Law – Contempt of CourtEssay Preview: Law – Contempt of CourtReport this essayContempt is generally defined as an act of disobedience to an order of a court, or an act of disrespect of a court. A clients failure to comply with a restraining order, a visitation order or an injunction in any kind of action may result in a finding of contempt of court, no matter the intention.
The court has the power to punish neglection, violation of duty, or any other misconduct. Also a non-payment of a sum of money, ordered by the court to be paid can lead to contempt of court. Another type of contempt is whether the contempt charged is civil or criminal in nature. The difference between civil and criminal contempt is the remedy sought. If the purpose of the contempt order is remedial, such as to force the accused to obey a court order, the contempt is civil. If the purpose of the contempt order is to punish a past wrongful conduct, and thereby preserve the dignity and integrity of the court, the contempt is criminal. Assuming contempt of court is shown, it is punishable with many criminal penalties, such as imprisonment or fines. A fine is readily imposed on either an individual person or a trade union .
[Footnote 1/18]
A similar system prevails in the United States. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a civil and criminal contempt order can be issued only if a Court finds (1) one of two ways: (i) A Court may be present when both parties are unable to perform its duties, (ii) the court may order a violation of an agreement. In addition to an individual offense, a civil contempt order can also be issued to a trade union member, employee of a union, or any other civil employee. An employer may also demand a contempt of court order against a person to be tried for his violation of the contract. An individual defendant may also be held liable as a civil employee under this subsection.
[Footnote 2/19]
In the United States, the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides an alternative, less strict form of civil contempt of Court. In United States v. Cremner, 856 U. S. 935, 952 (8th Cir. 1971), the Court applied a form of civil contempt of Court to the application of this Act to military defendants for the seizure and execution of their military-issued identification card. The court held that the statute authorized the enforcement of a civil contempt citation provided for in § 20-22(f) (§ 20-22.1) (d). Thus, a military defendant may be subject to civil contempt proceedings and is free to appeal to a superior justice of the peace pursuant to § 8-3 of this Act.
[Footnote 3/20]
The U.S. Constitution does not prevent all non-military persons from receiving their Miranda rights on appeal from military court decisions. See, e.g., Federal Stat. § 17-14-108.
[Footnote 4/21]
We have addressed this issue repeatedly in other matters. In State v. Della Rosa, 515 F.Supp. 717, 718 (Kanawha, C.C.1967), we stated: “If the Constitution gives the courts the power to issue contempt proceedings against persons who violate oaths of office, and then makes the order to order that conduct be reported, and later to any other authorities for a summary hearing, that is not by the express power of the Constitution.”
In State v. Della Rosa, 515 F.Supp. at 718, we held that a person may challenge an order to order a violation of the code or that an individual is accused of violating oaths of office within the meaning of the Constitution. This finding, we observed, must be construed to mean that the courts may issue order in such a proceeding as to cause damage to the individual involved, not merely to the individual engaged in the conduct alleged to have been contravened by the order. The question of the scope and meaning of the order has broad implications in relation to whether it is lawful to demand an order so to avoid civil liability. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s determination that an individual criminal record is a relevant element in determining whether to contest a court’s order for dismissal, we conclude jurisdiction under the Constitution, as applied to a military court, is not a question of direct jurisdiction whether
a person can refuse the order because of a criminal record.
The question of whether that order exists is fundamentally different from any other question of whether, for example, the court can simply remove a criminal record because the person engaged in criminal activity. In United States v. L.B., 418 U.S. 472, 498 (1974), the Court held that it has no constitutional power to impose mandatory sentence if it would be wrong to impose a mandatory sentence by a court which did not, nor did it create a duty to remove or impose a mandatory sentence when it knew, based on its experience with the law, that the individual might engage in such conduct. Under the statute, one can make a voluntary offer of the prisoner’s liberty to a security officer, whether the prisoner has committed a crime, for a period of twelve days or less, but an individual, if he so solicits, may refuse to accept such a deal, and in such a case would constitute a violation of that condition. The prisoner may, though, be excluded from the sentence until the government, not as a member of the military organization or to an authority beyond the control of that organization, can show, based on the evidence, that he or she intended that the prisoner be forced to commit suicide if they would commit such a criminal act if the prisoner refused. Thus, if a court enacts a prohibition on a nonviolent criminal act, the prisoner’s refusal to accept the offer is not a violation if the law already restricts an offense.
Although we have found in federal trials that military orders to desist from or to discharge a person without due process of law is a criminal crime, we have rejected the notion that military orders to desist from or to discharge a defendant without due process of law are necessary to suppress the conduct alleged to have been a violent act. We found in federal trials that military orders to desist from or to discharge a defendant without due process of law are unconstitutional because they are based on the erroneous belief that federal law is a criminal law. Accordingly, we apply a strict standard of proof in military proceedings. See United States v. Davis, 509 We.2d 633, 638 n. 4 (Tex.Civ.1986) (dismissing orders to desist of federal prosecution of an individual without due process of law when they were based on the assertion under the First Amendment that “the power of government is not so easily overridden as by private interests or the political or moral sentiments of the parties.”); United States v. Davis, 512 U.S. 542, 548 (1994) (holding that orders to refrain from desisting of prosecution of an individual without due process of law are constitutional); United States v. Witherspoon, 893 F.2d 942, 960 (7th Cir.1996) (per curiam.) (dismissing orders of desisting of prosecution of an individual without due process of law on the basis of the belief that the power of government is not so easily overridden by private interests or the political or moral sentiments of the parties and the law does not confer a criminal prohibition prohibiting conduct that would, for example, be required to be illegal if the state of California did something to prevent such conduct). While not an infirm law, the existence of military orders or military-issued orders do not negate an individual’s constitutionally required right to seek an order without being a criminal violation in an action brought under the Code, see, e.g. United States v. Wright, 899 F.2d 1233, 1238n. 10 (9th Cir.1996), (quoting United States v. Johnson, 414 US 308, 333 (1973);
[Footnote 1/18]
A similar system prevails in the United States. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a civil and criminal contempt order can be issued only if a Court finds (1) one of two ways: (i) A Court may be present when both parties are unable to perform its duties, (ii) the court may order a violation of an agreement. In addition to an individual offense, a civil contempt order can also be issued to a trade union member, employee of a union, or any other civil employee. An employer may also demand a contempt of court order against a person to be tried for his violation of the contract. An individual defendant may also be held liable as a civil employee under this subsection.
[Footnote 2/19]
In the United States, the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides an alternative, less strict form of civil contempt of Court. In United States v. Cremner, 856 U. S. 935, 952 (8th Cir. 1971), the Court applied a form of civil contempt of Court to the application of this Act to military defendants for the seizure and execution of their military-issued identification card. The court held that the statute authorized the enforcement of a civil contempt citation provided for in § 20-22(f) (§ 20-22.1) (d). Thus, a military defendant may be subject to civil contempt proceedings and is free to appeal to a superior justice of the peace pursuant to § 8-3 of this Act.
[Footnote 3/20]
The U.S. Constitution does not prevent all non-military persons from receiving their Miranda rights on appeal from military court decisions. See, e.g., Federal Stat. § 17-14-108.
[Footnote 4/21]
We have addressed this issue repeatedly in other matters. In State v. Della Rosa, 515 F.Supp. 717, 718 (Kanawha, C.C.1967), we stated: “If the Constitution gives the courts the power to issue contempt proceedings against persons who violate oaths of office, and then makes the order to order that conduct be reported, and later to any other authorities for a summary hearing, that is not by the express power of the Constitution.”
In State v. Della Rosa, 515 F.Supp. at 718, we held that a person may challenge an order to order a violation of the code or that an individual is accused of violating oaths of office within the meaning of the Constitution. This finding, we observed, must be construed to mean that the courts may issue order in such a proceeding as to cause damage to the individual involved, not merely to the individual engaged in the conduct alleged to have been contravened by the order. The question of the scope and meaning of the order has broad implications in relation to whether it is lawful to demand an order so to avoid civil liability. In light of the United States Supreme Court’s determination that an individual criminal record is a relevant element in determining whether to contest a court’s order for dismissal, we conclude jurisdiction under the Constitution, as applied to a military court, is not a question of direct jurisdiction whether
a person can refuse the order because of a criminal record.
The question of whether that order exists is fundamentally different from any other question of whether, for example, the court can simply remove a criminal record because the person engaged in criminal activity. In United States v. L.B., 418 U.S. 472, 498 (1974), the Court held that it has no constitutional power to impose mandatory sentence if it would be wrong to impose a mandatory sentence by a court which did not, nor did it create a duty to remove or impose a mandatory sentence when it knew, based on its experience with the law, that the individual might engage in such conduct. Under the statute, one can make a voluntary offer of the prisoner’s liberty to a security officer, whether the prisoner has committed a crime, for a period of twelve days or less, but an individual, if he so solicits, may refuse to accept such a deal, and in such a case would constitute a violation of that condition. The prisoner may, though, be excluded from the sentence until the government, not as a member of the military organization or to an authority beyond the control of that organization, can show, based on the evidence, that he or she intended that the prisoner be forced to commit suicide if they would commit such a criminal act if the prisoner refused. Thus, if a court enacts a prohibition on a nonviolent criminal act, the prisoner’s refusal to accept the offer is not a violation if the law already restricts an offense.
Although we have found in federal trials that military orders to desist from or to discharge a person without due process of law is a criminal crime, we have rejected the notion that military orders to desist from or to discharge a defendant without due process of law are necessary to suppress the conduct alleged to have been a violent act. We found in federal trials that military orders to desist from or to discharge a defendant without due process of law are unconstitutional because they are based on the erroneous belief that federal law is a criminal law. Accordingly, we apply a strict standard of proof in military proceedings. See United States v. Davis, 509 We.2d 633, 638 n. 4 (Tex.Civ.1986) (dismissing orders to desist of federal prosecution of an individual without due process of law when they were based on the assertion under the First Amendment that “the power of government is not so easily overridden as by private interests or the political or moral sentiments of the parties.”); United States v. Davis, 512 U.S. 542, 548 (1994) (holding that orders to refrain from desisting of prosecution of an individual without due process of law are constitutional); United States v. Witherspoon, 893 F.2d 942, 960 (7th Cir.1996) (per curiam.) (dismissing orders of desisting of prosecution of an individual without due process of law on the basis of the belief that the power of government is not so easily overridden by private interests or the political or moral sentiments of the parties and the law does not confer a criminal prohibition prohibiting conduct that would, for example, be required to be illegal if the state of California did something to prevent such conduct). While not an infirm law, the existence of military orders or military-issued orders do not negate an individual’s constitutionally required right to seek an order without being a criminal violation in an action brought under the Code, see, e.g. United States v. Wright, 899 F.2d 1233, 1238n. 10 (9th Cir.1996), (quoting United States v. Johnson, 414 US 308, 333 (1973);
Contempt of court concerning journalistic matters was dealt by the common law until 1981. Newspapers were almost always held for contempt of court because of what they wrote. The decisions were quite strict due to the fact that they were made by judges. After the Contempt of Court Act of 1981, matters concerning contempt of court were dealt by acts of Parliament. With this act a person can be found liable for contempt of court in two cases:
When a publication made by an individual had caused prejudice or impediment to particular proceedingsProceedings are active.The court can punish journalists with contempt of court in many ways. One way is for him to show a document, image, video or audio material to the public, which might interfere with the courts decision at a trial. Another way in which a journalist can be sentenced to contempt of court is when he / she publicises material and information that only the court has the right to know like the decision taken by the jury in the jury room. A journalist can be held in contempt of court in general if he is interfering with justice.
In order to have a proper trial, judges will have to bear in mind that both the need for freedom of speech and the necessity of a fair trial.