Columbia Space Shuttle
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The Columbia Space Shuttle disintegrated during its return to earth on February 1, 2003. The crew of seven astronauts died that day. As a result, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was created to investigate the cause of the tragic accident. The exact cause of the of the accident was that the a piece of the foam insulating material from the external tank broke free and struck the leading edge of the shuttle’s wing which damaged the heat shielding panels. The impact allowed super-heated gases to enter which led to the shuttle’s disintegration.
Aside from the technical failure, the CAIB pinpointed NASA’s culture and management structure as the culprit for the accident. From the start, NASA faced political pressure to be and stay number one in the space race against the Soviet Union. Although the Cold War ended and NASA’s funds were reduced, the political pressure continued. “…NASA officials decided to push ahead… with an approach of faster-better-cheaper…(handout)” Employees were asked to do more with less resources.
In addition, the shuttle’s safety overview program was outsourced. As a consequence, communication problems arose. Furthermore, NASA rewrote the safety protocol to include falling debris as an acceptable risk even though engineers found it to be a concern. These engineers were “…shut off from voicing their opinion (handout).” The CAIB stated that NASA’s structure did not allow easy communication. The report on Organizational Culture Change at NASA concluded that “NASA’s history and culture contributed as much to the Columbia accident as any technical failure (Assessment and Plan for Organizational Change at NASA).”
Answers to Questions
The AIB stated that although there was no one management decision that caused the Columbia disaster, management was to blame. What were the management issues that caused this accident?
There were several management issues that caused the Columbia disaster. One of the key issues was communication. NASA’s management structure did not allow adequate communication with engineers and management. Even though some engineers voiced their concern about falling debris from the shuttle, they were “shut off”. Furthermore, a couple engineers came up with a plan to land the shuttle despite the falling debris but their plan never made it to management. Thus, management did not have a good way of communicating.
Another management decision that caused communication problem was the outsourcing of the shuttle’s safety overview program. This reduced the workforce and added stress to the remaining staff. As a result, safety was taken for granted and communication started to break down.
Furthermore, the culture at NASA condoned questionable compromises. Safety protocols were rewritten from proving conditions to be safe to proving conditions to be unsafe.
It seems management was making decisions to save time and money which resulted in increased risk and the eventual demise of the Columbia Shuttle. If management stressed safety, communication, and listened to feedback, this disaster could have been avoided.
Decision making is a key component of management – did NASA allow effective decision making – why?
NASA did not allow effective decision making. Even though NASA was under pressure to perform while having their funds cut, NASA did not heed to the lessons learned from the 1986 Challenger explosion. The breakdown of communications was the same issue that led to that explosion.
NASA should have never outsourced its safety program because it led to more communication issues. It seems the decision was made using a simplified model of reducing cost at the expense of safety. As a consequence, this cost NASA more in the long run.
Furthermore, engineers are the key to NASA’s success. By shutting down their engineers, NASA’s management stopped using their most valuable resource. Logically, this was a poor management decision. It seems the decision was bounded rationality. Management did not capture the entire complexity of the decision.
Organization culture and management structure change over time. This did not appear to happen at NASA.