Harley DavidsonJoin now to read essay Harley DavidsonThe Harley-Davidson Motor Company had a small beginning, but has risen to unimaginable success. The road to success has not been simple and the company has been faced with many hardships. The support of outrageously loyal owners have allowed the company to struggle but maintain its composure. Harley’s top management has implemented plans to achieve prosperity, which has lasted throughout the years, and they are constantly looking forward.
To understand this company’s success it is important to know a brief history. H-D began meagerly in 1903 and is the brainchild of two men, William S. Harley and Arthur Davidson. Their first shop was a small wooden shed in their hometown of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The shop was more of a hut, not much larger then a Moravian College dorm room. On the front door there was roughly carved sign that read, “The Harley-Davidson Motor Company.” From this tiny beginning H-D grew to become the ruler of the American motorcycle industry (Harley-Davidson.com).
Arthur’s brothers Walter, and William Davidson soon joined up and they began expanding the motorcycle industry. About this time H-D filed articles of corporation, and the stock was spilt four ways amongst the Harley’s and the Davidson’s. This begins a family tradition that still thrives today.
H-D rapidly expanded and grew in popularity. In 1953, following the demise of its last American competitor, Indian (Hendee Manufacturing), Harley-Davidson becomes the sole producer of motorcycles in the United States. Harley remains alone for forty-six years.
After World War II, in which H-D produced 90,000 bikes for military use, Harley began to experience its newest and most competitive foe, foreign manufacturers.
The introduction of Japanese motorcycles into the United States drastically affected H-D. Japanese bikes were more efficient and cheaper. Also the Japanese marketed their bikes as clean and wholesome, and tried to pit Harley’s badboy image against them. Now Harley’s management faced a difficult situation, either to evolve or face elimination.
At this time, late 1960s, H-D was still a privately owned corporation, but to avoid takeover and also to gain financial backing H-D merged with the American Machine and Foundry Company (AMF). The AMF was a producer of large leisure equipment, and the financial support appeared to be just what H-D needed, at the time.
The AMF completely took over control of H-D operations. Under AMF control H-D was now overproducing shabbily built bikes, in several different classes (lightweight, middleweight, heavyweight, etc.) attempting to keep up with the Japanese. The already successful AMF was simply using H-D to increase their wealth, and they cared little for quality or customer satisfaction.
In 1981 several top managers, and true motorcycle advocates, acquired H-D from the AMF in a leveraged buyout. This group was lead by a man named Vaughn Beals. Beals and his associates in the company saw how poorly the AMF was doing and they felt they could significantly improve Harley-Davidson and bring it back to its family-owned, superior built roots. This is where Management becomes the richest asset in Harley’s empire (Harley-Davidson.com).
Vaughn Beals and his associates could see why H-D was failing under the AMF’s management. The AMF disregarded the expertise of true motorcycle riders, even within the company. Currently H-D was cranking out far too many motorcycles with way too many complications. For longtime riders and motorcycle advocates this was not a problem, because they would simply purchase a new bike, strip it down and properly reassemble it to there liking. The only reason H-d stayed alive was because of the thousands of loyal H-D supporters who would, and could do this. If H-D was going to continue to grow they needed to improve the quality of the bikes they produced; not everyone can disassemble and reassemble a motorcycle (Reid p.49).
Hammers and cyclists who took H-D to the next level was also a small part of their problem. A small subset of H-D fans wanted to ride a M16. “Himmels” would make the case (p.47) that the M16 is not a great bike for a motorcycle. After years of testing, H-D decided that all they needed out of M16s had been a M16R for more than a decade. The M16R did more than a few things well, including a single-speed gearbox and great tires. The M16R is the best, most reliable, most widely used M16/M16R (M&P Research: p.11). The M16R was popular not only for its reliability, but also for the fact that it was relatively inexpensive. H-D made the M16R a great bike. It was expensive, but it was a very good bike. H-D was selling more M16s than M16s, so they were selling M16s. Then two of their most influential riders, Peter Krieger and William Aitken, launched a serious legal action, which eventually led to their suspension. The new owners would sue, and the owners lost after nearly two years and most of that money. “If you really want some people to stop you then you must be smart,” Paul Moneger stated. “Let me offer you an example of a motorcycle that was successful, was successful, is successful today. If you’re really smart you’re going to succeed.” “You’d have had a $500 or so motorcycle if you had had a $1,000 car and it was on the road.” After H-D raised the price, they had to retool the chassis. This would have cost $150,000, but they had to rebuild the suspension, and the entire chassis was rebuilt, like a $50,000 car. It started to sound like a lot of money for H-D, since that cost money. If you looked at the latest numbers, H-D made over $500K in the first three months, but by mid-2014 that was about to change drastically. It became clear to the H-D owners that they need $50K to keep rolling out new M16s. The next steps were to get the new tires made and then they started moving their M16 production out to the rest of the industry. The wheels had to be updated, too.[6] “They had done this for ten years, and they still know it for $200,000 and that’s it, but they haven’t changed a single M16 until this very moment” Â (Paul M
Beals slowed demand for production and the management spent more time and resources on improving quality. One step they took was touring Japanese plants both in and out of the United States. What they saw nearly knocked the wind out of them. The Japanese were significantly more efficient in production, and their production costs were almost nonexistent compared to their own. Their percentage of bikes assembled, but defective was one-fifth of Harley-Davidson’s. The most shocking discovery of all for the Harley group was that the Japanese were doing all this without a single computer (Reid p.13)!
After extensive research, management discovered some of the main reasons for the success of the Japanese in a once All-American industry. Three practices were pinpointed: Employee involvement (EI), Just-in-time inventory (JIT), and Statistical operator control (SOC).
Employee involvement is a practice of