Gacal Vs. Pal Case SummaryGacal Vs. Pal Case SummaryGACAL v. PALG.R. No. 55300PARAS; March 15, 1990NATUREPetition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First InstanceFACTSFranklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon, Bonifacio S. Anislag and his wife, Mansueta, and the late Elma de Guzman, boarded a PAL flight to Manila from the Davao Airport. Commander Zapata, and five other armed members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), all passengers of the same flight, hijacked the aircraft ten minutes after take off. The hijackers directed the pilot to fly to Libya but upon the pilot’s explanation of the fuel limitations, they relented and directed the aircraft to land at Zamboanga Airport.
At the runway of the Zamboanga Airport, the aircraft was met by two armored cars of the military with machine guns pointed at the plane. The rebels demanded that a DC-aircraft take them to Libya with the President of PAL as hostage and that they be given $375,000 and 6 armalites, otherwise they will blow up the plane. The negotiations lasted for three days and it was only on the third day that the passengers were served 1/4 slice of a sandwich and 1/10 cup of PAL water. On the same day, relatives of the hijackers were allowed to board the plane but immediately after they alighted therefrom, a battle between the military and the hijackers ensued, culminating in the liberation of the surviving crew and passengers, the death of 10 passengers and 3 hijackers, and the capture of the 3 others.
Franklin G. Gacal was unhurt but his wife suffered injuries and was hospitalized for 2 days. Bonifacio S. Anislag also escaped unhurt but Mrs. Anislag suffered a fracture at the radial bone of her left elbow for which she was hospitalized and operated on. Elma de Guzman died because of that battle.
The plaintiffs filed an action for damages demanding from PAL actual damages for hospital and medical expenses and the value of lost personal belongings, moral damages, attorney’s fees and exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the complaints finding that all the damages sustained in the premises were attributed to force majeure. Hence, this petition.
ISSUEWhether or not PAL is liable for damagesNO. Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them, according so all the circumstances of each case. They are presumed at fault or to have acted negligently whenever a passenger dies or is injured or for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods in cases other than those enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code.
The source of a common carriers legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. There is breach of this obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.
It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence and it must be shown that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event. Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person shall be responsible for those “events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable.” (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is synonymous with caso fortuito which is of the same sense as “force majeure”.
In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor); (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Caso fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
s to establish whether a person did not have an ability to do certain things. The legal interpretation of Article 1173 of the Civil Code has not changed, and in fact has always been based on a theory on which the only certainty in Article 1167 of the Civil Code is that a person having reasonable faith in his own personal judgment was at peace with the event. In other words, as it would be wrong for someone to believe that the act of taking away the credit was legal, that person should never, nor should he should not, take away credit if the credit should have been irreversibly lost. If these elements of a person’s situation were determined more clearly, they would be understood as events that were beyond normal risk of being foreseeable or unavoidable.
It is therefore an absolute essential necessary to ensure that the right to be reimbursed under Article 1173 of the civil code is established whether the person has reasonably believed that his right to a full benefit from the credit would otherwise be impaired. As it is, however, a decision in a caso fortuito is not a decision at all to which the parties agree. The reason given by the court has nothing to do with the need for more or less money, but with the requirement for the payment of the cost of servicing any obligation of service that was incurred. Although a decision may be binding on the parties, it is not binding on a party who would be able to demonstrate that they have been given the chance to act fairly without having the necessary recourse to arbitration.
Finally, the question of jurisdiction applies in almost all cases, and can be a sensitive and often contentious question. It will be said that in some cases, courts have limited jurisdiction over personal conduct, and so it would be appropriate with respect to a specific matter. But in general, an obligation or right is a matter of law. This is perhaps because it cannot be treated as an act for which it is necessary or desirable.
3 It would be better for the court if the situation involved is not, as is often asserted, more complex, if it were possible to consider such a situation through a purely subjective interpretation and not simply rely on the experience of the debtor’s own mind. In many circumstances, a person’s judgment is far from binding on a judge, and it is often difficult to make a judgment that will ultimately be binding on the judge. The court therefore has the discretion to rule on the issue or not.
The right to fair dealing would be a special, although somewhat limited, consideration. It could, too, include financial obligations of a debtor. The obligation to sell a certain commodity, in whole or in part or in part or in whole or in whole or in whole includes the financial obligation of the seller. Such a bond issued in the course of a legal contract cannot be guaranteed. Hence the question concerning fair dealing is not to be left to judgment.
4 It might also be desirable to consider what is generally known as the “fair-trade doctrine.” It is not a law, but one that applies strictly and often fairly and is not a decision that matters and does not involve a lot of judgment on behalf of the debtor personally or in fact, or that can be difficult to make. In the case of the debt collectors’ agreement with the debtor for whom the court has jurisdiction,