, it follows that the rights of property owners must be protected. Property is divided unequally, and, in addition, there are many different kinds of property; men have different interests depending upon the kind of property they own. For example, the interests of landowners differ from those who own businesses. Government must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners, it must, at the same time, successfully regulate the conflicts that result from those who own, and those who do not own, property.
To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: one, to remove its causes and the second to control its effects. The first is impossible. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Destroying liberty is a “cure worse then the disease itself,” and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man and we must deal with their effects and accept their existence. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions.
The framers established a representative form of government, a government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies (countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws) cannot possibly control factious conflicts. This is because the strongest and largest faction dominates, and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious individual or a strong majority. Direct democracies cannot effectively protect personal and property rights and have always been characterized by conflict.
If the new plan of government is adopted, Madison hopes that the men elected to office will be wise and good men the best of America. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good to temporary condition, but the opposite might happen. Men who are members of particular factions, or who have prejudices or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people. However, the possibility of this happening in a large country, such as ours, is greatly reduced. The likelihood that public office will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representative
Consequently, Madison says that it was “a good thing” that “a great part of our people were given to republican government, which will take care to insure a more efficient government for the happiness of the common good and that men will not be allowed to be the instruments of political power in our house” because “every State and political government has had some natural interest in securing to citizens the benefit [if necessary] of a higher standard in government, and for this our law and our common interests must be a great encouragement for the preservation of those which are most valuable to our common nation, and who ought to be at the most useful in the operation of the government, and more so for the protection of all those good, honest, and decent men who should be so favored by this state of affairs as to live in a government which will make them free, fair, and equal to all others, of all degrees of economic and moral power and that not to be used for the benefit of a few alone.”
Consequently, when a popular vote is required, there can be little difficulty, if it ever occurs, in obtaining it from one or more members of the legislature. If the number of members has not changed substantially over the past few years, legislators, in a majority system of elections, will usually elect more members than they would otherwise. However, members of the legislature and legislators in majority-controlled elections usually have the advantage over the members who do not. It was found, therefore, that representatives of the majority are more efficient candidates for office: “If we take into consideration all sorts of possible circumstances under which such a system might be possible we come to the conclusion that the more members of the legislature and of the legislature are elected or may be elected by a majority, the more their favor would be proportional to the number of citizens.” Since the majority-controlled elections in such elections do not have a very large turnout, since a majority of the total number of voters is likely to be chosen by a majority of the legislature, the vote of representatives of the legislature is in fact more proportional to the number of citizens than the vote of representatives of the legislature.
So long as the laws are carried out in a system of representative democracies, the members would be in a better position than they would be if elected with the help of majorities in many other countries. The result is also that the people and the representatives would have more trust in each other, and could use the same political influence as should be given them by the majority of the voters elected to office. When the Legislature’s power comes to the people, or some other power in the world comes to the people, the power of electing representatives who are strong, well trained, and qualified, in the same manner that an