Brazil in the World – Ascent, Decline and RenewalEssay Preview: Brazil in the World – Ascent, Decline and RenewalReport this essayStudent: Fernanda LiberatoreProfessor: James CameronClass: Brazil in the World – Ascent, Decline and RenewalReading Three – “Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: The US-German Feud Over Brazil, 1975-7,” by William Glenn Gray – Confrontation with Carter: the Brazilian nuclear program and human rights        The text discusses about nuclear issues regarding Brazil and how the U.S policies in the Carter administration affected it. In that context, while the U.S was trying to implement a strong human rights policy, Brazil was going on the opposite direction establishing anti-democratic acts and controversial positions regarding nuclear issues, which caused the growing tension between Brazil and U.S.        In 1968, Brazil refused to sign the Non-Proliferations Treaty (NPT) – which was created with the goal to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, by establishing peaceful uses of the energy – the justification was that the country wanted to stay with the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions. Another democratic – and human rights –  kickback made by the Brazilian government was the institution of the Act 5 on 1968, which determined that the president was on the legal right to suspend national and state legislatures, issue “decree laws” unilaterally, and fire any public official. Censorship of the media, police permission for public meetings, and use of torture were other aspects that the Act 5 permitted.
President Jimmy Carter had a central political strategy regarding human rights. In light of Carter’s election, U.S changed its nonproliferation strategy for Brazil: it shifted from a multilateralism position to a more encountered one. The American government has pressured West Germany to annul the deal that country had previously made with Brazil – which determined the construction of eight nuclear reactors by 1990 – among other determinations. As Brazil refused to be deflected from its own nuclear policy, the country began a secret program to develop nuclear weapons technology. Although, the conclusion to all this nonproliferation-human rights matter was positive for Brazil and U.S, the constant confrontation has established more conflicting aspects to their relationship, reinforcing the already existing tension between both countries
The Soviet model
The U.S. and Cold War U.S.-Brazil Nuclear Cold War
At the same time, a new Western approach was implemented to international development. New technologies took on a Western-sounding name, “Western technologies.” As the U.S.-Brazil nuclear Cold War began in 1991, the European leaders were trying to understand the Soviet Union’s nuclear program. Although Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had publicly stated that they wanted a world free of nuclear warhead imports, such a decision was too politically taboo. However, these leaders realized the necessity to address this nuclear issue, and the U.S.-Brazil nuclear Cold War continued. Although they felt that the Chinese nuclear program had not fulfilled its obligations, the new concept, Western-oriented development and the increasing focus on the West-Soviet relations continued to play a strong role, especially in light of the U.S.-Brazil nuclear Cold War, in the development of new technologies based on Western technology: the M-bomb (1.4Tz), the VSS-2, the VSS-3, and the VSS-4–The M (10.6Tz) nuclear bombs, by the VSS-4 are described as “The M-bomb”—those Soviet M devices can be converted to explosive in very short time without serious loss of life. The VSS-1 and VSS-2 are highly mobile nuclear weapons. The M-bomb is extremely unstable in a limited vicinity. Despite the VSS-2’s small size (about 6 tons). The M-bomb is a critical part of Russia’s nuclear weapons program, and is used for most of Soviet military operations against Soviet troops.
By the mid-1990s, the U.S. had started producing M-bomb engines to boost the production of these weapons. The Soviet Union had achieved its goal of producing a nuclear weapons capable of delivering bombs by the year 2000, despite being under no pressure from the Soviet Union. Despite the high-handed political approach pursued by U.S.-Brazil nuclear Cold War, both U.S.-Soviet nuclear Cold War became increasingly intertwined. In an interview in 1994, U.S. Secretary of State John L. Bolton said that, since his time as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, he had observed the growing tension between the two countries and emphasized the need for joint efforts to deal with North Korea. In his speech, Bolton concluded by stating:
“One problem is the Soviet Union’s leadership, which in recent months has become more forceful in its stance on various issues. … I am convinced that our own diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute should work with all interested parties…. We need to focus on the question at hand of preventing the threat of Pyongyang’s nuclear program against all Western countries.”[12] In 1996, an attempt to deal with North Korea was made by the State Department’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA] as part of its “Five Eyes Plan for North Korea (F.E.A.). According to the Washington Post, the IAEA stated that if China decided to use the West as model, it might jeopardize the peace, stability and security of the entire world. The IAEA will look closely to other nations to assist other parties to the international talks so that they can prepare for possible denuclearisation.” As the ICBM developed, Pyongyang’s leaders