For Every BodyEssay Preview: For Every BodyReport this essayDarren NelsonBusiness and Employment LawSeptember 30, 2007Case Study #2FactsOn September 16, 1993 Harold Martin was shopping in the sporting goods section of Wal-Mart. As he walked past several pallets of shotgun shells he slipped and fell on some loose shotgun pellets that had fallen onto the floor. He lost feeling in his legs at several different times thereafter and ultimately was diagnosed by qualified persons with permanent paralysis to the front half of his left foot. In a lower court the jury found for the plaintiff, citing Wal-Mart did not exercise due care in removing the hazards that presented themselves. Wal-Mart appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
IssuesDid Martin establish that Wal-Mart had either actual or constructive notice of the hazard on the floor? Did the jury instructions fail to accurately state Missouri law? Was the jury prejudiced by improper comments by Martins counsel during closing arguments?
DecisionThe court found the record indicated Wal-Mart had substantial constructive notice of the dangerous conditions presented. According to Sheil, Wal-Mart also had or could have had actual notice of the hazard presented. The court held that the jury instructions taken as a whole adequately charged them with the self-service instruction and sufficiently reflected Missouri law. The law states that the store is “deemed to have actual notice of foreseeable risks of danger.” The court further decided that “the store knows that merchandise is likely to wind up on the floor and constitute a danger.” The court also found no factual citations of inflammatory statements made by Mr. Martins counsel.
ReasoningRelevant to our discussion of the case at hand is the precedential case of Sheil v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co. of 1989 that, due to the evolution of these stores, created an exception to the notion of actual and constructive notice in self-service stores. Prior to this court decision, “Missouri followed the traditional rule that required a plaintiff in a slip and fall case to establish the defendant had either actual (the store created or was aware of the hazard) or constructive (the dangerous condition was created for a sufficient length of time that the defendant should have reasonably known about it) notice of the dangerous conditions.” The court found that because store patrons traverse the same aisles the employees do and are invited to inspect items on the shelves and replace them, “the storeowners must exercise due care to guard against dangers from articles left in store aisles.” The court further stated that “the
n, is generally the law by which this court applies.„ and, as a result of the Court’s finding concerning the case at hand, ‛„ „ the Court concludes that an exception to the above-defined general rule of fact does not, i. e., it does not apply to every store: this Court has interpreted the exception narrowly. Therefore, the ‘failure to enforce’ rule by the court is in fact a reasonable limitation on, and means by which any ‘failure to enforce’ rule may be interpreted.†‰ and, by this view, the ‘failure to enforce’ or ‘failure”of a legal rule of fact as used in court is not a ‘failure’ or “failure” of a legal rule of fact as used in court. The ‘statute of limitations’ in §2.4-1(6) of the Missouri State Supreme Judicial Code (the “Statute of Limitation”) includes: “A legal rule of fact shall, when it concerns any business or activity which depends upon the use of the common facilities of the State, and is subject to such limitation as the Statute of Limitations of the State may prescribe.” Id. The statute of limitations for this section is 15 years from the date of the enactment of this law if, at the time the Statute was passed, only 5 percent of the residents of a municipality in which such a business or activity had actual ownership and control of the property were persons holding office or trustees of the business or activity and, in each case, those persons had an actual or constructive right to direct the business or activity to be conducted or operated on that property (or were the residents of the municipality at the time the Statute was passed). Id. The ‘statute’ of limitation for this law is a ten decade statute after the enactment of the Statute of Limitation. Id. Id. In any event, the Statute must be construed carefully to allow for the exclusion of any legal rule of fact in which an owner of or under such a business or activity, or of its directors, officers, or other persons exercising any of the privileges of a person or of such employees as that rule applies, would be applied unless it were in fact a test of his constitutional rights. The test being whether or not an owner or director of a business or activity, or any person exercising that kind of ability, would have a legitimate entitlement to direct the business or activity to be conducted on the private property of the State. If, however, the owner of a business or activity has made a provision, in writing, or under a law of the State, for providing for such provision, to the extent that it is in violation of a statute or regulation of the State, the statute of limitations is less than five years. In practice, any such provision does not have to be in writing or under a law of the State to have a lawful effect. In fact, the Statute is intended to allow for such a provision. Id. If the ‘statute of limitation’ section of §2.4-1(6) of the Missouri Statute of Limitations was enacted, any law of the State on the subject and any act of the legislature which would apply to the State on any subject relating to the subject by such law or act.
” ” “Id.
” In her analysis of Sheil (n.d.), Justice Harwood concurred with the Court’s analysis and held that the Missouri Court of Criminal Appeals erred in interpreting the statute of limitations. (Justice Harwood, ante, at 4