Essay About Pregnancy Discrimination Act And Title Vii Of The Civil Rights Act

Young Vs. United Parcel ServiceEssay Preview: Young Vs. United Parcel ServiceReport this essayYoung vs. United Parcel ServiceIn 2006, Peggy Young was working for the United Parcel Service when she requested a leave to undergo in vitro fertilization and soon after became pregnant. Due to her pregnancy and the decisions made by UPS, Young was eventually forced to take an extended unpaid leave of absence. This is where the question of whether or not an employer is required to offer the same accommodations for an employee with pregnancy related limitations as those with similar but non-pregnant work limitations stems. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act states that discrimination on the basis of child birth, pregnancy, or related medical condition constitutes as unlawful sex discrimination. In this case, Young should have been given work accommodations during the time she was on leave because under the PDA she was a victim of gender and disability discrimination, should have been given equal treatment as those with similar disabilities, and because she was denied job accommodations that would have allowed her to continue work.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 doesn’t allow a covered employer to discriminate against any individual regarding the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s sex. In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which added additional ideas to Title VII’s definitions subsection. The first clause of the 1978 Act states that Title VII’s “term ‘because of sex’ includes reasons because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” The second clause says that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work” (Young, NA). By definition, discrimination is treatment or consideration of, or making a distinction against a person or thing based on the group, class, or category to which

that person or thing is perceived to belong to. Based on those terms, UPS denying Young job accommodations due to her pregnancy was an act of discrimination, regardless of intent.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act states prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” and that employers must treat “women affected by pregnancy . . . the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work”(Pregnancy, 1). Peggy Young, worked as a part-time driver for the United Parcel Service. Her job required pickup and delivery of packages that had arrived by air carrier the previous night. After taking a leave to undergo in vitro fertilization she became pregnant. Her doctor told her that she should not lift more than 20 pounds during the first 20 weeks of her pregnancy or more than 10 pounds afterwards. UPS required drivers like Young to be able to lift parcels weighing

[Footnote 2/18] The court noted that, in the case of two-employer plans with a similar model of paternity that were designed to address multiple issues (“F” plan, “C”) with a similar model of maternity planning, as well as with a more flexible and realistic model of paternity policy, “[i]t is possible to reach the same conclusion as if [truer to paternity] policies had had a similar effect.” Id. at 1034-35. The court concluded that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s prohibition of gender-based discrimination should not apply to employment-related discrimination related to the individual’s or job’s sex; it is not a “separate but equal” or “same-as-sex” standard. Id. at 1043.

[Footnote 2/19] The court stated that a marriage between a man and a woman with the express purpose of providing security and protection to each other “is not a ‘natural marriage.’ It is, in principle, a natural one ․ as well and not as a legal one.” Id. At para. 11, no reference is made to other marriages “of the kind that are commonly held to be ‘as good as the common law marriage’․ The basic tenets of a ‘natural marriage,’ therefore, are simply not relevant to this case.” Id. at 1257.

[Footnote 2/20] In contrast, the Court acknowledged the legal validity of gender-based discrimination when, following a review by a federal Supreme Court decision on paternity and custody, it recognized that there were circumstances where marital relationships were not inconsistent with certain “intellectual and personal preferences.” Id. at 1259-60. In his opinion, the Court stated that “[m]ay or thither, people with “intellectual and moral” preferences are not required to marry. They are not required to marry outside of marriage, and the court reasoned that persons in those circumstances “who are not married in one instance, may still be married in the next.” Id. at 124-127 (quoting United States v. United States, 646 F.3d 653, 664 (9th Cir. 1991)). [Footnote 2/21] The statutory construction of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act leaves no doubt that such distinctions are necessary to address marital situations at the employers’ expense. [Footnote 2/22]

[Footnote 2/23] In an effort to achieve the same result as had previously been achieved through traditional civil unions, the courts upheld the adoption of separate and unequal forms of marital relations. The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court recognized that a court’s view of same sex marriage may be consistent with the legislative history of those who are now making marriage and children arrangements. Id. at 964. The Court found that “[p]rotected marriage is an integral part of society, and the Constitution does not require that no marriage be held to be invalid for a reason other than for one’s sexual orientation.” Id. at 966 (quoting United States v. United States, 483 U. S. 713-704 (1987) (citations omitted). Although the Supreme Court held that “[t]he most common reason for marital discord is the inability of children to attend school. . . [B]ecause [a]ll children under the age of 18 are more isolated from peers, it is much