Implications of TripsIMPLICATIONS OF TRIPSThe core purpose of Intellectual Property Laws is to protect the property rights of those who innovate and create work, from being imitated. It affirms exclusive rights over one’s creative production for a stated period of time. Its three mechanisms are Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks (World Trade Organization, 2013). The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, abbreviated as TRIPS, is a highly multifaceted international agreement for property rights, whose agreement was negotiated by WTO “in the 1986-94 Uruguay Round” (United Nations University, 2013). It encompasses a majority of intellectual property types, “including patents, copyright, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, trade secrets, and exclusionary rights” (Patent Lens, n.d). It goes beyond most pre-existent IPR rules, and requires minimum protection standards with the provision of some discretion to member countries.
Considering the purpose of a global acceptance of such a protective right, it can be judged that it brings multiple benefits to individuals and economies. Ethically, it rewards and assists the honest effort of innovators and their investments. Additionally, it averts free-riding. From a social and economic standpoint, IPRs also promote creativity and innovation, like a non-monetary subsidization or incentive.
Due to the implementation of TRIPS, various positive implications are seen. It causes a unifying system of conflict-resolution procedures between the WTO’s member countries. This means that the minimal property protection requirements lay out by WTO now have to be accepted by all member countries, including those anticipating membership. This encompasses China and Russia, as “China has upgraded its intellectual property laws to be virtually consistent with TRIPS” (Maskus 2000). This causes social or economic harmonization between countries, thanks to a set of rules which bind all member countries to relatively standardized property rights and protection requirements.
Numerous ethical and social implications caused by TRIPS, however, cannot go unobserved. Considering the agricultural industry, TRIPS requires provision of patents for new product or plant variations, or the provision of protection that’s less restrictive. “The privatization of rights to the outcomes of agricultural research is among the most controversial areas of IPRs” (Maskus, 2000). Agricultural farmers in poor countries would be affected competitively, as they’d struggle to afford new, innovative agricultural inputs that are costly under IPR protection. This forces them to resort to the usage of older technological inputs, making them less efficient and productive, and ultimately less competitive in the industry. Hence, the social implication arises due to an unfair income gap between producers, and competitive advantage held
The authors of the paper take a position in an unprofessional way. In my opinion, research that contributes to this unfairness is not supported. The research has been conducted in an institution that does not participate in a TRIPS initiative. I would therefore prefer to focus on a few aspects more widely known on the issue and their social implications.
The research was carried out by the Institute of Economics at MIT. In 2010, a large group of students were invited to an American industrial university (AUI). The participants were presented with a proposal by a professor about how to raise a seed-price policy through the IPR. The professor agreed with this proposal, as well as others that would be developed at this university in the future. However, the paper has a critical need in that it is based on a very difficult and contradictory case study on the impact of IPR on U.S. workers. Furthermore, the experiment was an in-person session, not at MIT, which is often used to discuss subjects under-studied. Although there is no formal support for a possible economic impact of the government’s seed prices, the researchers argue that the proposal must be implemented.
Why would a business that is involved in large seed producers have to use the IPR mechanism when there is almost no evidence that the seed is growing quickly? Many studies have shown that it is possible for U.S. firms to use the seed in production. This is one of the great weaknesses with IPRs.[3][4]
To some degree, such institutions can offer up a more efficient method of using seed, with increasing benefits for their researchers, and with potential social benefits in producing more seeds.[5]
The researchers did not make any predictions about the number of seeds that would be planted in the future. They used a simple test of the impact of seed prices on farmers in the United States, using the following question: Will farmers be more able to harvest higher yield seed if these prices remained under IPR?
As I reported previously, there are a large number of farmers that can harvest in small quantities. Therefore, small quantities and yield fluctuations are very important in this debate. I would like to draw attention to the fact that seed prices have a negative impact on farmers, as they are often lower in the U.S. market. As such, we need to consider alternatives to the proposed trade-offs to increase yields and help reduce the costs to produce seed at lower prices, which the authors propose to be implemented in the future.
Why does this research not contribute to the discussion of possible policy solutions or a better solution? While the seed price has always been discussed as a key cause of price distortions in U.S. agricultural production because of its inherent low cost to harvest, the cost has never been an intrinsic factor in crop productivity[6] and in the cost as a result of the loss of productivity to agriculture. That has been demonstrated in several recent studies from the private sector:
In the US, it has been argued that seed prices play an important role in improving crop yields and thereby decrease crop output. I believe this assertion is incorrect since yields cannot be improved, at least as a process.
In a study of more than 700,000 agricultural workers in Colorado in early 2013, one might ask how much seeds would cost to have growers grow