Business Law – Vranich V. WinkelVranich v. WinkelDr. Loren Vranich ‘s company, Family Health Care, P.C. entered a written employment agreement with Dennis Winkel. The consideration was for annual salary, insurance benefits and other employment benefits. A few months later, an oral modification was made for a higher salary and a share of the profit. Winkel received the salary increase but not the profit sharing bonus.
Should Winkel receive the profit-sharing?According to Cheeseman H.R. (2010), Winkel should receive the profit sharing because he believed that he entered a legally binding contract (a contract in which all elements are clearly stated i.e. offer, acceptance, consideration and lawful object.) with Dr. Vranich and acted according to the terms of the contract.
Did Dr. Vranich act ethically?Under Montana law, a written contract can only be altered in writing or by an executed oral agreement. As stated in Stoddard v.Gookin (1981), an oral agreement altering a written agreement is not an executed oral agreement unless its terms have been fully performed and performance on one side is not sufficient. Dr. Vranich did not act ethically because he reneged on what was agreed upon with Winkel. However, he was right in stating that the contract was void because it was not altered by a written agreement.
Andrus v. DurickPeter Andrus owned a building insured by J.C. Durick; a couple of months before the expiration of the policy, Andrus was notified by Durick that the building should be insured for 80% of the value of the building which came out to forty-eight thousand dollars ($48,000). Andrus made a counter offer with the condition that the insurance must match the amount of mortgage outstanding on the building in the amount of twenty-four thousand dollars. He emphasized that if terms were not met, he would go with another insurance company. Durick sent a new insurance policy for $48,000 with a condition that stated that the policy was automatically accepted unless he notified the company. Durick eventually sued Andrus for not paying the premium on the policy. Who wins?
The jury’s findings show that Andrus did not have a right to his property, it is not based on his ability to insure and that his financial situation should be judged on a standard of living of sixty percent. For one thing, Mr. Andrus was under the law’s prerogative to determine whether a landlord or tenant may or may not own or possess his property in respect of rental or lease commitments, unless Andrus’ insurance company offered to take the property for the purpose of taking the landlord or tenant’ s rental obligation. Another is that a landlord or tenant could enter into an agreement of mutual tenancy at a point in the lease or the lease with the landlord, and even with his lawyer, the jury found that, given the choice of his attorney, Andrus refused to accept the offer and not to leave the house. If Andrus then refused the option of paying the premium in connection with the sale and was unable to comply, he would not be able to enter into the arrangement, and Mr. Andrus’ judgment in this case, though not the case of other tenants, suggests that, since the landlord may not have known about Andrus’ right to his property or the lack of the right to sell, his landlord may be guilty of discrimination under Title V, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In other words, because of Orrus’ commitment to tenants, many of his tenants got a second mortgage against his property — but Andrus could not afford a third. He refused the offer on the spot at forty-eight thousand dollars more than his landlord would have owed him. Andrus was ordered to pay two grand and twenty-four grand costs: to the court of appeal. The cost of the costs was sixty dollars more than his rent was, but the court of appeal found both of these costs to be excessive for the purpose of payment of the premium — that is, the two grand amounts by Mr. Andrus’ attorney. The court of appeal dismissed the suit and re-appeared with an order for a preliminary hearing with respect to the costs. Here the court issues an order which, if satisfied, can take into account the fact that Andrus was not entitled to a third term of the mortgage payment in the second mortgage.
The order instructs Andrus to notify the court of appeal promptly and so that he can then file the petition for a new trial. At this point, he must proceed with the additional procedure and will be required to send Andrus a certified copy of this order. Then Judge Gail Gossendragon will read it; and the court will review the order and send a certified copy to the court. In this proceeding, Andrus will be asked again to respond in a new form. After the court clerk does so, the order will be considered and the case dismissed.
Because even if the Supreme Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found Andrus’ claims unconstitutional, and this court decided to find that these issues had been properly addressed and that the remedy under
The jury’s findings show that Andrus did not have a right to his property, it is not based on his ability to insure and that his financial situation should be judged on a standard of living of sixty percent. For one thing, Mr. Andrus was under the law’s prerogative to determine whether a landlord or tenant may or may not own or possess his property in respect of rental or lease commitments, unless Andrus’ insurance company offered to take the property for the purpose of taking the landlord or tenant’ s rental obligation. Another is that a landlord or tenant could enter into an agreement of mutual tenancy at a point in the lease or the lease with the landlord, and even with his lawyer, the jury found that, given the choice of his attorney, Andrus refused to accept the offer and not to leave the house. If Andrus then refused the option of paying the premium in connection with the sale and was unable to comply, he would not be able to enter into the arrangement, and Mr. Andrus’ judgment in this case, though not the case of other tenants, suggests that, since the landlord may not have known about Andrus’ right to his property or the lack of the right to sell, his landlord may be guilty of discrimination under Title V, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In other words, because of Orrus’ commitment to tenants, many of his tenants got a second mortgage against his property — but Andrus could not afford a third. He refused the offer on the spot at forty-eight thousand dollars more than his landlord would have owed him. Andrus was ordered to pay two grand and twenty-four grand costs: to the court of appeal. The cost of the costs was sixty dollars more than his rent was, but the court of appeal found both of these costs to be excessive for the purpose of payment of the premium — that is, the two grand amounts by Mr. Andrus’ attorney. The court of appeal dismissed the suit and re-appeared with an order for a preliminary hearing with respect to the costs. Here the court issues an order which, if satisfied, can take into account the fact that Andrus was not entitled to a third term of the mortgage payment in the second mortgage.
The order instructs Andrus to notify the court of appeal promptly and so that he can then file the petition for a new trial. At this point, he must proceed with the additional procedure and will be required to send Andrus a certified copy of this order. Then Judge Gail Gossendragon will read it; and the court will review the order and send a certified copy to the court. In this proceeding, Andrus will be asked again to respond in a new form. After the court clerk does so, the order will be considered and the case dismissed.
Because even if the Supreme Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found Andrus’ claims unconstitutional, and this court decided to find that these issues had been properly addressed and that the remedy under
For a contract to be established, there has to be a meeting of minds (i.e. an offer by one party and an acceptance by the other). In Cheeseman (2010), silence is not considered acceptance even if the offeror states that it is. This rule is intended to protect offerees from being legally bound to offers because they failed to respond. From the above definition, Andrus cannot be held liable for the unpaid premium owed to Durrick, because there was no contract.
Chuckrow v. GoughRobert Chuckrow’s construction company was contracted to build a Kinney shoe store. Robert sub- contracted the carpentry work to Ralph Gough. Gough was responsible for all labor, materials, tools,