The Corvair – Disaster and Redemption
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Abstract
The release of Unsafe at Any Speed (1965) by Ralph Nader about the American automobile industry was the beginning of a public relations crisis for every manufacturer. The escalation of events ended with a televised apology by General Motors (GM) in a Senate committee hearing and the passing of The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (NTMVSA). The objective of this research is to evaluate the validity of Naders claims. Due to the diverse and numerous claims outlined in the book, the focus of this research is evaluating the claims made in Chapter One, “The Sporty Corvair”.
The methods consist of examining GM, Ralph Nader, and the federal government prior to, during, and post apex of the crisis. Specifics include the complaint, the technology involved, transcripts of the Senate hearings in 1965-6 on traffic safety, Ralph Naders rise to political fame, and the investigative response ordered by GM.
The downfall of the Corvair was not due to poor technology. Corvairs are still favored race cars at events such as autocross and vintage racing circuits. The failure of the Corvair was part of the collateral damage in a public relations disaster. The battle of public opinion and governmental regulation was the automobile industries to lose, and they lost badly. The disaster caused by GM-hired private investigators getting into trouble, a sensationalist public, and offended Congress, the automobile industry lost credibility and the NTMVSA came to be.
The case against the Corvair sounded plausible to the unknowing. Without a strong media presence informing consumers of the technical information needed to understand the allegations, GM missed the opportunity to defend the Corvair properly.
“The Sporty Corvair”
The 1965 publication of Ralph Naders book “Unsafe at any Speed” caused a major crisis within the American automobile industry. General Motors was targeted specifically for what he considered to be inherent design flaws of the Chevrolet Corvair, taking specific aim at its rear suspension. The fallout from the resulting crisis helped cause the rapid demise and 1969 termination of the rear-engine car.
Ralph Nader accused General Motors of organizational misdeeds and of technical-error product harm by knowingly allowing an inferior and inherently unsafe product to be sold. General Motors position was that they produced a well-tested and quality product and that in the accidents Nader used as examples are human-error accidents. He acted with malevolence when he deliberately used altered videos without disclosing the changes; significantly altering the perception of the vehicles response to extreme handling maneuvers.
Nader is not an engineer but through his publications and political connections, he was brought in as an automotive expert during the 1965-6 US Senate examination of the Federal Role in Traffic Safety. (Federal Role in Traffic Safety, 1966) His delivery seemed plausible and credible enough to the non-engineer public and Senate to cause a lot of concern by the general public, federal government, and especially to General Motors. Specific complaints about the 1960-3 Corvair include the use of swing arm suspension at the rear and the use of a front/rear tire pressure differential.
General Motors, so overwhelmed by the potential ramifications of Naders cause, initially offered Nader a job to work with him rather than against him. He declined. Concerned about revealing too much information to the general public due to pending litigation, GM simply denied the claims without explaining them away. With the primary concern to protect the corporate image, an in-depth investigation of Nader was ordered. The investigation was revealed when two investigators were caught in a secure area of the Senate during the course of the sub-committee hearings.
The fallout from this resulted in a televised apology by James M. Roche, President of General Motors and utter disgust by the Senate sub-committee. The loss of credibility by a manufacturer with 52% of the market share is partially responsible for the stringent standards and distrust of manufacturer business practices. Following the Clean Air Act of 1965, The Highway Safety Act of 1966 was passed and the previously unregulated automotive and light truck industry experienced a major change. Federal regulations of the industry became a fact of life and are now more stringently regulated every year.
While the media was quick to cover the bad and the ugly, they did not as willingly publicize the verdicts in favor of GM. The Corvair became the only car in American history to legally be deemed safe. In 1972, 3 years after its cancellation, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration issued a press release reflecting the results of a 1971 Department of Transportation test of the Corvair and several other models available at that time. The results, while exonerating the Corvair, came far too late to save the nameplate and truncated development of mid and rear engine cars by American manufacturers.
In 1969, the previously 200,00+ units / year Corvair (1960-4 avg.) was canceled due to sharply declining sales. It is arguable as to the cause of its decline. The 1965-9 Corvairs were outfitted with a much more advanced rear suspension, designed by the same engineering team that designed the suspension for the 1963-67 Corvette. While quickly embraced by racers, the product image loss due to this crisis and the general lack of public understanding of engineering was substantial.
It should be noted that the decline of Corvair sales could partly be attributed to a shift in a consumer tastes that favored higher powered but worse handling and usually larger cars. While faster in a straight line than the Falcon-based six-cylinder Mustang, its not as fast as an eight-cylinder Mustang. A Yenko Stinger Corvair handles better than a Porsche 911 factory race car of the era but the public largely ignored it.
GM was one of the first major corporations to embrace the practice of public relations.
“Sloans conversion to public relations was conveyed in his message in the annual report. He said, “the corporations most vital relationship is with the public. Its success depends on a current interpretation of the publics needs and viewpoints, as well as on the publics understanding of the corporations motives in everything it does. Bernayss relationship