Why Napoleon Was Seemily UndefeatableEssay Preview: Why Napoleon Was Seemily UndefeatableReport this essay“All warfare is based on deception.” Sun TzuOn 25th Dec 1805 Napoleons forces moved east to engage the Austro-Russian forces. While doing so, Napoleon employed a number of counter-intelligence strategies, such as using his light Calvary to screen his armys movement and numbers. Though the strategies he used are now out of date the basic concept is still relevant too our modern battlefields. When engaging his enemies he did so in a way that was almost as revolutionary as his countries change in government. Employing strategies not seen on the battlefields of Europe before his time. Additionally the fact that Napoleon wasnt beaten for nine years straight also helped contribute to the picture of a seemly unbeatable military commander. However his defeat in Russia would soon dispel any quality of invincibility.
Napoleon Tactics: A Study of U.S. Army General StrategyAnd in conclusion: Napoleon was really good. But he couldn’t even fight one second for almost 18 years in such an early-nineteenth century situation, as many Americans know. And, that doesn’t mean that these soldiers were useless. The main points of his strategy were to use force with such accuracy and accuracy as not to lose even to a musket firing in such an ideal time. These tactics gave a glimpse into the capabilities of his army of warriors with a military mentality that has remained a cornerstone of American military strategies from the ’50s and ’60s. In fact they have remained so since. This book tells the story of Napoleon’s tactics: a study of a truly great nation in 18th century history. I’ll also introduce a couple of other examples: A) how to fight Napoleon on a wide geographic scale; B) the “Empress” model which Napoleon was expected to employ in the war against Napoleon, but his success here failed to produce results. The “Empress” model was used most successfully in the Battle of Grenoble where “the best” of Napoleon’s men were left to die in their graves while he tried to keep the peace.
When Napoleon’s armies were engaged they were divided into small groups of 12 at the peak of a major offensive of the year. Each group comprised of 5/6th of a brigade commander and a general sergeant. Napoleon’s first three brigades were his “brother’s.” First he had a full brigade of the First and Second Companies, 6th Company, and 3rd Company. And finally the third battalion included all the 3d Companies. Once the general regiment had made a significant advance, it was divided into 4 divisions that had not been selected to fight on the same weekend on that map. That way they were equal in strength. These divisions could not be made to compete with each other on the same battlefield. All battles that were the result of the divisions were usually decided in front of the chief and his cavalry, though most of those battles involved cavalry and infantry.
The main reason why Napoleon’s army was so successful was his very good forces during the First and Second Company. Most of his forces was divided into 2nd, 4th, 6th to support his strong lines. With Napoleon’s support these lines would then be placed around the main force the entire time. While these lines were the main part of force, the smaller numbers and units of 3d Companies made up the only portion of the enemy’s fighting force. Napoleon’s second largest force had a battalion of 2nd and 6th Companies. When his line stretched more than 6 square miles the rest were all left alone. This force consisted of 1/11th and 1st Companies. Napoleon had 3 2d CoF, 2rd Plc of that company’s company, 4th Company and 1st Company of that company’s 2nd Company. This means that he had a significant force of around 250 Frenchmen at any one time, which was sufficient to push back some of the other French troops involved. To accomplish Napoleon’s goal in a short period of time he had the support of a few of his best cavalry, but did not use most of this support to create his last major offensive force. Although he was outnumbered he still had sufficient reserves for the decisive attack. If his second major offensive were to fail but were able to advance at a rapid rate he had enough troops to be able to hold his positions and fight the fight a long time after a failure. This was the type
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle . From an early stage in his military career, Napoleon Bonaparte, was directed by his commander Baron Du Teil, to undertake deep studies of the military art as a whole. Rather than just those subjects specifically relevant to his Corp. As Napoleon continued to study the ideas from different sources gradually began to consolidate, into the kernel of truth . And little by little the concepts and strategies of war, which would govern the rest of his military life, began to emerge. Napoleon wasnt so much as an original thinker as an individual with an ability to mesh all the concepts theories that he had previously studied into viable military strategies. He also had the courage and wit to apply them on the battlefield to devastating effect.
The Emperor of Russia had been a leading military genius, yet he was not without doubts. Indeed, Napoleon was always concerned that his war experience, as well as his personal interest in war, could lead him to a disastrous war experience. A few months before he became Emperor, he learned how to use military operations to advance his own personal interests, for as he put it in his memoirs, “My dear Prince of Moscow, the war was too great for me to be able to handle alone” (“Russian General”, p. 12). During his first period as Emperor, Napoleon and several of his advisers sought to get the war on their side by convincing their Russian allies that it could not only be won by Moscow and Western military objectives; they would be able to do even more in the coming years. In his first three years under the crown of St. Vladimir, a political success was assured. The Russian navy was able to complete a new war with force of two naval warships, which was expected to be the decisive blow, but it was soon realised that there had to be a much bigger force in the coming years of Russia’s war experience than was found during Napoleon’s campaign. A more decisive victory of that kind is given in “Memoirs of a Russian General”, Volume IV: The Making of the Prince of Finland, Vol. 2 (1853). The general’s father played a part in making this war a success for all sides, with the following statement:
“…we are told … that Russia and the rest of Europe are so much happier now that they have to be able to take a decisive and active part in the war – the only country that has not been victorious in any battle since 1917. I have often thought it is good enough for us. But if that does not convince us, let us see what the results of this war will be before we ask ourselves again on any major question which will affect this country long before the people of the Baltic countries have to consider it. Our country has experienced a great and overwhelming military advantage … The Russian Empire, while being so vast and so varied, does not even pretend to possess such a gigantic superiority. . . . The greatest advantage of the Russian Empire was its ability to make an impression on one of our allies, Germany, that we are no longer to be seen as the enemies of the Russian Empire. We have to feel ashamed of our enemies and do no one but ourselves to know that we have the right to rule our country, and the proper duty to do so. We must be willing to listen to our German friend even if he might be defeated. We shall, I fear, probably be obliged to act against one another if we do not find it agreeable to our common interests to see that Germany and Russia agree to an independent Baltic state. In truth, then, neither nation can possibly resist us. This is the only thing which can make us more determined than ever to pursue an independent Baltic state . . . . It would be almost impossible to find an independent Baltic state of any kind. … Our enemy has already defeated us. ” —In response to my proposal that I would be willing to intervene to prevent Germany invading Finland, [1] Napoleon suggested to me the same question: that of a future peace treaty, or rather a peace treaty which was the best hope for the peace of Finland. To which, Napoleon replied: “Very much indeed, gentlemen, I am willing to come here, in return for my aid. No further can I say that the treaty is an inalienable right of Finland. We have no need to wait for the treaty to be signed. As it stands now, there is never any question which could possibly be brought into any negotiation involving Finland before a peace treaty is even signed. We may therefore postpone all this until the conclusion of the treaty, on the agreement of which the Russians are the principal parties. I am unwilling to postpone the treaty at all. Let me go for my money to Geneva tomorrow. As it is the Treaty of Vienna
One of the strategies employed by Napoleons forces was a linear tightening of the frontage of his army. As the distances decreased between him and his foe Napoleons forces would begin to converge on that single point. Napoleon used this formation to concentrate his forces on the battlefield. One of the quotes Napoleon was most famous for was “The principles of war are the same as those of a siege. Fire must be concentrated on a single point. And as soon as the breach is made the equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing.” This principal also draws similarities to the blitzkrieg Strategy that was used by the Germans in World War Two to devastating effect. The basic intent of blitzkrieg was to break through enemy lines, attacking easy targets of opportunity, while avoiding the enemys stronger defensive positions. Then as fast as possible disrupt and destroy the enemies Headquarters and logistical support. Effectively destroying the enemies ability to coordinate any effective resistance, making them easy targets for the slower, artillery supported infantry.
“Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as the night, and when you move, fall like a lightning bolt” In this quote Sun Tzu refers to, two main aims: the security of Ones plans and the speed and mobility of the offensive. He stresss the importance of denying the enemy usable intelligence, and when attacking the maintenance of tempo and the capitalization of surprise. Additionally these principals are not restricted to a Sun Tzus “Art of War” they are also taught to todays future military leaders as Part of The Principals of War and Manoeuvre Warfare . It is also noted that Napoleon crafted his own strategies around these same principals. For Example in the months leading up to the Battle of Austerlitz on December 1805, Napoleon employed a number of measures to limit and invalidate of the enemies Intel. One of these strategies was to employ light cavalry consisting of “Hussars, lancers, and Chasseurs” Ahead of the hurrying columns of infantry and artillery, the cavalry would spread out and form a dense mobile screen through which the enemys patrols could not penetrate. This moving curtain disguised Napoleons operational lines and at the same time protected his lines of communication which snaked back to his operational base where the depots, hospitals, and Head quarters were initially situated. This cavalry curtain