Nuclear Weapons and the Moral Accountability of the ŠmigrŠ¹ ScientistsEssay title: Nuclear Weapons and the Moral Accountability of the ŠmigrŠ¹ ScientistsIntroduction:In the years following the discovery of nuclear fission, the prospects of this new phenomena having some technological application (in the form of a bomb) were gradually realised. During this period, Leo Szilard and fellow Š¹migrŠ¹ scientists involved in the Manhattan Project became clearly entangled between their moral obligations to the United States, to the scientific community, and possibly even to their homeland in Europe. By analysing the details of key events, this paper will aim to explain exactly what their moral obligations to each party were, and to what extent these obligations were adhered to, up until VJ-Day . By the conclusion it will be clear that the Š¹migrŠ¹s primarily honoured their obligations to the U.S. government over and above those to the scientific community.
Experiment and Censorship:Even four years before fission was proven, Szilard intuitively sensed its possibility. Whatās more striking were his efforts to censor his first successful chain reaction experiment with Enrico Fermi in 1939. Both the experiment, and the censorship of it begged two important moral questions: Were Szilard and colleagues morally justified in exclusively deciding not to publish information which (according to them) if made public, could have been used by the Nazis to help them do the unthinkable? And were they morally justified in trying to discover such facts knowing that, if they found what they were looking for, it could lead to such a deadly weapon?
Both questions must take into consideration that, at the time of Szilardās experiment, the U.S. was still more than 3 years from declaring war on their only WWII enemy, Japan (and not Germany). There is a possibility that Š¹migrŠ¹s decision may have been influenced by the fact that the Nazis posed a threat to their European homeland. But even leaving this aside, it would be difficult to conclude that by not sharing this information, that the decision of the Š¹migrŠ¹s was morally justified. The Š¹migrŠ¹s should have known that, if correct, this data was going to have an impact not only on science, but (as later realised) the future security of nations, including their own. By choosing to censor this information, they unequivocally forgoed their moral obligation to the scientific community (which was to disclose it). Whatās more by taking this stance, they were not even (as they believed) acting in the best interests of their country. There is no historical record of the Š¹migrŠ¹s even considering to consult the government, which (unlike the scientists) had been elected by the people to make decisions (on their behalf) about issues such as this, which would ultimately impact on their lives. So, presuming they were not considering this course of action, censoring these results was clearly not morally justified to science or their government.
With reference to the second question, and in defence of the Š¹migrŠ¹s, there is little doubt that they were morally justified (both to science and their country) in carrying out this research which could, if successful (and whether they knew of its potential or not) assist in the creation of such deadly technology. In fact, they would have been in breach of their moral duties to both the scientific community and their government, if they had not decided to proceed on those grounds. Similarly, an astrophysicist has a moral duty to their government and to science to look for threatening asteroids which (with reference to the first question), if found, must be disclosed to at least one (or both) parties in order to fulfil their moral obligation to them. This leads to the final two questions of this essay: Were the Š¹migrŠ¹s morally justified in championing (in the way they did) the need for building a nuclear weapon? And of greater importance, were they morally justified in (as they did) advising the government on its use?
Circumstances, Motives and the Advisory Role:Again, their circumstances raised at the beginning of the third paragraph may have had some bearing here, but will not be considered in depth. If these circumstances did influence the Š¹migrŠ¹s need for a weapon, their moral responsibilities to U.S. government and the scientific community was in direct competition for, if not superseded by, what they saw as their moral responsibility to the people of their homeland. Despite how influential these circumstances were, the Š¹migrŠ¹s should be commended in having (unlike most of their colleagues) the foresight to correctly predict how close the world was to realising nuclear weaponry. The most concerning aspect of their involvement however, was their urgency to have the bomb built before the Nazis. Their only obligations as scientists were to assess and advise on (based on the evidence they had)
The ŠømigrŠ¹s, for the moment, are on their own. Though they remain on their own, they are still a part of the international community. As they are no longer responsible for, nor for negotiating with, the governments in their lifetimes, it seems logical that this matter would be handled by a group of them. The US has a role of international arbiter in matters arising out of its relationship to the Russian Federation, but their influence in that environment would probably be negligible if not negligible. It is now quite obvious to those interested in this topic, however, that they must do a much more complex job that involved getting to the bottom of the truth as it was at the beginning of this series than they did a year ago.
A quick Google search of “ŠømigrŠ¹” yields many more links to such a source. If nothing else, by examining the evidence here, the ŃŠµŠ¹ can hopefully be concluded that they were in no doubt about, at all, how close the United States and its world leaders were to building a nuclear weapon for use in the 21st century. Indeed, with no other government, political party, or public interest group in place at all, this is the only possible avenue available for their participation in this debate. Thus, one cannot even conclude that they were not involved in this conflict.
At this point, I’d like to point out that in their role in this affair, the President obviously did take a very long view on the issue, particularly regarding the nuclear issue, and that at the time was a very interesting point of focus for the U.S. public. Given that this conflict began at a time when no other international group or entity would have the opportunity to act on the nuclear issue, there were no public interest groups in place in this event at that time (including the United States) which would have been involved as such.
The Š¹migrŠ¹s themselves have no involvement in the U.S. Nuclear Suppliers’ Convention’s nuclear arms control agreement (NSDCC) nor would there even be such organizations in place to deal with these issues. In what they did know was that the U.S. was prepared to do whatever it could to make sure that the United States never made any overt use of nuclear weapons in an ever more belligerent world with regard to world peace. These reasons for this were based in part on some sort of “undertakings”, (in fact, all such “undertakings” could not be undertaken by the United States), that are entirely inapplicable as a justification for the nuclear weapons doctrine as well as for their role within the United States nuclear weapons program. Such an assumption cannot be taken seriously unless it is based upon an assumption of culpability. Even then, that same assumption is not taken seriously at the current time. Instead, it appears to have been set aside and accepted as the sole reason for all of the non-disparaging actions by the President since 9/11 as not just a matter of necessity that must have followed the first and second amendments before the President became entangled with the nuclear and related nuclear weapons program.
If it is at this point that things are going badly for the USA and the U.S. (see here), my conclusion is, unfortunately, that in spite of these actions Russia and the United States are now deeply at risk of losing its nuclear weapons programme in a future war of