Essay About Multi-Party Negotiation And Negotiators Dilemma

Paper5 Multiparty Negotiation
Paper5 Multiparty Negotiation
Pablo M. Linzoain 1
PREPARING FOR A MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATION
By Pablo M. Linzoain
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS
There is a substantial difference between negotiation involving two parties and those, which
involve more than two parties. Sebenius (1996) states that the most powerful advances in
negotiation theory have been mainly inspired by the two-party case. On the other hand, multiparty
negotiation is often seen as a question of coalition-formation (Rubin and Brown, 1975,
Zartman, 1988). The coalitional possibilities make the analysis of a complex negotiation more
difficult and interesting. Part of the game for each party is to build a relationship with the group
and to form alliances with some of the members within it. In these relationships they should be
able to improve their communication, trust, exchange of information and understanding each
others needs and wants.
According to Bazerman, Mannix and Thompson (1988), group negotiation is a process in
which three or more persons, with their interests, decide how to resolve their conflicting
preferences among issues. However, the knowledge, theory and practice of two-party negotiation
do not transfer to a group situation readily (Bazerman and Neale, 1992).
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO-PARTY AND MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATION
A classic example of two-party negotiation is the standard strategic model Prisoners Dilemma
Game, which has been called the negotiators dilemma by Lax and Sebenius (1986). Both
Pablo M. Linzoain 2
negotiators face a choice between contending (“claiming value”) and problem solving (“creating
value”). Hence, there are four possible outcomes, as shown in figure.
The negotiators dilemma characterises the whole of a negotiation. The line between
“creating” and “claiming” need not be clear-cut. Each negotiator has specific interest and s/he can
reveal information early, late, throughout, or not at all; s/he can mislead by omission or
commission, or be straight.
The tension the negotiators dilemma reflects between cooperative impulses to create
value and competitive impulses to claim it is the same regardless of the scale of the negotiation.
The essence of an effective negotiator is being able to manage this tension, creating while
claiming value (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). However, the dynamics of group negotiation are far
GOOD
GOOD
GREAT
TERRIIB LE
TERRIIB LE
GREAT
MEDIIOCRE
MEDIIOCRE
CREATE CLAIM
NEGOTIATOR 2
NEGOTIATOR 1
CREATE
CLAIM
Source: The negotiators dilemma, David Lax and James Sebenius (1986:39) “The Manager as Negotiator” The
Free Press, USA
Pablo M. Linzoain 3
more complex than those of the two-party negotiators dilemma. As has been seen, with two
parties there are four possible outcomes, two sets of interests and one interaction. With three
parties, the network grows; there are three sets of individual interests, three possible interactions
between any two players and one interaction of all three. In a five-party situation, there are five
sets of individual interests,