Iran Contra Affair Final
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Iran-Contra Affair: THANK the MERCIFUL beatnikk //yl0 G. long live my country, our pasttime, and the peace nuetrality brings our world
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When the Reagan administration first took office early in 1981, many of its key members wanted to make a move as soon as possible in response to the growing realm of Soviet power in the world. One area that the U.S. felt a lot of pressure from was Latin America. Even before the advent of communism, US influence in Latin America was always a touchy subject. As early as Teddy Roosevelt’s term as president, the US began a course of foreign policy that protected US investments in Latin America. While being decidedly pro-imperialistic in the dealings with these small neighbors, Roosevelt created a “dollar diplomacy” relationship and resorted to a devious policy of “preventive intervention” in dealings with Latin America.
Not surprisingly, there were not many American supporters in those countries, except, of course, for the American companies exploiting the native populations to maximize profits. But not until the late seventies, with the threat of communist expansion into Central America, did the US again focus their attention on Latin American foreign policy affairs.
From the beginning, the Reagan administration displayed concern about Nicaragua becoming another Cuba. Nicaragua showed signs of becoming an armed camp from which trained guerillas would be sent into the neighboring countries to start revolutionary movements, and the US began to think that their only choice was military intervention.
But support for military intervention was not very popular in the US among the public and legislature. The first Boland Amendment of 1982 capped the US monetary support for the contra rebels, and in successive years, amendments to the Boland Amendment dropped that number dangerously low. Congress remembered the lessons of the Vietnam War, and wanted to avoid the slow, steady build up to all-out war.
Also, many of Reagan’s most trusted advisors were leftovers from the Nixon era. They had watched Vietnam fall shortly after the U.S. withdraw, followed closely by Laos and Cambodia, and the situation in Nicaragua seemed eerily familiar. Cringing at the memory of leaving millions of South Vietnamese American supporters to suffer a dismal fate at the hands of the NVA and People’s Republic of Vietnam, the Reagan Administration was careful not to get so involved in the situation that they could not wash their hands of it if necessary. Therefore, the US’s plan for challenging communism in Latin America changed.
Now, the plan was not a large scale intervention to depose the