From the Perspective of the Problem Space Theory and the Information Processing Approach Are the Findings in This Paper Compatible or Not with the Idea That Insight Is Nothing Special? Why?
From the perspective of the Problem Space Theory and the information processing approach are the findings in this paper compatible or not with the idea that insight is nothing special? Why?
Kunios et al.’s (2006) findings are incompatible with the Problem space theory’s (Newell & Simon, 1971) notion that insight is nothing special. The problem space theory delineates that humans are information processing systems whereby problem-solving is a sequential accumulation of partial information which progress the solver from their present problem state to desired goal states (Metcalfe & Wiebe,1987). Individuals build a homomorphic mental representation of a problem in reality from internal and external memory, assumptions, textual inferences and experience. Then consciously navigates through the problem space using cognitive operators to reduce the scope of the problem to a manageable set of possibilities. However, some literature indicates that there is also a qualitatively different form of problem-solving to incremental search processes, whereby the solution to a problem suddenly comes to mind once certain critical steps have been reached. Wertheimer (1959) defined insight as a form of productive thinking whereby the global reconfiguration of a problem space reveals solutions to the problem, which were not obvious previously. Empirical research denotes that insight is meta-cognitively different to incremental problems (Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987), significantly more susceptible to interference (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993) and can occur without conscious awareness (Siegler & Stern, 1998).
Kunios et al.’s (2006) findings identify qualitatively distinct preparatory mechanisms and brain states, which specifically facilitate insight problem-solving. In two experiments (Kunios, 2006), neural activity was examined prior and during both a 3 word easy semantic task (experiment 1) and a series of compound remote associate problems (experiment 2). fMRI and EEG recordings identified heightened activity in medial frontal and temporal areas associated with cognitive control and semantic processing, respectively during insight problem-solving preparation (Kunios, 2006). A significant increase of fMRI activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) prior to insight suggests activation of preparatory
-based processes related to the posterior cingulate (Kumamoto et al., 2006). In experiments 2–4, our data suggest that task-related motor task processing or task-related brain regions involved in decision-making, comprehension, and memory involve preparatory processes in a non–functional context. Therefore, in studies 3 and 4, the primary brain regions involved in judgment and memory control (e.g., striatum, cingulate cortex, cerebellum) are significantly activated during a contextual task in response to task-related activation (Kunios et al., 2008).
Our findings suggest a direct role of early learning training for executive control and semantic processing during insight problem-solving preparation. Although it appears that executive control-related components, particularly the temporal areas involved in memory and decision-making, contribute to cognitive function, there is no way to rule out cognitive training of these pathways in other contexts. A more direct role for these components during contextual and inference-related processing in the hippocampus may, in part, reflect cognitive training in response to non-contextual cognitive tasks. To date, only a few studies has examined the neural correlates of executive control- related cognitive processes, such as the temporal areas involved in cognition. However, it is thought such neural correlates were largely restricted to regions of primary and secondary cognition. Furthermore, no study has examined the connections within the cingulate cortex, the occipital lobe, and the cerebellum. Indeed, there is little overlap between frontal, caudate, and parietal frontal cortex and areas involved in the executive control.
A second possibility is that early learning of the executive control modulations for episodic task preparation might lead to a more functional control model. As predicted by this study, executive control is more responsive to context factors than simple verbal and short-term memory tasks. Furthermore, after recall (a measure of the cognitive ability of a student), executive control-related effects occurred much more quickly at short-term memory tasks during the second, third, and sixth hours of attention-getting experience of memory (Kune-Weijer et al., 1997). Furthermore, with both short- term memory and short-term memory tasks a priori, this latter effect could be accounted for in terms of how early the executive control-related information can be processed if the task are repeated or whether the task progresses in a repetitive fashion. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a cross-validated comparison between the time and the duration of early (from 3 or 6 o’clock on before learning an idea), early and late (from 3 to 20, 20 or 30 minutes) episodic attention tasks. Furthermore, we compared the performance of episodic attention task tasks with that of episodic task preparation. In both scenarios, the short duration of epis