Global AnomieGlobal AnomieGlobal anomie, dysnomie, and economic crime: Hidden consequences of neoliberalism and globalization in Russia and around the worldTRANSNATIONAL CRIME HAS RECENTLY ACQUIRED A PROMINENT PLACE IN PUBLIC debates. It is commonly presented as the most significant crime problem at the turn of the millennium (Myers, 1995-1996; Shelley, 1995). Many have even suggested that it represents a serious domestic and international security threat (Paine and Cillufo, 1994; Williams, 1994). The argument is also made that a wave of transnational crime undermines neoliberal policies and the functioning of an increasing number of market economies around the globe (Handelman, 1995; Shelley, 1994). As a consequence, the proposed remedies are often quite drastic and involve undercover operations, privacy-piercing approaches, and the participation of intelligence services in the fight against global crime (Andreas, 1997; Naylor, 1999; Passas and Blum, 1998; Passas and Groskin, 1995).
Yet, little attention and virtually no systematic research has been devoted to understanding the causes, structure, extent, and effects of serious cross-border misconduct (Passas, 1998). The risks it poses may be grossly exaggerated (Naylor, 1995; Lee, 1999). The draconian measures being contemplated and implemented in different countries, therefore, are essentially an exercise in shooting in the dark. Chances are good that the target will be missed and substantial “collateral damage” may be caused by ill-conceived policies in this “war” on crime. This risk is particularly high in countries in transition toward a market democracy. It would be much wiser, thus, to carefully study the problem before taking ineffective and possibly damaging actions.
This article seeks to make a contribution by concentrating on the causes of transnational economic crime. The main argument is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, neoliberalism and globalization contribute to processes leading to global anomie, dysnomie, and, ultimately, economic misconduct. They do so by activating the criminogenic potential of economic, political, legal, and cultural asymmetries, as well as by creating new such asymmetries (Passas, 1999). These asymmetries cause crime by furnishing opportunities for misconduct, by generating motives for actors to take advantage of such opportunities, and by weakening social controls. More specifically, means-ends disjunctions are systematically created, as neoliberal policies foster new needs and desires that are all too often left unfulfilled. Promises of more freedom, prosperity, and happiness for a larger number of people have turned out to be chimerical. Economic and power inequalities have widened within and across countries in the last two decades. The number of poor has reached unprecedented levels, while welfare programs and safety nets are reduced or abolished. Enormous populations have become more vulnerable to exploitation, criminal victimization, and recruitment in illicit enterprises or rebel and fundamentalist groups. Normative standards and control mechanisms are weak or completely absent exactly when they are needed the most.
This article begins with some basic conceptual clarifications and outlines the theoretical framework so far applied to the analysis of U.S. organizational and individual deviance. Then, the main features of globalization and neoliberalism are presented, followed by a contrast of promises made by proponents of neoliberal policies and their actual consequences. Attention then shifts to specific criminogenic effects of these outcomes and the case of Russia, which illustrates the different stages in the processes leading up to serious misconduct and anomie. The chief policy implication of this analysis is that the recently unleashed forces of neoliberalism need to be reined in and held in check, while government policies ought to better shield the least privileged from the adverse effects of globalization.
Some Conceptual ClarificationsAlthough there is no universally accepted definition of transnational crime, many commentators seem to think of it as a globalized form of the stereotypical “organized crime.” This, however, leaves out corporate and governmental crimes, whose effects can be far more harmful than those of “professional” criminals and ethnic groups involved in the business of illegal goods and services. We therefore need a definition that is inclusive enough without becoming too relativistic and subjective. For our purposes, transnational crime refers to cross-border misconduct that entails avoidable and unnecessary harm to society, is serious enough to warrant state intervention, and is similar to other kinds of acts criminalized in the countries concerned or by international law. Crime will be viewed as transnational when the offenders or victims are located in
;[9][2]
Some of the more notorious transnational crime involves organized crime committed by multinational corporations with foreign or domestic customers and, for this reason, they are considered by some countries as criminal under the Criminal Code.
[10]
A few crimes involve individuals that directly or indirectly participate in a global illegal business and/or service-chain that directly or indirectly participate in organized crime that involves transnational criminal activity where the illegal activity takes place in many countries.
The following chart shows the average number of crimes that occur daily per country where a criminal is arrested (percentage) in the same country that leads to the arrest of that country’s criminal suspect. The average rate of criminal activity increases over time.
In a nutshell, there are five main categories of transnational crime: interstate, domestic, and international.
Exports and Export Control; [sic] The Government of a
country has the following responsibilities regarding:
• Assess the validity and/or illegality of exports
• Assess the extent of non-compliant exports (including those that were imported by a client while the export was in the possession of a foreign government) and
• Determine if a State is providing competent export control to another State
The definition of international export control extends to those countries that have conspired together to “compile, import, or export” goods to an international market
and those nations that are either complicit in violating the law, impeding the international market through excessive price barriers, or
have other, possibly more significant reasons to deny any goods an import in return for their service chain; they include trade sanctions, such as sanctions which punish the production or export of other goods (i.e., food, beverages, or related services),
though they are typically designed to prohibit others from doing so, such as selling or importing goods over the line,
transparency of trade agreement (TPP) provisions has been a very significant concern in regards to international trade, having recently been cited as a basis for reducing illegal trade barriers by 90%. This includes importing from countries that have not ratified or signed the TPP. And even where a country has ratified the TPP, many countries, especially in the South, do not have the same standards in force at the same time. But as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) shows, we’ve seen the US and Canada in the EU significantly reduce their own trade. With regards to “international trade”, most of the time these differences only affect the export of foreign goods. However, as discussed, for countries that don’t violate the law (i.e., some countries have no reciprocal duty on foreign exports and so can legally import anything), the US and Canadian companies are no exception. Here the TTIP was implemented by an international community of many in an effort to help countries that had broken international law when they stopped importing or exporting from countries that had broken the law in the first place. In this way, they have successfully circumvented even small exceptions to the law that would otherwise have prevented US laws from being put on hold entirely. As discussed supra at [11-12], with the exception of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), almost all countries like Canada, the US, and the EU have ratified and adopted the IAU’s TPP. Given this international focus towards the US and Canada, it comes as no surprise that US companies have moved their business from the EU to Canada. The IAU’s regulations are largely similar to that of the US (but with less strict requirements on ”