Canada In World War IiEssay Preview: Canada In World War IiReport this essayWhen the German attack on Poland on 1 September 1939 finally led Britain and France to declare war on Germany, King summoned Parliament to “decide,” as he had pledged. Declaration of war was postponed for a week, during which Canada was formally neutral. The government announced that approval of the “Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne,” which stated the governments decision to support Britain and France, would constitute approval of a declaration of war.
On September 9 the address was approved without a recorded vote, and war was declared the following day. The basis for parliamentary unity had in fact been laid in March, when both major parties accepted a program rejecting conscription for overseas service. King clearly envisaged a limited effort and was lukewarm towards an expeditionary force. Nevertheless, there was enough pressure to lead the Cabinet to dispatch one army division to Europe. The Allies defeat in France and Belgium in the early summer of 1940 and the collapse of France frightened Canadians. The idea of limited and economical war went by the board, and thereafter the only effective limitation was the pledge against overseas conscription. The armed forces were rapidly enlarged, conscription was introduced June 1940 for home defence (see NATIONAL RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT), and expenditure grew enormously.
The cabinet’s decision at that time to proceed with a war of any kind was a political one, one in which it could scarcely have been opposed by the Conservatives. Indeed, a British military expert of considerable skill in Canada has reported that Canadians were given to be sent to the Great War “in the hope that, during the struggle it would allow the French to maintain their position by forcing an Allied military presence.”[2][3]
In November 1940, the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Douglas MacArthur, in a cabinet speech, urged the prime minister to sign an agreement by April 1945, and this arrangement would be subject to a constitutional amendment. No such agreement was made, though a letter from the government of Great Britain, dated 18 October 1940, instructing that the cabinet would make the following recommendation:
I have some confidence that the Prime Minister of Canada will consider and ratify this statement, and so that we will proceed to work with the people of this country to create a new government … It is my position that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland … shall, by the adoption of that Government’s Constitution and laws, and by the operation of the Security Council, and be responsible to me or any of my deputies for any breaches, omissions or breaches which shall have impeded the Government of Canada from operating its national defence system.[4]
National Security Concerns
National security concerns became widespread in early 1941 and remained so until June 1942, when the British Crown and its allies came under immediate condemnation for military action by Canada and Germany against Germany during WWII.[5] Both leaders publicly called on Canadian Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to make the government of Canada the best government in the world. In March 1942 the minister told the Royal Commission it was time to have a strong national defence. He also told the Royal Canadian Air Force, as well as to Canadian soldiers and the National War College Council, at a conference in June 1942. The Canadian government also urged the Royal Canadian Air Force to give Canada as a base of operation a Canadian Armed Forces airforce to replace the existing Canadian Air Force or the Canadian Navy.
In March, the prime minister, who had announced his government’s support of a British expeditionary force to Norway, said, “I hope that all men will join as well in their endeavour to defend the rights of the individual on earth against the threat of an expeditionary force from our allies.”[6] The prime minister’s position was somewhat questionable before the war ended in June 1942. The Crown subsequently tried to prevent Canada from enlisting in Canada.
In response to the international criticism of the Crown’s plan to build a British Army Corps in Norway, Canada and the Crown had already entered a new period of confrontation. As Prime Minister Chamberlain warned, the military situation in France and other Allied countries, particularly Britain, was not favorable to the Crown. He had declared that Britain was “not prepared to deal with what she can and shall do, but will do what she can to preserve its independence. Our security and national interests cannot be threatened by such acts of aggression by France and Japan and Japan by Germany.”[7]
However, Britain’s participation in the offensive against France was considered a political decision at this stage. In February 1942 it was discovered that the French army was in fact attacking Germany. In early April all military measures on the part of Britain were rescinded. It was clear that an attempt to get a military response would be a difficult operation for Canada. In November 1942, the British government stated
The cabinet’s decision at that time to proceed with a war of any kind was a political one, one in which it could scarcely have been opposed by the Conservatives. Indeed, a British military expert of considerable skill in Canada has reported that Canadians were given to be sent to the Great War “in the hope that, during the struggle it would allow the French to maintain their position by forcing an Allied military presence.”[2][3]
In November 1940, the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Douglas MacArthur, in a cabinet speech, urged the prime minister to sign an agreement by April 1945, and this arrangement would be subject to a constitutional amendment. No such agreement was made, though a letter from the government of Great Britain, dated 18 October 1940, instructing that the cabinet would make the following recommendation:
I have some confidence that the Prime Minister of Canada will consider and ratify this statement, and so that we will proceed to work with the people of this country to create a new government … It is my position that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland … shall, by the adoption of that Government’s Constitution and laws, and by the operation of the Security Council, and be responsible to me or any of my deputies for any breaches, omissions or breaches which shall have impeded the Government of Canada from operating its national defence system.[4]
National Security Concerns
National security concerns became widespread in early 1941 and remained so until June 1942, when the British Crown and its allies came under immediate condemnation for military action by Canada and Germany against Germany during WWII.[5] Both leaders publicly called on Canadian Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to make the government of Canada the best government in the world. In March 1942 the minister told the Royal Commission it was time to have a strong national defence. He also told the Royal Canadian Air Force, as well as to Canadian soldiers and the National War College Council, at a conference in June 1942. The Canadian government also urged the Royal Canadian Air Force to give Canada as a base of operation a Canadian Armed Forces airforce to replace the existing Canadian Air Force or the Canadian Navy.
In March, the prime minister, who had announced his government’s support of a British expeditionary force to Norway, said, “I hope that all men will join as well in their endeavour to defend the rights of the individual on earth against the threat of an expeditionary force from our allies.”[6] The prime minister’s position was somewhat questionable before the war ended in June 1942. The Crown subsequently tried to prevent Canada from enlisting in Canada.
In response to the international criticism of the Crown’s plan to build a British Army Corps in Norway, Canada and the Crown had already entered a new period of confrontation. As Prime Minister Chamberlain warned, the military situation in France and other Allied countries, particularly Britain, was not favorable to the Crown. He had declared that Britain was “not prepared to deal with what she can and shall do, but will do what she can to preserve its independence. Our security and national interests cannot be threatened by such acts of aggression by France and Japan and Japan by Germany.”[7]
However, Britain’s participation in the offensive against France was considered a political decision at this stage. In February 1942 it was discovered that the French army was in fact attacking Germany. In early April all military measures on the part of Britain were rescinded. It was clear that an attempt to get a military response would be a difficult operation for Canada. In November 1942, the British government stated
The army expanded until by late 1942 there were 5 divisions overseas, 2 of them armoured. In April of that year the FIRST CANADIAN ARMY was formed in England under Lieutenant-General A.G.L. MCNAUGHTON. In contrast with WWI, it was a long time before the army saw large-scale action. Until summer 1943 the force in England was engaged only in the unsuccessful DIEPPE RAID (19 August 1942), whereas 2 battalions sent from Canada had taken part in the hopeless defence of HONG KONG against the Japanese in December 1941. Public opinion in Canada became disturbed by the inaction, and disagreement developed between the government and McNaughton, who wished to reserve the army for a final, decisive campaign.
The government arranged with Britain for the 1st Canadian Infantry Division to join the attack on Sicily July 1943, and subsequently insisted upon building its Mediterranean force up to a 2-division corps (by adding the 5th Division). This produced a serious clash with McNaughton, just when the British War Office, which considered him unsuited for field command, was influencing the Canadian government against him. At the end of 1943 he was replaced by Lieutenant-General H.D.G. CRERAR.
The 1st Division was heavily engaged in the Sicilian campaign as part of the British Eighth Army, and subsequently took part in the December 1943 advance up the mainland of Italy, seeing particularly severe fighting in and around Ortona (see ORTONA, BATTLE OF). In the spring of 1944 Canadians under Lieutenant-General E.L.M. BURNS played a leading role in breaking the Hitler Line barring the Liri Valley. At the end of August the corps broke the Gothic Line in the Adriatic sector and pushed on through the German positions covering Rimini, which fell in September. These battles cost Canada its heaviest casualties of the Italian campaign.
The final phase of Canadian involvement in Italy found 1st Canadian Corps, now commanded by Lieutenant-General Charles FOULKES, fighting its way across the Lombard Plain, hindered by mud and swift-flowing rivers. The corps advance ended at the Senio River in the first days of 1945. The Canadian government, so eager to get its troops into action in Italy, had soon begun to ask for their return to join the main Canadian force in Northwest Europe. Allied policy finally made this possible early in 1945, and the 1st Corps came under the First Canadian Armys command in mid-March, to the general satisfaction of the men from Italy. All told, 92 757 Canadian soldiers of all ranks had served in Italy, and 5764 had lost their lives.
The Industrial ContributionCanadas industrial contribution to victory was considerable, though it began slowly. After the Allied reverses in Europe in 1940, British orders for equipment, which had been a trickle, became a flood. In April 1940 the Department of MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY, provided for in 1939, was established with C.D. HOWE as minister. In August 1940 an amended Act gave the minister almost dictatorial powers, and under it the industrial effort expanded vastly. Various CROWN CORPORATIONS were instituted for special tasks. New factories were built, and old ones adapted for war purposes.
Whereas in WWI Canadian production had largely been limited to shells (no weapons were made except the ROSS RIFLE), now a great variety of guns and small arms was produced. Many ships, notably escort vessels and cargo carriers, were built; there was large production of aircraft, including Lancaster bombers; and the greatest triumph of the program was in the field of military vehicles, of which 815 729 were made. Tanks were produced, chiefly of components imported from the US. More than half the material produced went to Britain. Britain could not possibly pay for all of it; so Canada, in the interest of helping to win the war, and keeping her factories working, financed a high proportion. At the beginning of 1942 a BILLION-DOLLAR GIFT was devoted to this purpose. The next year a program of MUTUAL AID to serve Allied nations generally, but still in practice mainly directed to the UK, was introduced. During the war Canadian financial assistance to Britain amounted to $3 043 000 000.
The programme of the Second World War was a major one as it began to affect British policy rather than civilian policy. At the same time it was an important cause for public policy in several important areas: peace, the promotion of independence, the freedom of speech, and the use of civilian organisations in all spheres. The Second World War had provided a major opportunity for all the leading parties to gain the public impression with their efforts and in a few cases their success. So long as the British Government accepted a favourable outcome to this war in its terms and conditions, as long as it refused a favourable one in its obligations to the people, an opportunity for peace may have been created that was perhaps too low. The development of the British campaign began with an event. In August, 1934, an armistice was signed with the Soviet Union against the Axis powers, which was soon the subject of great publicity. The British Cabinet was given power to make, in its powers to implement (within a range of conditions) the terms agreed upon, and to make orders about the nature and form of a new peace and of the nature and application of the terms that might be made during this period. The most important element in the agreement was a guarantee of the existence of a British government. The British Governments accepted this guarantee by holding the negotiations. By the end of the summer of 1934 a number of British governments expressed their “concerns” that the negotiations were becoming more difficult. The British Government in response demanded that a further assurance be extended. The government agreed that the terms of these guarantees would have to be made in writing.
A few weeks before the Armistice, the British Government began to organise a meeting at Cambridge in which the main arguments for peace and for maintaining peace were also advanced. The British Government accepted an ultimatum of peace, which it wrote to the European Commissioner for Trade with Great Britain in August, 1935. It had decided (under the following terms) “that the United Kingdom should take measures to reduce trade in certain of its products in preparation for and before the Armistice . . . If the measures become difficult after the Armistice . . . you will have to decide whether to accept an ultimatum or to give in advance the conditions to prepare for a treaty of peace.”
This was a very serious matter and could not be resolved by means of a treaty unless the conditions would have been clearly established. To meet the British Government’s questions, as well as to make their own arrangements at the time of the Armistice, the Government proposed that the United Kingdom should go forward on its own terms without a guarantee for the continuance or expansion of trade in British goods in their products. In 1939 the British Government proposed to make the treaty an extension of the terms of existing arms trade. Then in 1941, although this would require further negotiations, the British Government was agreed at this time in principle to extend this extension until the Armistice passed. But in July 1941, just before the Armistice and the end of the war the governments at Cambridge reached their final decision, but at no later date did they actually make a treaty for extending the extension until 1937 (the date, with which the armistice was signed, of the first general agreement ending the period between the Armistice and the Armistice of 1939). Even after they had said thus, their final declaration was quite clear whether the terms of the agreement had yet to be agreed upon or not. No agreement on the issue was made until it was in fact passed. The treaty was finally passed on 4 September 1941.
The general approach to peace on both sides of the Atlantic had been more aggressive than other possible approaches to such conflicts until 1945 when, after the war, the British Government announced its unconditional surrender. With the Armistice this was the only agreement that could be signed. The negotiations
Canada had a limited role in the development of atomic energy, a fateful business that was revealed when atomic bombs were dropped on Japan in August 1945. Canada had an available source of uranium in a mine at Great Bear Lake, which led to Mackenzie Kings being taken into the greater Allies confidence in the matter in 1942. That summer the Canadian government acquired control of the mine. A team of scientists that had been working on the project in England was moved to Canada.
Tension developed between Britain and the US, but at the QuД©bec Conference of September 1943 an Anglo-American agreement was made that incidentally gave Canada a small share in control. A Canadian policy committee decided in 1944 to construct an atomic reactor at the CHALK RIVER NUCLEAR LABORATORIES. The first reactor there did not “go critical” until after the Japanese surrender. Canada had no part in producing the bombs used against Japan, unless some Canadian uranium was used in them, which seems impossible to determine.
Canada had no effective part in the higher direction of the war. This would have been extremely difficult to obtain, and