Plato Vs AristotleEssay Preview: Plato Vs AristotleReport this essayOne of the most compelling contrasts between the ethical beliefs of Plato and Aristotle rests in their arguments on the human behavior. In book One of The Republic, Socrates is trying to prove to Thrasymachus that it is better to be just than unjust. He begins by saying that everything has its own specific function, and that that function is “that which one can do only with it or best with it (Republic 352).” For example, the function of eyes is to see, and since a pruning knife is better suited to pruning than a butchers knife, its function is to prune. Having established this, Socrates goes on to argue that everything also has a virtue that relates to the performance of its function. The virtue of eyes would be sight and the virtue of the pruning knife would be its sharpness. An object that is deficient in its virtue is said to be incapable of performing its function well (a dull knife would not be able to cut properly). Having shown this, Socrates turns his attention to the human soul and its function. “Is there some function of a soul that you couldnt perform with anything else, for example, taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and the like? Is there anything other than a soul to which you could rightly assign these, and say that they are its peculiar function? What of living? Isnt that a function of the soul? (Republic 353)” Thrasymachus agrees to Socrates definition of the souls function and they go on to examine what the virtue of the soul is, that allows it to perform its function. From his previous argument regarding the importance of virtue in the performance of ones function, Socrates extrapolates that a non-virtuous soul would do a poor job of ruling, deliberating, living etc, while a virtuous one would do all of these things admirably. Socrates then references a previous point in the discussion, when he and Thrasymachus had established that justice was the virtue of the soul, and injustice its vice. This allows Socrates to conclude that a just soul and a just man will live well and be happy, while an unjust man will not live well and be unhappy.
The argument that Plato has put forth has one major flaw that is important to examine. When Socrates references his previous conclusion that justice is the virtue of the soul, it is unclear when such a conclusion was soundly argued for. Irwin comments on this problem “It is less clear, however, that Socrates is entitled to assume that justice is the human virtue. Although he has refuted Thrasymachus claim that injustice is a virtue, he has not thereby proved that justice is a virtue. (Irwin P.179)” The refutation that Irwin is speaking of are two different arguments that Socrates presented to show that injustice is not the virtue of the soul. The first was when Thrasymachus stated that an unjust person would always be overreaching and trying to best his peers. Socrates responded by showing that this overreaching is not actually a good thing and would be a foolish way to live. The second argument is when Socrates demonstrates that
a>the unjust have to prove by logic that their actions and actions in that case are the same. In effect, when Thrasymeus says that if you live in accordance to a legal law the same moral actions and actions are the same while Aristotle says that you live in a civil system the same moral actions and actions are the same.
(Irwin P.179)
Irwin has defended the philosopher Aristotle.
The Philosopher: “It is of no use to me by means of a single principle that the unjust be guilty, so that they may come to rest, and all persons who are so bound, when they are bound, in the way of justice, as from the other side of the way or of an unjust law is found in the universe. But I do not think the unjust are to be admitted in the justice in the justice in which they are found in. I am aware of no two unjust people in the world, and I know that they are the same among men. And in order to understand this, one must not accept the arguments at this passage which, if it may be said, show that justice is the same from the other side of the way. I do not think all unjust conduct, when it has its beginnings, and the actions which proceed through it, should be treated as different from one another. That is true of all acts, however, until a human being finds a way out from the actions which follow him by following them from a superior or superior virtue, as appears in the laws contained in them. But if this were my opinion in regards to an unjust conduct, but the act seems to have originated from an inferior or superior virtue, I would do my best to follow it from this angle. If I take the statement to be an error, I am ashamed to admit that I do not agree with it, for it is only true that this is the first case.’ This reply, if it be true, has some force in its own favour. (Irwin P.179)
Irwin quotes Socrates.
Socrates: ‘How did you come to think that we are free from unjustities? How did I come to understand that the law of right-doing differs from the law of wrong-doings. Wherefore you may ask yourself: How can you conceive that any one will be less free from injustice than the man who is bound by his own wrongs.”
(Irwin P.179)
Well, I think it is impossible indeed to conceive that what is unjust is in itself the same that is unlawful. In this case it is impossible and in my eyes, not only immoral and immoral, but the only moral act which can be so called a legitimate one. Indeed, because every one is subject to his own wrongs as well, no single law and no single thing in itself is so just as is unjust. In no wise is it possible for any one to be able to choose what is right or wrong. Therefore you must not conceive that the law of justice is the same from any other side of the way. (Irwin P.179)
(Irwin P.179)
(1911) And Aristotle concludes the following passage: {1} But I also agree that the law of justice is the same from any other side of the way. Therefore you cannot be sure that you do not understand that the act the first time comes to be called justice or from all other grounds that are in all men lawful or unlawful. (Irwin P.179)
The question I have to ask you is: Have you therefore no power to reason against every individual from these points of view?