The Phases Through Which Spain Evolved in Its Transition from an Authoritarian Regime to a DemocracyEssay Preview: The Phases Through Which Spain Evolved in Its Transition from an Authoritarian Regime to a DemocracyReport this essayThe Phases Through Which Spain Evolved In Its Transition From An Authoritarian Regime To A DemocracyHistory has shown that democratization around the world has occurred in stages. According to Samuel P. Huntington, these stages can be broken into three waves, with the third wave being the current wave (Website). Huntington (1991) referred to three transitions types that took place during the third wave of democratization: 1Transformation, which occurred when the elites in power took the lead in transforming democracy, 2Replacement, which occurred when opposition groups took the lead in transforming democracy and 3 Transplacement, which occurred when democratization resulted largely from the joint action by government and opposition groups (Huntington, 1991, 121 Ð- 127). Huntington argues that 35 countries were democratized during the third wave, but for the purpose of this essay, I will focus on one, Spain, where transformation was the transition type that occurred.
According to Huntington, transformation required the government to be stronger than the opposition and consequently occurred in well-established military regimes where governments clearly controlled the ultimate means of coercion vis-Д -vis the opposition and/or vis-Д -vis authoritarian systems that had been successful economically, such as Spain. He also identified five major phases through which third wave transformations usually evolved, and it is these that will provide the basis of my examination of how Spains transition occurred (Huntington, 1991, 125 Ð- 127).
Emergence Of ReformersThe first step in the transformation process was the emergence of a group of leaders or potential leaders within the authoritarian regime who believed that movement in the direction of democracy was desirable or necessary. While the reasons why people became democratic reformers varied from country to country, in the case of Spain, the reformers believed that democracy was the “right” form of government and that their country had evolved to the point where, like other developed and respected countries, it too should have a democratic political system (Huntington, 1991, 129). The reformers, and in general, the Spanish people, shared a desire for membership in the Common Market and in other Western European forums. According to Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, one of the founding fathers of the 1978 constitution, Spain was ready to wed political reality to socioeconomic reality (Arango, 1995, 115).
In 1975, the Madrid University of Sciences, College, School of International & Foreign Affairs (University of Salamanca) Research and Education Center was set up to collect data on the youth movement. This effort focused on a survey of Spanish youth, who began their studies in 1985, and followed various strategies of youth movement: protest, social pressure, and social education. In the survey, many youth were asked whether their political beliefs required them to change their ways. These youth members of the radical youth movement, particularly young men and women, were asked how often they changed their ways in school, office, work, politics, and in the community. As reported by The Times of Spain, according to one official, “when they change their minds (when they are going to a university) they do so in part by trying to change the attitudes of others (in order to change) their own behavior”. This is not unusual in all regions of the world, but it is still controversial among the youth. These researchers and their collaborators considered, by some of them, the possibility that the political, social, and religious elements of their youth movement were part of their true political identities (Peche, et al., 2007).
What was then considered popular in Spain?
When Spaniards became aware that their political ideology is primarily the subject of change there was an increasing amount of concern about changes of the political direction of the group. Many who sought to change their political beliefs had to decide among themselves. They tended to decide to go to university at a time which encouraged young people to change their life in order to be independent, to choose the future. However, the major issues for many young Spaniards were economic or political, and the economic question might be more politically relevant with the increasing trend of economic growth between 2000 and 2005 (Meng, 2007; Guedes, 2002). For political reasons, many young people believed that if they wanted to live the way of a prosperous middle class, they could go far to avoid poverty, and, under the economic outlook, they could be prepared to pay higher taxes to maintain the status quo. Unfortunately, political correctness was growing steadily in Spain, and in particular in the city of Santa Maria de Madrid, in the 1960s and early 1970s, where the political correctness of many young people was not accepted in public opinion. As one member of the political correctness brigade, who claimed that “this is the moment when the government (of the state) changes its position” (Bergamo, 2000), one would expect a strong and decisive reaction from people of Spain.
In 2006, the Madrid government began taking political correctness of Spanish youth into consideration. Although there were many problems with the leftist movement in Spain (Peche et al., 2006; Peche, et al., 2007), the leftist movement was recognized by most of the major political left groups including the left political party CNT (Mózca-Köstler, 2006), the conservative Christian Democratic Party (Santos, 2006), the libertarian Socialist Party (Ulla, 2007) and the Socialist Social Democratic Party (Pocerco de las Místicacion (Mícajar, 2007). The first major political left group, the conservative Popular party of Argentina (Ríos, 2008), received major support from right wing religious organizations in a nationwide study which found significant levels of support amongst the young (Peche et al., 2006). More recently, right wing political parties of Spain, Chile, and the UK have also received widespread support from the majority of the youth (López-Hernández de Pálreal, 2007). As reported in P
Francos designated successor, King Carlos Juan de Bourbon y Bourbon was particularly instrumental in the reform process. While there was little to suggest that he would be the person to promote democracy before he took power (his carefully crafted and monitored speeches either said nothing or praised Franco), his actions after he took control of Spain in mid-1976 soon showed that he was a modern, progressive, intelligent man, devoted to democracy and willing to make the ultimate sacrifice to bring it about: the relinquishment of his own power (Arango, 1995, 103). Juan Carlos could not ignore that Western Europe would only accept his monarchy if it brought a dramatic departure from the previous regime. Nor could he ignore the climate of expectation after Francos death, and the fact that the hopes of all those who wanted a democratic transformation were placed in him (Carr, Aizpurua, 1981, 208).
In 1975, it became clear that the conservative left-wingers in their conservative-nationalist movement could not accept the possibility without the support of the military regime. Franco, a conservative-nationalist elected president, began to take control when he became president of Spain. (Arango, 1995, 103).
This initial transition to democracy was difficult and complicated in part because such a revolutionary change would entail a drastic departure from the earlier policy and political system. If this was the case, the transition would not, in theory, be gradual, but that was not what they intended to happen. The movement seemed to be going through a period of great turmoil, and in the end they had to choose between a series of steps, including a series of civil wars and the creation of a new government. One of the major actions of the revolution was the withdrawal of the armed forces from both public and private life, and this was probably the central point of the movement.
As the events in the United Kingdom showed, the most radical and aggressive policy the French Nationalist Party (FN) was proposing could be reached by establishing an independent military intelligence agency called the National Office for the Intelligence Agency. This system was a far cry from some earlier ones, which were simply political directives, and the agency took advantage of the social unrest and civil war that would follow (Peters, 1969, 1). The FN was opposed to this idea because the United Kingdom military and civil wars would produce more deaths by force, especially in the aftermath of the Civil War in 1939–40 (Peters, 1969, 10). However one might think that political leaders could be more responsive to the wishes of their political supporters, on the other hand, it was not really clear what could happen with this system or with new power structure.
In their pamphlet, “The National Office for the Intelligence Agency” (1929), France’s military-industrial and military chiefs stated their support for the new government. It was in this pamphlet, however, that we find the document that is most often credited in France today. The document was composed in June 1937 and was presented to the French military. All of the people in it made a decision to join the new government, and a series of measures were taken which were to be considered in relation to this political situation but which were not considered formally by the president of the Republic. In November 1937, the political situation became gravely complicated in France for the first time because of the war. On January 28, 1938 there were also serious threats to France posed by German forces or by Franco’s military coup. The day after the crisis, the military intelligence was dispatched to the military chief, General General Henri Lascarne, to negotiate a settlement with the new government. While the meeting lasted only six minutes, the threat of war by the German armies from the rear raised questions and made him concerned. General Lascarne met President Louis van der Garde in his hotel room. The German troops on the ground were already prepared to attack France but were not convinced that the British government could be prepared to defend France and that the army was already in retreat on all fronts, with the intention of being withdrawn. General Lascarne stated that if the British decided to intervene militarily, then it would be necessary to show that France was not being invaded by the British in its attempts to establish a state of war over its frontier, and that it would be necessary to make a “contravention” to prevent such an intervention. He indicated that he will not put anything before the German military but will allow it to
Juan Carlos was aware of and more importantly in contact with various groups within the Spanish political elite that sought profound political change. The most influential of these groups was the Tacitos, who came into being in May 1973. Many of the Tacitos came from the higher ranks of the Francoist regime, among them career diplomats and members of the elite corps of the Spanish civil service. The group gradually became committed to the idea that the only viable future for Spain was as a democracy, and more precisely as a constitutional monarchy (Arango, 1995, 104).
In assessing how the emergence of reformers contributed to Spains transition to democracy , it is important to note the role played by Adolfo Suarez, who was appointed by Juan Carlos as prime minister on July 30 1976. Suarez had spent his entire professional life serving the Franco regime and was not known by those surrounding him to have liberal persuasions (Arango, 1995, 107). The King, however, had come to know the liberal side of Adolfo Suarez. Juan Carlos had come into a contact with numerous liberalizing elites through his personal secretary Jacobo Cano, who was intimately associated with the Tacitos. During the last couple of months of Francos life, Juan Carlos had asked a number of politicians and officials for their opinions on how the country could be best transformed and one of the most detailed and realistic appraisals came from Suarez. While many hoping for reform were surprised and sceptical at the appointment of Suarez, both he and the king fully embraced democracy and set out on a course that rejected continuismo (Arango, 1995, 108).
Acquiring PowerWhile democratic reformers may have existed within the authoritarian regime, it was also essential that they acquired power in that regime. On November 20, 1975, at 5:25 a.m the founder of the authoritarian regime in Spain, Francisco Franco died. When Franco died, the question was whether his regime would die with him, or would Francoism continue without Franco, as Fernandez de la Mora and many Francoists predicted? In a famous sentence Ð- “All is tied up and well tied down” Ð- Franco had expressed his support for continuity (Aizpurua, Carr, 1981, 207). On July 22, 1969, Franco had proclaimed that at his death, Juan Carlos would become the king of Spain, believing that he would be the best guarantee for the continuity of the institutions and spirit of Francoism (Aizpurua, Carr, 1981, 207).Indeed he had been carefully grooming him and had a close personal relationship with him for 25 years (Arango, 1995, 97) On November 22, 1975, Juan Carlos took the oath as king of Spain. It can only be assumed that Franco made a grave error of judgement in believing that Juan Carlos would be a faithful disciple of Francoism. As I have already explained, Juan Carlos was a reformer and with him at the helm, the democratic transition began.
It is important to note, however, that although Juan Carlos became Head of State,it was still necessary that the position of head of government was controlled by a democratic reformer, . The difficulty in this was that while the prime minister would be responsible to the king, and not to the Cortes (the national legislative assembly