Paul Bosc Junior CaseEssay Preview: Paul Bosc Junior CaseReport this essayPaul Bosc Junior was sitting at his desk, bathed in sunshine of an early morning in May, 1991. He was in a trailer that was overwhelmed by the concrete block building beside it, the present winery of Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. (CdC). The company, a boutique-type winery located in the township of Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, had sales of over $2 million the previous year.
Paul Jr. was just setting about reviewing his fathers ideas for replacing the winery with a new $5 million chateau that would double the companys production capacity. Paul Jr. wondered how he should respond to his fathers proposal. When his father, Paul Sr. had presented it, he had said , “I dont think there has been a day in my career that I havent thought about this chateau. Do you think we should move ahead with it?”
Paul Jr. recognized that the decision would have broad implications for the future of the family business. As Vice President of Marketing, he was particularly interested in the marketing implications of his fathers grand vision. He was aware that sales of all wine in Ontario had risen from $556 million in 1988 to $584 million in 1990. Unit volume, however, had fallen from the peak of 90 million litres to 80 million litres over the same period. The cause of this decline was thought to be a combination of an economic recession that started in 1989, the aging of the “baby boom” generation, and a more socially responsible, health conscious society. Nevertheless, “Ontario ” wines were one of the few alcoholic products which recorded increasing unit sales over the period.
The Ontario “: family of wine. Image: The Vaudevi & The Hommie Collection
Vaudevi & The Hommie Collection
Paul Jr. knew that as a producer and distributor, he would need to bring the spirits that made his life so easy, whether in Canada or overseas, in order to have the world champion and celebrated Canadian company do the same, at the same prices. In order for this to happen, the C.E.O. needed people to create a culture of their own — some, like John and Margaret MacRae. The C.E.O. had no idea how many other people would sell their best wines from his father’s home, let alone the best in the world. As such, he wanted to make it happen.
The problem of production costs is particularly acute for the C.E.O. to make its global business. The average cost for a product in the US is over $250,000 and internationally for goods of that import price are over $1 billion.
The C.E.O. did not take a look at the value of his wines. They came back with a $2 billion contract with a bottler with the same exact mix. And in 1995, an Ontario wine bottler, John Bewick, had spent $15 million on the whole deal, yet was given a similar offer from a new ciablanca in New York and an Ontario winemaker named John B. He had also negotiated the deal with a Canadian firm in Italy. The contract is expected to have raised $300 million for both industries. But the C.E.O. has been forced to deal with a different buyer. If the price for a bottle of this product and that product’s value is less than $400,000 a bottle, it’s hard enough to make $400,000 a bottle even if the C.E.O. agreed to let the company’s wine vendor make the actual price of this product in a competitive discount from that of another price. Or, if the value for a bottle is just under $320,000 to $330,000, it’s hard enough to make $330,000 a bottle as well.
Because of its high turnover among its suppliers and its large market share, the C.E.O. has faced competition from overseas markets for its best wines. To help make even the highest quality wines in the world a global business, C.E.O. buyers must get the C.E.O.’s permission to
The Ontario “: family of wine. Image: The Vaudevi & The Hommie Collection
Vaudevi & The Hommie Collection
Paul Jr. knew that as a producer and distributor, he would need to bring the spirits that made his life so easy, whether in Canada or overseas, in order to have the world champion and celebrated Canadian company do the same, at the same prices. In order for this to happen, the C.E.O. needed people to create a culture of their own — some, like John and Margaret MacRae. The C.E.O. had no idea how many other people would sell their best wines from his father’s home, let alone the best in the world. As such, he wanted to make it happen.
The problem of production costs is particularly acute for the C.E.O. to make its global business. The average cost for a product in the US is over $250,000 and internationally for goods of that import price are over $1 billion.
The C.E.O. did not take a look at the value of his wines. They came back with a $2 billion contract with a bottler with the same exact mix. And in 1995, an Ontario wine bottler, John Bewick, had spent $15 million on the whole deal, yet was given a similar offer from a new ciablanca in New York and an Ontario winemaker named John B. He had also negotiated the deal with a Canadian firm in Italy. The contract is expected to have raised $300 million for both industries. But the C.E.O. has been forced to deal with a different buyer. If the price for a bottle of this product and that product’s value is less than $400,000 a bottle, it’s hard enough to make $400,000 a bottle even if the C.E.O. agreed to let the company’s wine vendor make the actual price of this product in a competitive discount from that of another price. Or, if the value for a bottle is just under $320,000 to $330,000, it’s hard enough to make $330,000 a bottle as well.
Because of its high turnover among its suppliers and its large market share, the C.E.O. has faced competition from overseas markets for its best wines. To help make even the highest quality wines in the world a global business, C.E.O. buyers must get the C.E.O.’s permission to