U.S. Global War on TerrorismEssay Preview: U.S. Global War on TerrorismReport this essayU.S. Global War on TerrorismCounterterrorismAl Qaedas actions on September 11, 2001, demonstrated the use of a new form of warfare, requiring relatively modest resources and aimed at achieving maximum disruption of the morale and the economic core of Western society. Security in this new age will not be achieved by a policy that seeks to safeguard an almost infinite number of individual targets at all times. Instead, we must protect these foundations by developing public and, equally important, private-sector measures that deny the terrorists the leverage they seek in disrupting our societies.
Lets began by talking about risk management and security. Virtually every current method of risk management begins with the assumption that individual assets (e.g., buildings, aircraft, people) are the proper focus for investments in security. Even where the characteristics of an asset (or of its environment) are dynamic-for example, a presidential motorcade-risk management focuses on the methods for protecting against threats such as theft or destruction. Indeed, both our legal system and insurance (and reinsurance) industries-the institutional foundations of risk management in Western society-base their policies and procedures on calculations of the risk-adjusted value of specific identified assets. In the face of the potential for ongoing terrorist attacks from al Qaeda (and potentially others), the objective of risk management must now be shifted to a focus on protection from the leverage that attacks on assets can achieve with respect to the continued functioning of our society. Assets of any type may be the specific targets-they are the concrete focus of terrorist actions that provide the leverage needed to cause “unconstrained disruption”-but it is the ability of Western society to continue to rely on the vitality and utility of these functions and systems that is really in al Qaedas sights.
Al Qaedas actions on September 11 were certainly horrific, but they were not catastrophic. The destruction of what risk managers would regard as the targeted assets-the four airplanes, the passengers and crew, the three major buildings, the occupants of the buildings, and so on-was the source of the horror. But even the number of deaths (exceeding the strike on Pearl Harbor), the destruction of the World Trade Center and airplanes, and the damage to the Pentagon were not catastrophic for the nation or for the West. And as difficult as it is for us to comprehend, the death and destruction were, in fact, incidental to the terrorists goals. Al Qaedas objective was simply to use the attacks on those assets as the means to gain the leverage needed to disrupt and destabilize the governments, economies, and social structure of the West. Aside from al Qaedas interest in retribution through death and destruction, the assets employed and destroyed were merely the means to pursue the broader goal of neutralizing the West. Osama bin Laden has been extraordinarily clear about the goals of al Qaeda: restructuring-and purifying-Islam and creating a modern version of a caliphate. To achieve this goal, al Qaedas leadership recognizes that the West must be neutralized in the role it plays in the world-and the Middle East in particular. Or, in bin Ladens words (from his 1998 fatwah):
“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies– civilians and military– is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.”
Seen through this new lens, the actions on September 11 were only marginal tactical successes. As was the case after the failure of the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, however, al Qaeda has not changed its ultimate goals. The leadership and member cells of al Qaeda may bide their time before initiating new major attacks, but they certainly have not been eliminated as a threat. We must therefore begin to work on protecting the West and our global partners from the potential threat to the “commons”-to societys commonly held assets-by redirecting the focus of risk management so that it can, in fact, offer standards and guidelines in the face of the this new form of terrorism. Rather than focusing on the management of risks to specific assets, we must now ask “How can we restructure risk management (and counterterrorism and homeland security) procedures, standards, and methods to account for leverage protection? How can the methods of risk management be extended to supply estimates of the relative value of security investments aimed at mitigating the effects of the leverage provided by attacks on assets?” Put another way, the assets that are the focus of virtually all current risk management methods are, in effect, simply a means to an end with respect to terrorism. The real targets of the type of terrorism that we face today are the derivative values of these assets: the systems of production and government, the means of economic exchange, and the vitality of and confidence in our social organizations and institutions.
Although often forgotten in the face of its message about the disastrous condition of the worlds rivers and air, Garrett Hardins now classic call-to-arms for the environmental movement, The Tragedy of the Commons, opens with a quotation from Wiesner and York on the dilemma of national security in the nuclear age:
“Both sides in the arms race are confronted by the dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security. It is our considered professional judgment that this dilemma has no technical solution. If the great powers continue to look for solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be to worsen the situation. (Wiesner and York [1] in Hardin [2])”. Both Hardins analogy and his conclusions about the need for a better means for making choices where there are common critical interests have been given new life by changes in international terrorism. Hardins “commons,” a shared town pasture used by all farmers to graze their livestock, but owned and cared for by no one, finds its analogue in our shared infrastructure and the core critical functions necessary to the operation of Western society. In most cases, such
-instructures and services take place in small, local, informal groups. For instance, small groups gather and operate around a specific area and, with the aid of social services and local government, provide aid to a central or provincial government, or support local schools to provide a better educational atmosphere to all students. Many such small groups then go on to grow and develop into large or independent community groups which engage in community activities. We know from their activities that these small groups often share values, ideals and goals but are always subject to constant questioning, criticism and interference by larger, regional, national and religious groups, and in some cases by governments or special interest groups. Yet if these small groups do so with great care and efficiency and with a clear understanding of current and future problems and the potential for change, they can thrive. On the other hand, if, as in most societies, the local populations are well fed and the people of the region are well educated than a situation in which more and more communities become a common space to engage with one another will not be. When this happens, this often leads to the development of regional or local tensions which can cause the local, regional or local leadership to be unable to bring change into the global order. As Hardins notes, while there are generalised tensions, these tensions are primarily felt by the local leaders in their respective communities, and also by the government. For example, the main problem in most European countries (among them, France)? the conflict of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the emergence of ‘Arab Spring’ in the Middle East, were the result of the Arab Spring’s own ‘protestant’ movement within the region at large. The ‘Arab Spring’ is an uprising against the ‘Arab Spring’ as a term is used here in the West, from the popular opposition of the ruling classes in Turkey and France to the ‘Arab Spring’ in Egypt as well as the ‘Arab Spring’ in Iran. In contrast, in Western Europe, a common political process whereby all parties have a voice and are represented on the EU. This common process involves many actors involved in developing mutual respect and agreement and in establishing common rules of conduct. “As we have had to acknowledge, but in short, the Arab Spring is an act of armed conflict. As it happened it is not because of any individual’s actions alone, but rather because of the political process within that process. But the real answer lies not in a single, singular incident, but rather in the collective, collective, collective reaction that took place across the entire Arab world.” (Hardin, Hardin, Hardin et al. [3]). In these cases, it is precisely this collective process which has provided the impetus of the ongoing political process in Egypt, which is rapidly turning into a sectarian violence. On this note, it is also for this reason that the situation in Egypt shows its lack of political leadership and is extremely difficult to predict. For the moment, it is too early to say that that which is happening around Egypt has anything to do with the Arab Spring or with any single incident. A similar pattern emerges in China where Mao Zedong (Mao Xue) was in some sense the ‘pragmatic leader’. He held the leadership from 1965 to 1980 in China and was responsible for sweeping over half the ‘popular front groups’ across China into the countryside, and was responsible for building large-scale military bases around the country and building a political ‘social